Maria Dimova-Cookson

A New Scheme of Positive and Negative Freedom Reconstructing T. H. Green on Freedom

This article offers a new scheme of the relation between positive and negative freedom that is based on a retrieval of T. H. Greens theory of freedom and on further reconstructions of his theory. Some of the distinctions in the literature have proven difficult to sustain, and this has resulted in a weakening of the dichotomy in principle, and of the concepts of positive and negative freedom independently of each other. The main distinction between negative and positive freedom offered here is based on the relation of freedom to the will. We have two kinds of freedom, in both our private and social spheres, because there are two types of goods that we, as human beings, pursue: ordinary and moral. This distinction proves to be sustainable, manages to explain the antagonistic nature of the two concepts, and provides grounds for the support of the two kinds of freedom in their own right.

T. H. Green’s Moral and Political Philosophy

This book offers a new phenomenological, interpretation of T.H. Greens (1836-1882) philosophy and political theory. By analysing in turn his theory of human practice, the moral idea, the common good, freedom and human rights, the book demonstrates that Green falls into the same tradition as Kantian and Husserlian transcendentalism. The book offers a reconstruction of Greens idealism and demonstrates its potential to address contemporary debates on the nature of moral agency, positive and negative freedom and on justifying human rights.

Conceptual clarity, freedom and normative ideas : reply to Blau.

Adrian Blau makes three main criticisms of my article on positive and negative freedom.1 First, that the positive-negative freedom distinction is superfluous because it fails to address any important normative arguments. Secondly, that my interpretation of T. H. Green is wrong in certain respects. Thirdly, he claims that my ‘normative analysis does not always convince’.2 I see two reason’s for Blau’s first charge. To start with, Blau does not believe that conceptual clarity necessarily contributes to better normative analysis. If there is a unifying theme in Blau’s criticisms, it is that normative arguments are more important than conceptual distinctions. So strong is his critique of conceptual clarity that one gets the impression that there is a reverse relation between the degree of conceptual clarity, on the one hand, and significant normative messages, on the other. The topic of freedom falls into this dangerous category of topics generating a permanent discussion about conceptual clarification. Because of this, Blau believes it is worth dismissing all talk of such distinctions, and of freedom altogether, and focusing directly on normative issues. It is implied in his criticisms, that nothing of normative significance can be explained via the terminology of freedom. Secondly, Blau thinks that Berlin’s and Green’s important messages stand apart from their discussion of the distinction between positive and negative freedom. This is linked to Blau’s general scepticism about the conceptual analysis of freedom expressed in his statement that ‘the debate over positive and negative freedom has created more heat than light’.3 Blau’s response gives me a second chance to explain why the positive-negative freedom distinction captures moral dilemmas that are at the heart of political philosophy: something both Green and Berlin help us see. Blau recognises one of my normative contributions: that I show how ‘for Green, poorer citizens’ negative freedom depends on richer citizens’ positive freedom’.4 I will demonstrate that this normative conclusion could not have been reached without the preceding conceptual analysis. Blau’s third charge, that my normative analysis does not always convince, already admits that my conceptual analysis has led to a normative discussion, thus appearing to contradict his first charge. What concerns me about this charge, however, is that Blau hardly engages with the normative arguments of my paper. His main normative criticism is that as a defender of Green I have to, but I do not, justify Green’s ‘moralisation of freedom’.5 I do discuss this issue but Blau ignores the argument I develop for that purpose. In my reply I will deal with the three criticisms in turn. I will first talk about the normative significance of the positive-negative freedom distinction in the context of Green’s and Berlin’s philosophies, which will in turn reflect on the normative significance of my new scheme of positive and negative freedom. I will then address Blau’s claim that Green does not distinguish between freedom in personal and political contexts. Finally, as ‘Green’s supporter’ I will defend Green’s ‘moralisation of freedom’ but only within certain limits. I will demonstrate that Green’s defence of ‘true’ freedom can serve as a basis of a new justification of negative freedom.

Internalism and Externalism in Ethics Applied to the Liberal‐Communitarian Debate

This article addresses the question of whether we can explain moral action in terms of an attraction to a moral ideal. It defends T. H. Greens internalist ethics against John Skorupskis externalist claim that moral ideals are optional whereas moral duties are not. A parallel is drawn between the Internalism and Externalism debate in ethics and the liberal-communitarian debate in political theory. My defence of Internalism offers new arguments in support of communitarian approaches to the nature of moral action. Greens internalist ethics provides the communitarian discourse with the universalist moral dimension it traditionally lacks.

Justice as a secondary moral ideal: The British idealists and the personal ethics perspective in understanding social justice

This paper aims to show the advantages of the personal ethics perspective employed by the British idealists in the analysis of justice. In the context of Green’s and Bosanquet’s political theory, justice is a secondary moral ideal. Yet, it is argued here, their moral philosophy leads us, through a longer path, to the philosophical grounds we already occupy today: those of thinking about human rights as fundamental, not derivative, i.e. thinking about justice as a primary, not secondary moral ideal. There are three related yet distinct philosophical claims here. First, the British idealists saw clearly the stand-off between justice and virtue. Second, the personal ethics of Green and Bosanquet, with some reconstruction offered here, outlines the way in which this stand-off can be resolved without undermining its significance. Third, the personal ethics perspective is beneficial for resolving some of the difficulties surrounding the institutional approach of implementing of social justice.

Dialogues with contemporary political theorists

The book consists of a series of dialogues with pre-eminent contemporary political theorists, that are undertaken by political theorists who are currently interested in and engaged by their work, together with an introductory chapter. The dialogues deal with the influences upon and significant works of these major theorists, as well as their views on the current state of political theory and the significant issues of contemporary politics. The 12 theorists who are the focus of these dialogues represent major aspects of contemporary political theory, and are drawn from several areas of the globe. They include Dipesh Chakrabarty, Amartya Sen, Carole Pateman, R B J Walker and Quentin Skinner. What they have in common and reveal in these interviews are fascinating backgrounds and influences and highly individual perspectives on theory and politics. The upshot is a multi-faceted introduction to political theory today.

Do We Owe More to Fellow Nationals? The Particular and Universal Ethics of Bosanquet’s General Will and Miller’s Public Culture

There are significant similarities between Bosanquet’s ethical function of the state and Miller’s defence of nations as communities that generate duties. Bosanquet’s references to the state are predominantly to the nation state (1917a: p. 295), and Miller argues that there are good reasons for states and nations to coincide. More to the point, there are essential similarities in the reasons why these two thinkers believe in the ethical significance of the nation state. Many of their arguments in defence of the state or the nation, respectively, are based on the particularist nature of communities in principle and the nation state in particular. The state, for Bosanquet, has ethical significance because it embodies the general will and the latter can exist only in specific communities with shared experiences and established traditions. The general will is anchored in specific communities, institutions and practices and the state is ‘the largest body which possesses the unity of experience necessary for constituting a general will’ (Bosanquet, 1917a: p. 272). Miller’s commitment to particularist ethics is explicit. Particularism, for him, works on the assumption ‘that memberships and attachments in general have ethical significance’ (Miller, 1995: p. 65). National membership, however, supersedes in ethical significance other memberships for two reasons: existence of public culture and national self-determination.

Can social justice, economic redistribution and voluntariness fit into a single conception of liberty?: Pettit versus Hobhouse

Purpose - – The paper aims to examine and compare two understandings of liberty that have dealt successfully with the normative and analytical challenge of reconciling liberty with social justice: Philip Pettits republican liberty as nondomination and Hobhouses concept of liberty as personal growth available to all. The paper focuses on one particular question: how successful each of these thinkers has been in resolving the tension between voluntariness of action, implicit in the “primary” meaning of liberty (as defined by T.H. Green), with the often heavy demands of social justice policies aiming at social equality and entailing economic redistribution. Design/methodology/approach - – The paper analyses two theories of liberty by spelling out the difficulties they aimed to deal with and by assessing the level of success they have achieved in resolving these difficulties, with the objective to demonstrate their originality in the broader context of conceptualising liberty. Findings - – The paper criticises Pettits republican theory from a new perspective and develops an original critique of it; it spells out the achievements of Hobhouses understanding of liberty in a new light – related to the specific critique of Pettits republican liberty; and by spelling out the analytical and normative achievements of Hobhouses liberty as “personal growth available to all” it offers a viable concept of liberty that fits with contemporary conceptualisations but overcomes their shortcomings. Research limitations/implications - – As the project is based on analysing texts that have been easy to access, there have not been significant research limitations. Practical implications - – The two theories of freedom assessed here (the contemporary republican and the “new liberal”) entail some subtle, but potentially significant differences in public policy implications. While both can justify extended state action, the latter could tailor specific policies in a manner more mindful of the well-being of all parties, even those on the wrong side of social justice. Originality/value - – The paper makes an original contribution in three areas: contemporary republican theory of liberty, Hobhouses theory of liberty and conceptualisations of liberty in general.

Introduction – Dialogues with Contemporary Political Theorists: Then and Now

This book offers an engaging introduction to the range and vibrancy of contemporary political theory.1 It provides a unique overview of the variety of ways in which political theory has been done and debated over the last few decades. Through the conversations and dialogues in this book, the perspectives and contexts of some of the most celebrated recent political theorists come alive. The important themes of liberty, equality, democracy, justice, gender, class, identity, and international politics are developed in the different chapters. The insights gained through reading these interviews are an invaluable place to start for those who have not already been steeped in political ideas, and for those with a preceding academic interest in political theory the book has even more to offer.

Subaltern Studies, Post-Colonial Marxism, and ‘Finding Your Place to Begin from’: An Interview with Dipesh Chakrabarty

Maria Dimova-Cookson: Dear Professor Chakrabarty, many thanks for agreeing to give us an interview. You are well known as one of the founders of the subaltern studies project and as a scholar of South Asian history and culture. However, I can see from your biographical notes that your university education started with a degree in physics in Calcutta. You are now at the University of Chicago. What has been the path that led you there?