Malcolm Chalmers

Is There a Tank Gap?: Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets

There is still widespread publicity given in the West to the claim that the Soviet Union and its allies have conventional forces that are substantially more powerful than those of In recent years, however, the certainty with which this view has been held has eroded considerably, particularly in the academic debate. Although the methodologies used vary, a growing number of commentators now argue that there is rough overall parity in conventional forces. Several others argue that, at most, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO or Warsaw Pact) has a margin of advantage insufficient to give it a high probability of victory were it to launch an offensive against Western E ~ r o p e . ~

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate—widening or fragmenting?

The Atlantic burden-sharing debate during the early part of the twenty-first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO’s first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non-military international public goods–financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate-damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war. This widening of the burden-sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.

Kingdom's End?

Should the Scots vote Yes in the announced referendum on independence, what would the consequences be for the two successor states? Malcolm Chalmers explores the potential implications of an independent Scotland for the security and defence of the British Isles.

SPENDING TO SAVE? THE COST‐EFFECTIVENESS OF CONFLICT PREVENTION

While the general argument that it is easier and more cost‐effective to prevent conflicts before the outbreak of violence has considerable attraction, a rigorous approach to estimating the cost and benefits of this policy is still lacking. The objective of this study is to contribute to the development of such an approach. The project involves six case studies, three retrospective (the Western Balkans, Afghanistan, and Rwanda) and three prospective (Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and southern Sudan). Its main conclusion is that targeted programmes of conflict prevention are (or would have been) significantly cheaper than cure.

Will Scotland Sink the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent?

For over sixty years, the possession of nuclear weapons and practice of nuclear deterrence have been important to the United Kingdom’s defense policy, self-image, and international standing. It was a partner in the Manhattan Project and had acquired its own weapons by the mid-1950s, its program thereafter assisted by cooperation agreements with the United States. Its nuclear capability has long been assigned to the NATO alliance, and it is one of the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet, remarkably, continuing the United Kingdom’s position as a nuclear weapon state could now rest in the hands of Scottish voters in September 2014. Nuclear decision-making has always rested on the assumption that the United Kingdom would remain united, with power and authority centered in London. That assumption underpinned the UK government’s decision, endorsed by the Westminster Parliament in March 2007, to replace the aging submarines that carry its only nuclear weapon system, Trident. The decision took for granted that the UK Trident system would continue to use its bases in Scotland for several more decades. However, the government did not anticipate the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) sweeping victory in the 2011 elections in Scotland just twelve years after authority over many elements of Scottish domestic policy had been devolved to a re-established Scottish Parliament at Holyrood in Edinburgh. (The Scottish Parliament had last convened in 1707 to approve the Act of Union, which gave the Westminster Parliament sole legislative authority over the combined

A Force for Influence? Making British Defence Effective

DOI: 10.1080/03071840802670015 For several decades, UK defence planning has been primarily contributory, concerned with how the armed forces should contribute to collective responses to shared threats, organised either bilaterally with the US or multilaterally through NATO. This contributory defence policy in turn fits within an overall grand strategy that is itself heavily collectivist in nature. Across a wide range of issue areas, the government emphasises the importance of international co-operation as the primary means through which to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. National purposes retain an important residual role in UK defence policy. But the working assumption is that these alliances – and in particular the close defence relationship with the US – are deeply embedded in the domestic politics and cultures of the states involved. As a result, both the UK’s security policy, and most of the military operations in which it has taken part over the last decade, can only be understood in the context of the interplay between national purposes and collective military efforts. This alliance-focused approach to defence has its origins in structures of imperial defence, as well as in the central role that coalition warfare played in both of the last century’s world wars. Most of all, it is rooted in the closeness of its security ties with the US, forged in the Second World War and continuing through the Cold War. This ‘special relationship’ proved bittersweet for some, associated as it was with the end of empire and the drawing down of Britain’s role as an independent great power. But it also helped soften this transition, preserving key elements of that role (such as the permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its possession of nuclear weapons), as well as helping to secure US commitment to European (and therefore to British) territorial defence.

The United Kingdom, nuclear weapons, and the Scottish question

Among the states that possess nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom is now regarded as one of the least problematic. Long established and recognized as a nuclear weapon state (NWS) under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it has a stable democracy, competent administrative system, disciplined military forces, and a cooperative approach to international security. It is a trusted member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a close ally of the United States.

The 2015 SDSR in Context: From Boom to Bust – and Back Again?

Significant new investment in defence and security announced in the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review has sent positive signals about the future of the UK’s role in the world. However, argues Malcolm Chalmers, further reform and flexibility will be needed if the UK is to remain an important security player in the international arena.

NUMBERS AND WORDS

Abstract Nuclear arms control is once again a major international issue. The Obama administration has taken a number of important steps to reinvigorate the process, including a significant departure from the previous US declaratory posture. It is also clear that Obama hopes to move disarmament forward, and include tactical and reserve stockpiles alongside cuts in strategic arsenals. But crucial questions remain for the major nuclear powers. The process will not be simple nor the answers easy.

The strategic defence review— British policy options

The recent election was notable in many ways, one of which was the distinct lack of focus on defence issues. This pervades public consciousness as much as that of political parties, not least because the end of the Cold War has seemed to remove any immediate threat to the UK This lower profile for defence will likely have a correlating effect on funding as the government strives to meet other commitments. In the light of the Defence Review announced by the Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Malcolm Chalmers here raises some core issues of Britains defence. As we have moved away from national towards collective defence, how should Britain maintain her international influence? Looking at areas of soft security and specialisation, Dr Chalmers highlights the need to make choices of different capabilities based on geographical and functional priorities and concludes that while there must always be policy engagement in the wider world, Britains security concerns lie primarily in and with Europe and her forces...