Marcus Faulkner

British Operational Responses to German Control of Denmark and Norway, April 1940–June 1941

Throughout the Second World War the British strategic interest in Scandinavia focused on three areas. Firstly, the region’s abundant supply of raw materials. Secondly, the region was important for reaching and sustaining other theatres. Finally, the Baltic Sea itself was important because it was utilised by the Kriegsmarine as a training ground for its submarine arm. This chapter considers the range of options available to the British for intervention in Scandinavia between April 1940 and June 1941. The spring and summer submarine campaign represented the greatest operational concentration of British submarines in any theatre throughout the war. Following the German occupation of Norway, there was need for an antishipping campaign against German supplies. The poor performance of British forces in the region during the first two years of the war stemmed from the inadequate planning and preparation of the interwar era coupled with the poor coordination between the services. Keywords:Baltic Sea; British operational responses; Denmark; German occupation; Kriegsmarine ; Norway; scandinavia

The Kriegsmarine and the Aircraft Carrier: The Design and Operational Purpose of the Graf Zeppelin, 1933-1940

While the Kriegsmarine’s only aircraft carrier, the uncompleted Graf Zeppelin, has attracted considerable interest over the decades, this has been limited to technical histories of the vessel. This article explores the origins of the programme and what the German navy believed it needed such vessels for. It examines the design process and the proposed method of operational employment, and seeks to place them in an international context. To date, German efforts have been considered in isolation from the wider developments in aircraft carrier technology during the interwar period. When these are taken into account a more balanced view of the German enterprise emerges.

Strategy in the American War of Independence: A Global Approach edited by Donald Stoker, Kenneth J. Hagan, and Michael T. McMaster

Levels of complexity make the American War of Independence a difficult conflict to understand. An insurrection in Britain’s thirteen American colonies became a regional war fought by conventional forces. At the same time, irregular warfare did not cease but instead fanned the flames of conflict across the colonies. The instability resulting from Britain’s attempt to reestablish control over its thirteen colonies caused hostilities to expand beyond North America, leading to a global maritime struggle. Strategy in the American War of Independence approaches the war’s multilayered nature through a series of chapters highlighting the strategic imperatives faced by the principal combatants as well as certain tangential players. With each chapter written by a different area specialist, the book’s editors overcome language constraints that would make a single author book on the subject nearly impossible. Several chapters are particularly valuable, especially the ones on the Dutch, the French, and the Spanish. The Dutch are frankly forgotten in most studies of the conflict, yet Victor Enthoven’s chapter demonstrates that the war was a catastrophe for the Dutch state, damaging its maritime trade to such an extent that it never recovered. Enthoven also persuasively argues that the Dutch tried to maintain neutrality but other imperatives prevented this course of action. Though the role of the French is generally better known than that of the Dutch, most studies do not analyze French involvement from their perspective. James Pritchard’s chapter does a real service in this respect. Pritchard focuses on the French navy and how French leadership attempted to use it to obtain the state’s objectives. He clearly demonstrates the difficulty of balancing naval power in European waters with naval power in the peripheral colonies while trying to satisfy the requirements of several allies. In addition to assessing operational alternatives, Enthoven and Pritchard also succeed in tying broader diplomatic and economic considerations to issues of military strategy. Thomas E. Chavez provides a sympathetic description of Spain’s role in the FrancoThe Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 34, No. 2, 281–293, April 2011

The Kriegsmarine, Signals Intelligence and the Development of the B-Dienst Before the Second World War

Abstract This article explores the development of the Kriegsmarines signals intelligence service, the B-Dienst, and its role in operational planning prior to 1939. It challenges the prevalent view that the Kriegsmarine had little interest in intelligence gathering and contends that the naval leadership understood the implications and possibilities of this new intelligence source. By employing hitherto unused source material the article demonstrates how the B-Dienst was systematically protected and nurtured by the naval staff. Consequently the Kriegsmarine entered the Second World War with a well-prepared signals intelligence machinery from which it reaped the rewards in the first half of the conflict.