Marc R. Tool

The Elgar companion to institutional and evolutionary economics

This reference work is a comprehensive introduction to the expanding field of institutional and evolutionary economics. It includes work by a number of leading international authors who synthesize perspectives from Veblenian, Schumpeterian and new institutionalist theoretical traditions. Including biographical and subject enteries, this book brings together widely-dispersed but theoretically congruent ideas.

The discretionary economy : a normative theory of political economy

The Discretionary Economy argues that we do in fact control our own political and economic destinies. As a community, we have discretion over policies that determine whether an economic process adequately provides for the necessities of life. We also determine who participates in normative public judgments and whether decisions distinguish between what is and what ought to be. Tool argues that we must continuously organize the institutional structures through which economic and political functions in the social process are carried on. We must exercise discretion by creating and modifying institutions that coordinate our behavior. To exercise discretion effectively requires that we employ distinctively American economic, political, and philosophical theory. In this volume, the pivotal twentieth-century contributors to this encompassing theory of political economy are Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, Clarence Ayres, and R. Fagg Foster. This volume presents, in detail, their analytical and philosophical perspective on social change. A major purpose of this volume is to compare and contrast the American tradition with the traditions of capitalism, Marxism, and fascism, demonstrating that the former can resolve compelling economic and political problems and the latter two cannot. This book explains how to identify and analyze social, economic, and political problems confronted in all communities, and how to go about framing and implementing structural adjustments in the political economy. It will be of interest to students in non-traditional courses in political economy including institutional economics, contemporary social problems, economics and social policy, methodology, and contemporary economic thought.

The Theory of Instrumental Value: Extensions, Clarifications

Institutional economists have long argued that social value theory is and must be an integral part of economic inquiry. They have recognized that inquiry, addressed directly or indirectly to problem analysis, is purposive in the normative sense. To define an economic problem is to distinguish between “what is” and “what ought to be.” Constructs of social value are employed, then, in identifying the social significance of economic inquiry. In recent years, institutional economists have contributed to a theory of instrumental social value. In this chapter, I explore elements and attributes of this theory of instrumental value and, in particular, present recent extensions and theoretical clarifications of this value theory.

The Theory of Institutional Adjustment

Social change is necessarily a universal experience coextensive with the emergence and continuation of human communities. Foster’s three principles of institutional adjustment, as developed in this Chapter, provide an exploratory and persuasive explanation of the character and direction of social change from the institutionalist perspective. Foster observes that: “These three principles are altogether different than what is presented in standard textbooks as the principles of economics. But if economics is a social science (and it certainly is) and if social science is to maintain significance in the sense of being applicable to real problems, and if answers to all social problems necessarily take the form of institutional adjustments (which they appear to do) then the principles of economics will have to be conceived and stated in such terms” [(1972) 1981, 942].

Institutional analysis and economic policy

Lists of Figures, Tables, Graphs. List of Contributors. Preface. I: 1. Foundational concepts for Institutionalist Policy P.D. Bush, M.R. Tool. II: 2. An Institutionalist View of Fiscal Policy P.A. Klein. 3. Monetary Policy: An Institutionalist Approach L.R. Way. Progressive Tax Policies P.S. Fisher. III: 5. Promoting Economic Equity: The Basic Income Approach C.M.A. Clark. 6. Welfare Reform J. Peterson. 7. Universal Health Care in the United States: Analysis and Proposals M. Keaney. 8. Social Security: Truth or Convenient Fictions? L.R. Wray. IV: 9. Competing Perspectives on Economic Power and Accountability E.S. Miller. 10. Market Failure in Public Utility Industries: An Institutionalist Critique of Deregulation H.M. Trebing. 11. The Abuse of Economic and Financial Power in the New Economy: Historical Patterns in the Creation of Modern Remedies M.F. Sheehan. V: 12. Toward Developmental Curriculum Reform: Teach What? To Whom? Why? B. Ranson 13. Policies to Provide Non-invidious Employment D.M. Figart. 14. Policy Implications of the New Information Economy W.H. Melody. VI: 15. An Institutionalist Perspective on Environmental Goal Setting K. Stephenson. 16. Policy Concerns Regarding Ecologically Sound Disposal of Industrial Waste Materials F.G. Hayden. VII: 17. Globalization: An Institutionalist Perspective G. Parker Foster. 18. Global Industrial Policies W. Elsner. 19. Recent Tendencies in Developmental Economics: Bringing Institutions Back in J.M. Cypher. About the Authors. Index.

Foundational Concepts for Institutionalist Policy Making

Institutional economics is a policy-oriented science. For over a century, it has contributed to the resolution of economic problems at the federal, state, and local levels. Institutional economists have continuously sought to identify and resolve the economic and political problems that impair the efficiency and equity with which the economy engages in the production of goods and services and the distribution of income. The topics of the chapters of this book illustrate the broad range of interests institutionalists exhibit in policy issues and the approaches they take in dealing with them.

Institutional economics and the theory of social value : essays in honor of Marc R. Tool

Preface. 1. Marc R. Tools contributions to institutional economics P.D. Bush. 2. From natural value to social value C.M.A. Clark. 3. Institutionalism and value theory: an identity crisis? G. Parker Foster. 4. The urgency of social value theory in postmodern capitalism D. Brown. 5. Pragmatism as a normative theory of social value and economic ethics L.E. Hill, R.M. Traub. 6. Efficiency versus equity: a false dichotomy? G. Atkinson. 7. The instrumental value principle and its role W.J. Samuels. 8. The instrumental efficiency of social value theory E.S. Miller. 9. Instrumental valuation in a democratic society P.A. Klein. 10. Compulsive shift of cultural blind drift? literary theory, critical rhetoric, feminist theory and institutional economics W.T. Waller. 11. Structural change and the compulsive shift to institutional analysis C.J. Whalen. 12. Beyond technology to democracy: The Tool legacy in instrumentalism W.M. Dugger. 13. Marc Tools social value theory and the family J.B. Stanfield, J.R. Stanfield. 14. Market failure and regulatory reform: energy and telecommunications networks as a case study H.M. Trebing. 15. Thorstein Veblen: science, revolution and the persistence of atavistic continuities R. Tilman. References. About the authors. Author index. Subject index.

Institutional adjustment and instrumental value

Abstract Eastern Europe and Russia, in their struggles to make comprehensive transformations of their economies, are being guided mainly by neoclassical theories and advisors in pursuit of stabilization, privatization, and restructuring. It is the argument of this paper that an alternative approach holds greater promise. The paper offers major tenets and principles of a contemporary institutional‐evolutionary theory of institutional adjustment. That framework is then used to present and appraise an abbreviated version of the mainstream position, especially as reflected in the views of advisor Jeffrey Sachs. Of special significance is consideration of social value aspects of institutional adjustment.

The Evolutionary Principles of American Neoinstitutional Economics

The demands placed on organized scholarship in political economy for applicable economic analysis and policy formation are increasingly heavy and complex. The significance of generating credible responses can scarcely be exaggerated. Economists are being called upon to analyze inadequate provisioning processes and to recommend institutional changes in a myriad of convulsive and conflictual settings. Technologically advanced economies are confronting instability, widening inequality, and unemployment. Transitional economies are having profound difficulties following Western advice to change from socialist models to capitalist market-oriented systems. Underdeveloped economies are finding the route to development impeded by continuing shortfalls in internal and external resources, talent, and funding. Ethnic divisions and conflict in all three categories drastically complicate economic problem solving per se.

The 2003 Veblen-Commons Award Recipient: F. Gregory Hayden

Our divergent ages notwithstanding, Greg Hayden has long been an impressive model for me of the exemplary professional scholar. He is an exceptional classroom instructor, an original theory builder, a frequent and vigorous policy advocate, a trusted political advisor, and an author of significant published works. In these roles he has repeatedly demonstrated mature analytical capabilities and an unwavering commitment to the formulation of substantive and pertinent theoretical explanations and their often courageous application in difficult circumstances. He is a rigorous devotee of democratic processes in economic policy making. More particularly, in his contributions to the theareticalliterature in the application of neoinstitutional economics to the general area of policy making, and especially to environmental economics, he has few peers. It is altogether appropriate that Greg Hayden receive the Veblen-Commons Award. It is indeed well deserved. Professor Hayden was born on August 14, 1939. He earned a Bachelor of Arts in Economics at Kansas State University in 1962 and went on to the University of Texas in Austin, where he completed his Doctorate in Economics in 1968. He took classes from Clarence E. Ayres. The chair of his doctoral committee was Daniel C. Morgan, a Wisconsin institutionalist who also had studied with Ayres. Greg has been a member of the economics faculty at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln since 1967. My first extensive contact with Greg occurred when, shortly after my The Discretionary Economy was published in 1979, he invited me to come to the campus in Lincoln and serve as a guest lecturer for several days. We have been the best of friends ever since then. In the years following I came to recognize that Greg is a superb lecturer-instructor-articulate, imaginative, substantive, and empathetic. He regularly involves his most able students in his research projects. They gain analytical skills. They assist him in the pursuit of his research projects; he assists them in developing their own research capabilities. Interestingly, Greg has served on some twenty-eight doctoral committees at UNL and was chair of fifteen. One of Professor Haydens most significant contributions is his service as role model for his students. As their instructor, he consistently demonstrates his commit-