Marijke C. Leliveld

Social distance modulates recipient's fairness consideration in the dictator game: An ERP study

Previous research showed that social distance (e.g., being friends or strangers) influences peoples fairness consideration and other-regarding behavior. However, it is not entirely clear how social distance influences the recipients evaluation of (un)fair behavior. In this study, we let people play a dictator game in which they received (un)fair offers from either friends or strangers while their brain potentials were recorded. Results showed that the medial frontal negativity (MFN), a component associated with the processing of expectancy violation, was more negative-going in response to unfair than to fair offers from friends whereas it did not show differential responses to offers from strangers. The P300 was more positive for fair than for unfair offers irrespective of friends or strangers making the offers. These results suggest that violation of social norms can be detected at an early stage of evaluative processing and that this detection can be modulated by social distance.

Social Comparison Affects Brain Responses to Fairness in Asset Division: An ERP Study with the Ultimatum Game

Previous studies have shown that social comparison influences individual’s fairness consideration and other-regarding behavior. However, it is not clear how social comparison affects the brain activity in evaluating fairness during asset distribution. In this study, participants, acting as recipients in the ultimatum game, were informed not only of offers to themselves but also of the average amount of offers in other allocator–recipient dyads. Behavioral results showed that the participants were more likely to reject division schemes when they were offered less than the other recipients, especially when the offers were highly unequal. Event-related brain potentials recorded from the participants showed that highly unequal offers elicited more negative-going medial frontal negativity than moderately unequal offers in an early time window (270–360 ms) and this effect was not significantly modulated by social comparison. In a later time window (450–650 ms), however, the late positive potential (LPP) was more positive for moderately unequal offers than for highly unequal offers when the other recipients were offered less than the participants, whereas this distinction disappeared when the other recipients were offered the same as or more than the participants. These findings suggest that the brain activity in evaluating fairness in asset division entails both an earlier (semi-) automatic process in which the brain responds to fairness at an abstract level and a later appraisal process in which factors related to social comparison and fairness norms come into play.

Initial Ownership in Bargaining: Introducing the Giving, Splitting, and Taking Ultimatum Bargaining Game

In three experiments, the authors studied the role of initial ownership of property in bargaining behavior. For this purpose, they created three new variations of the Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG): giving, splitting, and taking UBGs. On the basis of insights of loss aversion and the do-no-harm principle, the authors predicted and found that allocations to the recipient were highest in the taking UBG and lowest in the giving UBG. Additional measures to study the underlying mechanism of this effect indicate that the game type effect was mediated by perceptions of entitlement, which allocators did not want to infringe on. Moreover, the effect was not affected by strategic options as provided by deception or power.

Brain activity in fairness consideration during asset distribution: does the initial ownership play a role?

Previous behavioral studies have shown that initial ownership influences individuals’ fairness consideration and other-regarding behavior. However, it is not entirely clear whether initial ownership influences the brain activity when a recipient evaluates the fairness of asset distribution. In this study, we randomly assigned the bargaining property (monetary reward) to either the allocator or the recipient in the ultimatum game and let participants of the study, acting as recipients, receive either disadvantageous unequal, equal, or advantageous unequal offers from allocators while the event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to reject disadvantageous unequal and equal offers when they initially owned the property as compared to when they did not. The two types of unequal offers evoked more negative going ERPs (the MFN) than the equal offers in an early time window and the differences were not modulated by the initial ownership. In a late time window, however, the P300 responses to division schemes were affected not only by the type of unequal offers but also by whom the property was initially assigned to. These findings suggest that while the MFN may function as a general mechanism that evaluates whether the offer is consistent or inconsistent with the equity rule, the P300 is sensitive to top-down controlled processes, into which factors related to the allocation of attentional resources, including initial ownership and personal interests, come to play.

If it walks like fairness, and quacks like fairness, it sometimes is fairness : Instrumental and true fairness in bargaining

To what extent are bargainers motivated by fairness and self-interest? To answer this question, we will review previous research on ultimatum bargaining. Based on this review, we argue that it is relevant to distinguish between instrumental fairness and true fairness. We speak of instrumental fairness when bargainers use fairness to maximise their own outcomes. In contrast, true fairness is linked to a concern for the outcomes of one’s opponent. Our review reveals four moderators that affect the use of the two types of fairness: (a) the social value orientations of the bargainers, (b) the emotions bargainers communicate, (c) the valence of the bargaining outcomes, and (d) the initial distribution of property. (Netherlands Journal of Psychology, 65, 155-162).

Dynamics in charity donation decisions: Insights from a large longitudinal data set

Longitudinal data of charity donation decisions reveal patterns in line with moral consistency as well as moral licensing. Despite the vast body of research on charitable giving and its drivers, no research has investigated the longitudinal dynamics of individual donation decisions. We analyzed unique data with nearly 300,000 real donation decisions made by more than 20,000 individuals for a period of 10 months. Each decision entailed a choice of what to do with money received for completing a survey (on average, €0.67 per survey): keep it or donate to charity. We found that most of the participants (89%) always chose to keep the money. Within the group of people who sometimes kept and sometimes donated the money (that is, Switchers), we find that people do not change their decision very often (cf. moral consistency). However, the likelihood of donating increases when people kept the money the previous time, and the amount at stake differs substantially (both positively and negatively). Finally, once Switchers donated, they are more likely to keep the money next time if they can earn more (for example, €2 now versus €0.50 last time), signaling moral compensation. These longitudinal data provide a first step to better understand charity donation decisions, not only in terms of a more nuanced description of decision-makers but also in terms of the dynamics of charity donations.