Maria Victoria Murillo

Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness

本書は、S. レヴィツキーと M. ムリージョの共同編集による13本の論文集であ る。主たる内容として、まず編者は、明文化されたルールや手続きが実際に施行 される側面(施行性)とそのルールや手続きが安定する側面(安定性)との両面 から導かれた「制度的脆弱性」を中心概念として提示している。次に、各執筆者 がこの概念を受けて、近年のアルゼンチンの個別具体的な政治文脈や政治制度を 分析している。 構成に関して、共同編集者が導入部と第 1 章、さらに結論部を執筆し、各章の 共通のテーマである、アルゼンチンにおける「制度的脆弱性」が政治アクターに もたらす帰結と影響を論じている。残りの各論文は、大別して以下の 4 つの部分 に分けられている。第 1 部「経済改革の制度、アクター、政治」は、1989年に大 統領に就任し、1990年代を通じて政権を担ったメネム政権の政策決定と政治アク ター間の政策をめぐる政治過程に焦点を当てている。第 2 部「民主制度の再考」 は、地方の政党ボスが国政議会に及ぼす影響や行政権と司法権(最高裁判所)と の相互関係を扱っている。第 3 部「アルゼンチンの政治システムの変化と持続」 は、1990年代にメネム政権が断行した経済改革が政党システムに与えた影響と各 政党の対応力の相違を論じ、その結果として見られる代表制の危機の問題を取り 上げている。第 4 部「市民の組織と抗議の出現パターン」においては、一方で、 市民社会が権力のチェックや監視機能を担う「社会的アカウンタビリティ」が論 じられている。他方では、2001年の危機以後もアルゼンチン社会にはクライエン ティリズム関係が継続して存在していることが指摘されている。 本書の序論部で提示された理論上の論点は、以下の 5 点である。第 1 に、制度 的脆弱性の帰結である。第 2 に、急進的な経済改革と民主主義との緊張関係であ 〈書評〉

Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner

Unlike in 2003, Argentina’s 2007 presidential election brought few surprises. Peronist candidate Cristina Kirchner—nominated after her husband, Nestor chose not to seek re-election—won easily. This victory was rooted in both the strong performance of Nestor Kirchner’s government and the weakness of the non-Peronist opposition. The article examines the impact of the Kirchner government on Argentine democracy. It argues that, notwithstanding Kirchner’s concentration of power, the regime remained fully democratic, and that in some areas, its quality improved. The article then examines two problems confronting Argentina’s democracy: the collapse of opposition parties and the persistent weakness of political and economic institutions.

When Parties Meet Voters Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile

This article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of party–voter linkages from the perspective of voters, where the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties is access to publicly provided benefits. In the former case, partisan networks mediate access to goods. In the latter, beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. We show that these different access mechanisms shape voters’ distributive expectations and the nature of their linkages to political parties by developing a unique methodology to measure party networks. We test it using original survey data from Argentina and Chile and show variation both across and within countries on party–voter linkages based on differential access to benefits and parties’ organizational capacity.

Teachers' Strikes in Argentina: Partisan Alignments and Public-sector Labor Relations

In a context of increasing teachers’ militancy in Argentina, this article provides the first empirical analysis of teachers’ strikes in all twenty-four Argentine provinces during the 1990s. Using a cross-provincial statistical analysis, it explains the wide variation across provinces and across time of Argentine teachers’ strikes. It demonstrates that political alignments between provincial governors and teachers’ unions explain these patterns better than organizational and institutional variables, which strongly shape public-sector labor relations in other countries. We emphasize the discretion of provincial governors, for both the application of labor regulations and budgetary appropriations in the politicization of provincial public-sector labor relations in Argentina, especially after the decentralization of education resulted in the provincialization of teachers’ protests.

Building Institutions on Weak Foundations

Abstract: This article examines patterns of institutional change in Latin America. It argues that unlike advanced industrialized democracies, where institutions evolve gradually and wholesale change is rare, many new democracies in Latin America are characterized by serial displacement, in which constitutions, electoral rules, and other institutions change both radically and frequently. Serial displacement is a product of extreme uncertainty and frequent incongruence between formal rule-makers and real power holders, which, in turn, are a product of regime instability, electoral volatility, frequent institutional borrowing, social inequality, and rapid institutional design. The article also examines how variation in enforcement affects institutional change. It argues that limited enforcement is often a source of institutional stability, and that varying levels of enforcement can be a substantively important source of institutional change. Because the activation of formal rules via enforcement is often easier than legal change, it may provide a useful focal point for civil society activism.

The Political Economy of Productivity: Actors, Arenas, and Policies. A Framework of Analysis

Following the research strategy put in practice in the project behind Stein et al. (2008), Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, this project will be a collective and interactive process among various country teams and the coordinators. We will build a number of country studies structured around a common set of questions. The objective of this paper is to put together some theoretical axes as well as a number of guiding questions to serve as background to the country studies, but the overall comparative framework will be jointly developed throughout the project with feedback from and cross-fertilization among the country studies.

Latin American Unions and the Reform of Social Service Delivery Systems: Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice

Recent policy debates on the reform of social service delivery systems focus on the decentralization of services and the introduction of competition in order to improve the quality of services. Despite the common assumption that public sector unions oppose these reforms, their responses were diverse. This paper argues that the structure of union organization and the environment of party and union competition are fundamental for understanding union policy preferences and strategic choices regarding the reforms of social service delivery systems. Mexico and Argentina education and health reforms in the early 1990s are used to illustrate the influence of these institutional features on the policy preferences and strategic choices of public sector unions.

Variación en la fortaleza institucional

La investigacion comparada sobre instituciones politicas ha comenzado a girar su foco del diseno institucional formal hacia la fortaleza institucional. Mas que asumir la coincidencia entre las reglas formales y comportamiento politico, estos estudios examinan como la variacion en la estabilidad y/o imposicion de las reglas formales moldean las expectativas y el comportamiento de los actores. Este articulo explora la agenda emergente de investigacion sobre fortaleza institucional. Desagrega el concepto de fortaleza institucional en dos dimensiones -imposicion y estabilidad- y argumenta que las instituciones varian ampliamente con respecto a ambas. El articulo luego examina las fuentes de esta variacion y sus implicancias para la investigacion comparada. Muestra como la investigacion reciente acerca de las instituciones debiles puede ser utilizada para refinar las teorias existentes sobre los efectos, diseno y desarrollo institucionales, la que deberia expandir su alcance comparativo. La conclusion examina diferentes posibilidades para desarrollar medidas comparativas de fortaleza institucional. Palabras clave: Instituciones politicas - desarrollo institucional - instituciones debiles - imposicion - estabilidad - paises en desarrollo.

Argentina: El protagonismo de los votantes y la alternancia electoral

En el marco de una caida de los precios de las materias primas, las elecciones de 2015 dieron paso a la alternancia gubernamental en Argentina. La llegada de un nuevo Presidente, que no es ni peronista ni radical, abre la posibilidad de un cambio en el sistema politico argentino. En este articulo repasamos las principales tendencias observadas en las elecciones de 2015, analizando datos a nivel nacional, provincial y municipal como asi tambien el contexto economico en el que se dieron los comicios y los desafios que genera para el proximo gobierno. Finalmente, nos enfocamos en la derrota del peronismo en la provincia de Buenos Aires tras veintiocho anos de gobierno hegemonico para ejemplificar el caracter estrategico de los votantes argentinos.

Cuando los partidos políticos se encuentran con sus votantes: un análisis de los vínculos políticos a través de las redes partidarias y las expectativas distributivas en Argentina y Chile

This article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of partyvoter linkages from the perspective of voters where the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties is access to publicly provided benefits. In the former case, partisan networks mediate access to goods. In the latter, beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. We show that these different access mechanisms shape voters’ distributive expectations and the nature of their linkages to political parties by developing a unique methodology to measure party networks. We test it using original survey data from Argentina and Chile and show variation both across and within countries on party-voter linkages based on differential access to benefits and parties’ organizational capacity.