Marcel Lubbers

Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats

This contribution aims, first, to determine whether support for the far right is based on perceptions of cultural or economic threats posed by immigrants in 11 European countries. Second, it seeks to reanalyze the question of whether class is an important explanation for support for the far right using new measures of class and, related to this, to determine the extent to which class interacts with perceived threat to explain support for far-right parties. The study reveals that perceived cultural ethnic threats are a stronger predictor of far-right preferences than are perceived economic ethnic threats. This cultural versus economic distinction is also depicted in social class differences in far-right preference. These are particularly evident between sociocultural specialists and technocrats, as anticipated by the new social class scheme. Sociocultural specialists particularly perceive fewer cultural ethnic threats compared to technocrats and consequently have a smaller likelihood to prefer the far right. On the contextual level, the authors find that higher levels of GDP in a country result in greater far-right preference, whereas higher levels of GDP do result in lower levels of ethnic threats. The effect of proportion of Muslims on far-right preference is nonsignificant. The study shows that the choice of countries in cross-national research can heavily influence the results.

Primary and Secondary Socialization Impacts on Support for Same-Sex Marriage After Legalization in the Netherlands

Two years after the legalization of same-sex marriages in the Netherlands, 65% of the Dutch population largely or completely disagrees with the statement “gay marriage should be abolished.” This article shows, by way of multinomial logistic regression analysis of survey data, which socializing agents influence one’s attitude toward same-sex marriage after its legalization (FNB2003; N = 2,124). Parents’ attitudes toward homosexuality during one’s youth strongly affect one’s attitude toward same-sex marriage. The strongest determinant is socialization within religious institutions. Religious practice provides an explanation of the differences between members of denominations opposing same-sex marriage. A lower educational level enhances one’s probability of being neutral on abolishing gay marriage. Finally, men and people from non-Western origin are especially likely to oppose same-sex marriage.

Support for Repatriation Policies of Migrants Comparisons Across and Explanations for European Countries

In this article we focus on the acceptance of migrants among the general public in the receiving societies. We analyze the most radical of such anti-immigrant sentiments, that is, the support for repatriation policies for legally established immigrants. We analyze intra- and international differences among Western and Eastern European societies, taking advantage of recently collected cross-national high quality data providing means to rigorously test hypotheses on individual and contextual level determinants. Although there are large differences between countries within European regions, we found that support for repatriation policies is overall somewhat higher in Western European societies. In line with Ethnic Group Conflict Theory, support for repatriation policies is stronger in countries with higher proportions of resident migrants and higher levels of immigration. Regarding individual level determinants, we found that particularly lower educated individuals are more in favor of repatriation of migrants. The effect of education differs however across countries and is — in line with socialization theories — less strong in Eastern European countries.

A longitudinal study of euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 versus 1990

With a unique longitudinal data set covering a time-span of 18 years, we test to what extent euroscepticism evolved among the Dutch between 1990 and 2008. We compare Eurosceptic attitudes on the eve of the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht with attitudes after the Dutch ‘no’ in the referendum on the European Constitution. We find a strong increase in euroscepticism among the Dutch. This change did not develop evenly across the educational strata. We propose to explain these differences through the utilitarian, political cueing, political cynicism and identity approaches. Over the years, the less educated have become more cynical about politics and have come to perceive a greater ethnic threat than before, which explains their stronger increase in euroscepticism. In contrast to 1990, perceived ethnic threat was the main predictor of euroscepticism in 2008.

Unknown is unloved? Diversity and inter-population trust in Europe

With more than 400,000 trust evaluations, we examine inter-population trust in the European Union. We focus on social capital theory explanations in a context where European inhabitants from 20 countries rate trust in the populations of 27 other European countries and in their own national population. We emphasize the role of ethnic heterogeneity, but we extend the research by studying the importance of the presence of specific European migrants in a country for trusting this population as a whole. Moreover, we consider the relation with the citizen’s country and characteristics of the trusted populations’ country. We use the European Election Studies, showing that diversity is important for explaining trust in other populations and trust in one’s own population — but opposite to what is expected by Putnam.

Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants in Central and Eastern Europe : cross-national comparisons and explanations

We set out to answer three questions: (a) to what extent do (former) EU candidate countries differ from Western European countries regarding opposition to civil rights for legal migrants? (b) to what extent do the (former) EU candidate countries differ among themselves in terms of this particular anti-immigrant sentiment, that is, opposition to civil rights for legal migrants? and (c) to what extent can we explain such cross-national differences, considering cross-national demographic or economic conditions, taking into account individual differences? We found that former EU candidate countries were really on comparable levels as EU member states in terms of opposition to civil rights for legal migrants. We found rather strong differences with countries like Estonia, Latvia and Hungary standing out, whereas countries like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Turkey showed low levels. We found that these differences were (rather strongly) explained by the migrant stock in the country. Although none of the other national characteristics turned out to reach significance, their parameters were in the direction we proposed.