W. J. Mander

Life and Finite Individuality: The Bosanquet/Pringle-Pattison Debate

ion by which we attend to finite individuals within the whole of experience’ (91). THE BOSANQUET/PRINGLE-PATTISON DEBATE 119

Does God Know What It is Like to be Me

Does God knows what it is like to be me? Scripture and religious tradition seem quite clear that God knows everything about us, even the deepest secrets of our hearts. There is nothing hidden from him. And this is an answer backed up by a more philosophical theology; for among the traditional list of divine attributes is omniscience: knowing everything that there is to know. The idea, moreover, seems essential to the ordinary religious consciousness, for how can God really help us, or fairly judge us, unless he knows exactly what things are like for us?

F. H. Bradley and the philosophy of science

Abstract It is sometimes thought that Absolute Idealism was undermined by its inability to deal with science. Through a critical discussion of F. H. Bradleys philosophy of science, this idea is challenged. His views on science are divided into a positive and a negative part, and it is argued that, although he found the scientific world view to be essentially false, he was nonetheless able to develop a sympathetic and intelligent philosophy of science. This was basically pragmatic and instrumental in tone, and gave to science a large measure of autonomy from philosophy. His doctrine is connected with certain contemporary ideas in the philosophy of science.

Hegel and British Idealism

Over thirty years after his death in Germany in a foreign land most famed philosophically for its common sense empiricism and distrust of anything abstract or metaphysical, there occurred one of the most striking and surprising outbreaks to date of Hegelianism. From around 1865 onwards a species of neo-Hegelian idealism rose up rapidly to become the dominant form of philosophy in Britain. This chapter offers an introductory consideration of that school1 — most commonly referred to as ‘British Idealism’ — presenting, first, an outline of the basic history of the movement, second, an inventory of the several different kinds of material it gave rise to and, finally, some broader observations on the general character of this particular incarnation of ‘Hegelianism’.

Idealism and the Ontological Argument

The ontological proof became something of a signature argument for the British Idealist movement and this paper examines how and why that was so. Beginning with an account of Hegels understanding of the argument, it looks at how the thesis was picked up, developed and criticized by the Cairds, Bradley, Pringle-Pattison and others. The importance of Bradleys reading in particular is stressed. Lastly, consideration is given to Collingwoods lifelong interest in the proof and it is argued that his attention is best understood as a direct continuation of theirs. In view of the fact that recent commentators have tried to draw a sharp line between Collingwoods approach to metaphysics and ontology and that of his predecessors, the establishment of this connection calls for a measure of reassessment on both sides.

Theism, pantheism, and petitionary prayer

Theists typically think it appropriate to pray to God in the hope that He will thereby intervene in affairs. On the other hand, such prayer is often held to be quite inappropriate for pantheists; a view endorsed by many pantheists themselves. This paper argues for the exact opposite of these positions. It is maintained not only that pantheism can make sense of petitionary prayer but that, despite initial appearances to the contrary, classical theism can not.

Omniscience And Pantheism

This article argues that theism entails a species of pantheism on the grounds that there is simply no discernible difference between the Gods knowledge of the world and the world that God knows. The case against this thesis begins with the traditional theory of distinctions. But since God is necessarily omniscient there is not even the possibility that these might be considered apart and thus distinguished in that way. But neither is it possible to do this by means of Leibnitzs law, that is, by finding some feature possessed by the one but not the other. Three potential areas of difference are considered but rejected, first, that knowledge unlike the world is representational, and second, that knowledge unlike the world is phenomenal – there is something that it is like to have. Both of these features, though able to distinguish ordinary knowledge from its objects, cease to provide the difference we require when extended to the case of divine knowledge. A final area of potential difference lies in the transcendent nature of God over the world, especially with respect to time, finitude and possibility. But this, in the end, is found no more able to distinguish Gods knowledge from its object than the previous two suggestions.

God and Personality

Among the traditional list of divine attributes it is commonly said that God is a person. Making a distinction between being a person and having a personality, it is argued that God cannot be a person because it makes no sense to think of him as having a personality. Problems with the notion of divine personality are considered stemming from God’s perfection, his infinity, his omniscience, his rationality, his morally good nature and his gender neutrality. Three generic types of response to these problems are considered, but each is found wanting. It is concluded that the problems with personality apply as much to the human case as to the divine.

Emotion and satisfaction in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley

ABSTRACT The philosophers of the self-styled ‘revolution in philosophy’ that went on to become the contemporary analytic tradition started a rumour about the British Idealists that has persisted to this day. Finding neither the substance of the idealist case, nor the style of idealistic writing, congenial to their modern taste, these Edwardians hinted that their Victorian forbears had argued from emotion rather than reason. No single paper could address this accusation across the board, for the movement in its entirety, and so in this essay I focus on just one case, that of F. H. Bradley. Specifically, I identify the role he allows to feeling, emotion and what he terms ‘satisfaction’ in the determination of metaphysical and moral principles, and further ask whether the critics of idealism were right that there was something untoward in his approach.

New conceptions of transcendence in the thought of the British idealists

ABSTRACT British Idealism was the philosophical school which dominated during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Using the ideas of Bernard Bosanquet, John Caird and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison as an illustration, this paper looks at some of the ways in which the British Idealists sought to develop new and more subtle conceptions of the transcendent, able to resist the corrosive effects of late nineteenth-century critical and naturalistic thinking. The paper concludes by looking at three fields – philosophy, theology and literature – in which it is possible to discern the ongoing influence into the first half of the twentieth century of their efforts.