Greg Austin

Unwanted Entanglement: The Philippines’ Spratly Policy as a Case Study in Conflict Enhancement?

The Philippines used a number of incidents involving China around Mischief Reef between February and May 1995 as a lever to stimulate their political and military relationship with the USA following the closure of the US bases in the Philippines in 1992. However, the success enjoyed by the Philippines was not due to the underlying logic of US–Philippines relations narrowly defined. Rather, the main factor was China’s resort to military pressure against Taiwan in July and August 1995, and again in March 1996. For the first time, the USA used its ally’s presence in the disputed Spratly islands as a lever of its own for winning back Philippine support for renewed US military access as part of the USA’s strategy for regional power projection against China. The Philippines had played for a security guarantee from the USA in respect of the Spratly islands, but found the price of alliance was mutual commitment, especially with regard to a possible Taiwan contingency.

The strategic implications of China's public order crisis

ISSN: 0039-6338 (Print) 1468-2699 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsur20 The strategic implications of Chinas public order crisis Greg Austin To cite this article: Greg Austin (1995) The strategic implications of Chinas public order crisis, Survival, 37:2, 7-23, DOI: 10.1080/00396339508442787 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396339508442787 Published online: 03 Mar 2008.

Education in Cyber Security

This chapter sketches the terrain of China’s university-level education in the cybersecurity sector. The chapter also looks briefly at the impact of an internationally mobile work force on China’s talent development.

Chinese Views of the Cyber Industrial Complex

This chapter outlines the government’s view of national policy for S&T and industrial development in the field of cybersecurity. It draws on a roadmap for S&T development developed in 2011 by the Chinese Academy of Sciences. It documents vigorous leadership engagement in these issues beginning in 2016, and their policy imperative of indigenization. It discussed the emergence of the private sector in cybersecurity relative to the better established state-owned sector.

Grading National Cybersecurity

There are many useful approaches to evaluating different aspects of a country’s ability to provide for its security in cyberspace. Some focus on more technical aspects, while others include broader social and political issues. This chapter documents several assessments of the state of cybersecurity in China, looking first at Chinese assessments and then at international points of view. The chapter concludes with a discussion of China’s performance against the nine strategic tasks identified by the December 2016 Cybersecurity Strategy and canvassed in Chap. 1.

The Next Wave

The short conclusion highlights key findings of the book, emphasizing the need to look beyond a monochromatic characterization of national cybersecurity to one based on diverse mission sets and stakeholder sets. It comments on the balance between technology, society and international political economy in shaping the future of cybersecurity in China.

Cyber Insecurity of Chinese Citizens

The chapter restates the well known fact that China’s government demands a near absolute right to monitor online activity of its citizens. It is introduced by results of a 2017 report on citizen security in cyberspace by major cities in China. It is then organized around four themes: defenses against cyber crime; the cybersecurity confidence of the citizens; protection of political privacy, including in connection with advanced artificial intelligence; and other personal privacy, especially in the light of the emerging social credit system.

Strategic Military Geographies in the South China Sea

Military geography at the strategic level of war and war planning is more politics than geography. Hence the term geopolitics. Regarding the South China Sea, there is much debate amongst analysts about the political meaning of control of this or that piece of the geography in peacetime, and what it might mean in terms of the risk of war or the conduct of warlike operations. This chapter assumes that geopolitics is not an objective physical reality, but rather a social construct imbued with historical, cultural and social meaning. Therefore, strategic military geography in areas like the South China Sea is by definition contested and politicised. There are competing military geographies in the South China Sea that reflect the geopolitical stances of individual states. Analysis of Chinas view shows that for it, Taiwan is the most important strategic military geography in the South China Sea. Moreover, China has not undertaken combat action against rival claimants to the Spratly Islands since 1988. Arguments are provided as to why the alleged Chinese threat to commercial shipping in the South China Sea is political propaganda with little foundation in military analysis. The closing argument addresses the need to manage the strategic shock created by China’s reshaping of physical dimensions of several tiny geographical features.

The Cybersecurity Ecosystem

China conducts more cyber espionage on itself than any other country does. The ecosystem for security in cyberspace is distorted by the country’s political system. The chapter lays out China’s definition of the problem set, and describes key features of the 2016 National Cyber Security Strategy. It then gives some background on the national policy shift in 2014 represented by Xi’s declaration of the ambition for China to become a cyber power.

Restraint and Governance in Cyberspace

The cyber age holds out much promise for a democratised and newly empowered global information society. But in its early years, the social revolution has been overshadowed by threats, especially new mass surveillance technologies and an arms race foreshadowing prompt global strike (in milliseconds). Traditional understandings of sovereignty and citizenship have been shaken, and new opportunities for a reordering of aspects of international power have emerged. The most powerful states have responded by pursuing a dual-track strategy: one favouring state security (a war impulse) and the other emphasizing social and economic development (a justice impulse). While the military and confrontational impulses will remain dominant for some time, they will be increasingly counter-balanced by recognition of common interests in cyber space. For the balance to shift more decisively in favour of collaboration and common security, states will need to give more weight to ideas of mutual military restraint and to ethically grounded approaches.