Marcelo Dascal

Defending Literal Meaning

The notion of literal meaning was once so unproblematic that it would easily fit Arnauld’s description: it was one of those notions that are “so clear that they cannot be explained through others, because there are none which are clearer and simpler than them.” But in our century, its fate has not been different from that of so many other notions previously presumed to be “fundamental ,” and it has been severely challenged. Literal meaning has come under attack in successive waves. First by philosophers, then by linguists and, more recently, by psychologists. Having discussed elsewhere some of the philosophically and linguistically based attacks against literal meaning, I will address myself here to a recent psychological argument that purports to provide empirical evidence to the effect that literal meanings play no role in the process of language comprehension and hence cannot be claimed to have “psychological reality” (Gibbs, 1984). Since there is no way to disentangle completely conceptual and empirical issues, it will be necessary first to sketch an alternative conception of literal meaning (Section 2) which will be able to cope with most of the theoretical points raised by Gibbs and others against literal meaning (Section 3). Then, I will consider the empirical evidence that allegedly shows that this notion has no psychological validity and try to rebuff this allegation (Section 4). The next step will be to provide some positive evidence for the “psychological reality” of literal meanings (Section 5). I will conclude by outlining the implications of the discussion for such issues as the theory of metaphor and the distinction between semantics and pragmatics (Section 6).

On the roles of context and literal meaning in understanding

In my recent defense of literal’meaning (Dascal, 1987), my main concern was to show that such a theoretical construct is “psychologically real”. At least in one sense, Gibbs (1989, p. 249) grants this point. For he acknowledges that the meanings I call “literal” are among the “variety of products that result from language understanding,” and adds: “Nobody disputes this as an aspect of psychological reality.” What he disputes is that there is anything special about these products, which would grant them a privileged status (a) as being somewhat “basic” or “primary,” (b) as being the output of a unique cognitive process, and (c) as playing some necessary role in the processes involved in engendering the other, nonliteral, products of language understanding. Gibbs argues against (b) and (c), and concludes that (a) cannot be the case. I will try to show that:

The Balance of Reason

I. Western conceptions of rationality have been dominated by one image: that of the balance. According to this image, human rationality rests essentially on our capacity of weighing. Animals react instinctively and emotively to their environment and to their impulses. Humans, on the contrary, are able to escape from the influence of immediate stimuli (external or internal) thanks to their capacity to control their actions on the basis of a comparative evaluation of their different beliefs, motives, desires, values, and goals. Such an evaluation consists in weighing them on the scales of the Balance of Reason1. A rational belief is reached by carefully weighing data, evidence, and justifications; a rational preference is based on a choice of goals that have value or weight; a rational

Two modes of understanding: Comprehending and grasping

Abstract We shall be concerned, in this essay, with communicative acts involving at least two persons, whereby a relationship is established between them, based on the use of language in a given context. Such a relationship is often considered to require or contain some measure of ‘understanding’ between the persons engaged in it, but it also allows for a considerable amount of ‘misunderstanding’. Our purpose is to clarify these two notions. In so doing, we will identify and describe two distinct modes of understanding, which we call ‘comprehending’ and ‘grasping’. Our analysis here refers basically to the linguistic interaction between adult speakers belonging to the same linguistic community, in everyday situations. We will occasionally apply our conceptual distinction to other kinds of interaction (e.g. mother/child, husband/wife, patient/analyst, public speaker/audience, etc.), in order to show its ability to provide a means for categorizing different types of dialogues in terms of their differential requirements regarding the two modes of understanding. We shall also suggest a genetical/developmental conjecture to account for the origin and establishment of the two basic modes of understanding.

The Malthus-Ricardo correspondence: Sequential structure, argumentative patterns, and rationality

Abstract Although the controversy between Malthus and Ricardo has long been considered to be an important source for the history of economic thought, it has hardly been the object of a careful study qua controversy, i.e. as a polemical dialogical exchange. We have undertaken to fill this gap, within the framework of a more ambitious project that places controversies at the center of an account of the history of ideas, in science and elsewhere. It is our contention that the dialogical co-text is essential for reconstructing the meaning and the evolution of science. In the present paper we try to substantiate this contention by means of a pragma-rhetorical study of this particular controversy. First, we reconstruct, through an analysis of a chunk of the correspondence, a micro-level of specific moves and countermoves which constitute a sequential structure within which also meta-scientific and meta-controversial considerations play a role. We then move to a macro-level of analysis, looking for recurrent patterns of argumentation. Finally, we draw epistemological conclusions on the nature of rationality and progress as manifested in actual scientific controversies.

Adam Smith’s Theory of Language

Adam Smiths lasting fame certainly does not come from his work on language. He published little on this topic, and he is not usually mentioned in standard histories of linguistics or the philosophy of language. His most elaborate publication on the subject is a 1761 monograph on the origin and development of languages, “Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages.” Smiths monograph joins a long list of speculative work on this then fashionable topic (cf. Hewes, 1975, 1996). The fact that he later included it as an appendix to his successful Theory of Moral Sentiments indicates that Smith “set a high value” on this monograph (Stewart, 1793: 32) - an appreciation he did not bestow on his lecture notes on rhetoric and literature, which he consigned to the flames. Although Smith devoted most of his teaching to language-related topics, and certainly developed an organized body of convictions about the subject, it would be an exaggeration to say that he had a “theory of language.” In contrast to Theory of Moral Sentiments , Smith did not call his monograph a “theory,” preferring the modest “considerations.”

Leibniz : what kind of rationalist?

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The rational law-maker and the pragmatics of legal interpretation

Abstract In so far as legal discourse in general, and legal interpretation in particular, is a communicative process, it is subject to rationality assumptions. In so far as it is a more regimented communicative process than ordinary communication, it should be expected that such assumptions play a more important and reliable role in the interpretation of legal discourse than in the interpretation of other forms of discourse. In an earlier installment of our interdisciplinary project of bringing together pragmatics and the theory of legal interpretation, we referred to the need to rely on rationality assumptions. We alluded briefly to the theoretical construct of a ‘rational law-maker’ as expressing this need. Given the importance of this notion, it deserves a more careful scrutiny — which we purport to provide in the present paper. We delineate a profile of the ‘rational law-maker’ (and of its counterpart, the ‘rational law-interpreter’), and analyze their role in legal reasoning, in the determination of the meaning of legal texts, and in the ideologies of legal interpretation.

Cultural relativism and philosophy : North and Latin American perspectives

To what extent does cultural diversity affect the activity and the products of philosophizing? Can there be convergence of worldviews and conceptual frameworks across cultural boundaries? Can there be mutual understanding across them in spite of diversity? To what extent are the philosophies and worldviews developed in North and Latin America diverse? These and other questions prompted by the recent upsurge of relativism are tackled in original essays by philosophers and social scientists from North and Latin America.

Identities in Flux: Arabs and Jews in Israel

I am not a sociologist, nor a political scientist, nor a jurist, nor a specialist in the affairs of the Arab minority in Israel. Although I have some training in linguistics, especially in the pragmatic analysis of discourse, I suppose I was invited to participate in the interdisciplinary ‘think tank’ that led me to write this chapter in my capacity as a practitioner of philosophy.1 As such, I — for one — don’t necessarily disregard the ‘facts’, nor do I make a point of suggesting ‘unrealistic’ ideas. But I can allow myself a measure of methodological freedom in taking some distance from strict subservience to a narrowly understood ‘realism’. This freedom grants a philosopher the possibility of putting forth for discussion what seem to be fantastic or utopian proposals, if judged from the perspective of the present circumstances. It is my belief that, if such proposals meet the condition of being at least conceptually sound (that is, if they could exist in some possible world, where circumstances would be reasonably different), it is not unreasonable to hope that they may, ultimately, materialize. Even if they don’t, they may be worth elaborating, discussing and, eventually, fighting for.