Steven Levitsky

THE RISE OF COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM

The post–Cold War world has been marked by the proliferation of hybrid political regimes. In different ways, and to varying degrees, polities across much of Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe), postcommunist Eurasia (Albania, Croatia, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine), Asia (Malaysia, Taiwan), and Latin America (Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru) combined democratic rules with authoritarian governance during the 1990s. Scholars often treated these regimes as incomplete or transitional forms of democracy. Yet in many cases these expectations (or hopes) proved overly optimistic. Particularly in Africa and the former Soviet Union, many regimes have either remained hybrid or moved in an authoritarian direction. It may therefore be time to stop thinking of these cases in terms of transitions to democracy and to begin thinking about the specific types of regimes they actually are. In recent years, many scholars have pointed to the importance of hybrid regimes. Indeed, recent academic writings have produced a variety of labels for mixed cases, including not only “hybrid regime” but also “semidemocracy,” “virtual democracy,” “electoral democracy,” “pseudodemocracy,” “illiberal democracy,” “semi-authoritarianism,” “soft authoritarianism,” “electoral authoritarianism,” and Freedom House’s “Partly Free.” 1 Yet much of this literature suffers from two important weaknesses. First, many studies are characterized by a democratizing bias. Analyses frequently treat mixed regimes as partial or “diminished” forms of democracy, 2 or as undergoing prolonged transiSteven Levitsky is assistant professor of government and social studies at Harvard University. His Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. Lucan A. Way is assistant professor of political science at Temple University and an academy scholar at the Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University. He is currently writing a book on the obstacles to authoritarian consolidation in the former Soviet Union.

INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A RESEARCH AGENDA

Mainstream comparative research on political institutions focuses primarily on formal rules. Yet in many contexts, informal institutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, shape even more strongly political behavior and outcomes. Scholars who fail to consider these informal rules of the game risk missing many of the most important incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior. In this article we develop a framework for studying informal institutions and integrating them into comparative institutional analysis. The framework is based on a typology of four patterns of formalinformal institutional interaction: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. We then explore two issues largely ignored in the literature on this subject: the reasons and mechanisms behind the emergence of informal institutions, and the nature of their stability and change. Finally, we consider challenges in research on informal institutions, including issues of identification, measurement, and comparison.

Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness

本書は、S. レヴィツキーと M. ムリージョの共同編集による13本の論文集であ る。主たる内容として、まず編者は、明文化されたルールや手続きが実際に施行 される側面(施行性)とそのルールや手続きが安定する側面(安定性)との両面 から導かれた「制度的脆弱性」を中心概念として提示している。次に、各執筆者 がこの概念を受けて、近年のアルゼンチンの個別具体的な政治文脈や政治制度を 分析している。 構成に関して、共同編集者が導入部と第 1 章、さらに結論部を執筆し、各章の 共通のテーマである、アルゼンチンにおける「制度的脆弱性」が政治アクターに もたらす帰結と影響を論じている。残りの各論文は、大別して以下の 4 つの部分 に分けられている。第 1 部「経済改革の制度、アクター、政治」は、1989年に大 統領に就任し、1990年代を通じて政権を担ったメネム政権の政策決定と政治アク ター間の政策をめぐる政治過程に焦点を当てている。第 2 部「民主制度の再考」 は、地方の政党ボスが国政議会に及ぼす影響や行政権と司法権(最高裁判所)と の相互関係を扱っている。第 3 部「アルゼンチンの政治システムの変化と持続」 は、1990年代にメネム政権が断行した経済改革が政党システムに与えた影響と各 政党の対応力の相違を論じ、その結果として見られる代表制の危機の問題を取り 上げている。第 4 部「市民の組織と抗議の出現パターン」においては、一方で、 市民社会が権力のチェックや監視機能を担う「社会的アカウンタビリティ」が論 じられている。他方では、2001年の危機以後もアルゼンチン社会にはクライエン ティリズム関係が継続して存在していることが指摘されている。 本書の序論部で提示された理論上の論点は、以下の 5 点である。第 1 に、制度 的脆弱性の帰結である。第 2 に、急進的な経済改革と民主主義との緊張関係であ 〈書評〉

Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner

Unlike in 2003, Argentina’s 2007 presidential election brought few surprises. Peronist candidate Cristina Kirchner—nominated after her husband, Nestor chose not to seek re-election—won easily. This victory was rooted in both the strong performance of Nestor Kirchner’s government and the weakness of the non-Peronist opposition. The article examines the impact of the Kirchner government on Argentine democracy. It argues that, notwithstanding Kirchner’s concentration of power, the regime remained fully democratic, and that in some areas, its quality improved. The article then examines two problems confronting Argentina’s democracy: the collapse of opposition parties and the persistent weakness of political and economic institutions.

why democracy needs a level playing field

Abstract:In some countries, democratic competition is undermined less by electoral fraud or repression than by a skewed playing field—unequal access to state institutions, resources, and the media.

Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes

Although military rule disappeared in Latin America after 1990, other forms of authoritarianism persisted. Competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents, emerged in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the post-Cold War period. This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. It argues that populism – the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters with an anti-establishment appeal – is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Lacking experience with representative democratic institutions, possessing an electoral mandate to destroy the existing elite, and facing institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by that elite, populists have an incentive to launch plebiscitary attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability. Where they succeed, weak democracies almost invariably slide into competitive authoritarianism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.

Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability

We explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis. Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion—and consequently, regime durability—by providing institutionalized access the spoils of power. We argue, by contrast, that while elite access to power and spoils may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, it often fails to do so during crises. Instead, the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes. Origins in violent conflict raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the partys hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable. We apply this argument to four party-based competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact and regimes survived.

From Labor Politics to Machine Politics: The Transformation of Party-Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983-1999

The Argentine (Peronist) Justicialista Party (PJ)** underwent a far-reaching coalitional transformation during the 1980s and 1990s. Party reformers dismantled Peronisms traditional mechanisms of labor participation, and clientelist networks replaced unions as the primary linkage to the working and lower classes. By the early 1990s, the PJ had transformed from a labor-dominated party into a machine party in which unions were relatively marginal actors. This process of de-unionization was critical to the PJs electoral and policy success during the presidency of Carlos Menem (1989-99). The erosion of union influence facilitated efforts to attract middle-class votes and eliminated a key source of internal opposition to the governments economic reforms. At the same time, the consolidation of clientelist networks helped the PJ maintain its traditional working- and lower-class base in a context of economic crisis and neoliberal reform. This article argues that Peronisms radical de-unionization was facilitated by the weakly institutionalized nature of its traditional party-union linkage. Although unions dominated the PJ in the early 1980s, the rules of the game governing their participation were always informal, fluid, and contested, leaving them vulnerable to internal changes in the distribution of power. Such a change occurred during the 1980s, when office-holding politicians used patronage resources to challenge labors privileged position in the party. When these politicians gained control of the party in 1987, Peronisms weakly institutionalized mechanisms of union participation collapsed, paving the way for the consolidation of machine politics—and a steep decline in union influence—during the 1990s.

Organization and Labor-Based Party Adaptation: The Transformation of Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective

This article examines the capacity of Latin American labor-based parties to adapt to the challenges of economic liberalization and working class decline. It presents an organizational approach to explaining party change, highlighting the ways in which informal and weakly institutionalized structures may contribute to party adaptation. It argues that loosely structured labor-based parties, such as many mass populist parties, possess a distinctive advantage in adapting to environmental change. Though a source of inefficiency and even internal chaos, populist legacies such as fluid internal structures, nonbureaucratic hierarchies, and centralized leaderships yield a high degree of strategic flexibility. The argument is applied to the case of the Argentine Justicialista Party (PJ), a mass populist party that adapted with striking success to the socioeconomic changes of the 1980s and 1990s. The weakly institutionalized nature of Peronisms party-union linkage facilitated the dismantling of traditional mechanisms of labor participation, which resulted in the PJs rapid transformation from a labor-based party into a predominantly patronage-based party. At the same time, the PJs nonbureaucratic hierarchy and weakly institutionalized leadership bodies provided President Carlos Menem with substantial room for maneuver in developing and carrying out a radical neoliberal strategy that, while at odds with Peronisms traditional program, was critical to its survival as a major political force. The conclusion places the Peronist case in comparative perspective by examining the cases of five other Latin American labor-based parties.

The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes

Authoritarian regimes that have their origins in revolution boast a much higher survival rate than other brands of authoritarianism. What accounts for the durability of these revolutionary regimes (which the authors define—building on the work of Samuel Huntington and Theda Skocpol—as those which emerge out of sustained, ideological, and violent struggle from below, and whose establishment is accompanied by mass mobilization and significant efforts to transform state structures and the existing social order). Four variables emerge as decisive in explaining the durability of revolutionary regimes: The destruction of independent power centers, strong ruling parties, invulnerability to coups, and enhanced coercive capacity.