Ilja van Beest

When Gains Loom Larger Than Losses Reversed Loss Aversion for Small Amounts of Money

Previous research has generally shown that people are loss averse; that is, they weigh losses more heavily than gains. In a series of three experiments, we found that for small outcomes, this pattern is reversed, and gains loom larger than losses. We explain this reversal on the basis of (a) the hedonic principle, which states that individuals are motivated to maximize pleasure and to minimize pain, and (b) the assumption that small losses are more easily discounted cognitively than large losses are.

The ordinal effects of ostracism : A meta-analysis of 120 cyberball studies

We examined 120 Cyberball studies (N = 11,869) to determine the effect size of ostracism and conditions under which the effect may be reversed, eliminated, or small. Our analyses showed that (1) the average ostracism effect is large (d > |1.4|) and (2) generalizes across structural aspects (number of players, ostracism duration, number of tosses, type of needs scale), sampling aspects (gender, age, country), and types of dependent measure (interpersonal, intrapersonal, fundamental needs). Further, we test Williams’s (2009) proposition that the immediate impact of ostracism is resistant to moderation, but that moderation is more likely to be observed in delayed measures. Our findings suggest that (3) both first and last measures are susceptible to moderation and (4) time passed since being ostracized does not predict effect sizes of the last measure. Thus, support for this proposition is tenuous and we suggest modifications to the temporal need-threat model of ostracism.

Shared Cognition as a Product of, and Precursor to, Shared Identity in Negotiations

Three studies examined the hypothesis that shared cognition and group identification can be each other’s catalysts as well as driving forces behind multiparty negotiation outcomes that might not otherwise be realized. Experiment 1 demonstrates that clear links exist between communication, the development of shared cognition and group identification, and integrative outcomes. The subsequent experiments isolated the causal directions of these links. Experiment 2 showed that stronger group identification before interaction was associated with the development of shared cognition in a subsequent phase of negotiation, which then increased the attainment of integrative outcomes. Conversely, a direct manipulation of shared cognition in Experiment 3 resulted in stronger identification during negotiation, which then led to more integrative outcomes. Thus, we find support for the theoretical claim that group identification can be both the product of, and precursor to, the development of shared cognition, with communication functioning as the interface between the two.

Why Anger and Disappointment Affect Other’s Bargaining Behavior Differently The Moderating Role of Power and the Mediating Role of Reciprocal and Complementary Emotions

In two experiments, the authors investigated the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment in negotiations. Whereas previous research focused on the informational inferences that bargainers make based on others’ emotions, this article emphasizes the importance of affective reactions. The findings of this study show that anger evoked a complementary emotion (fear) in targets when reported by a high-power bargainer but evoked a reciprocal emotion (anger) when reported by a low-power bargainer. This reciprocal anger led participants to offer less to low-power counterparts who reported anger. Disappointed bargainers, however, evoked a complementary emotion (guilt) in participants and increased offers, regardless of the bargainer’s power position.

The Excluded Player in Coalition Formation

Coalition research generally assumes that people strive to maximize their share of the coalition payoff and that they exclude others from joining a coalition if these others are not needed to obtain the coalition payoff. In two experiments, the authors show that this view is too narrow and that willingness to include such others is dependent on the extent to which people feel that exclusion affects the payoff of the excluded player. This finding was moderated by social value orientations. Proselfs were not affected by the consequences for the excluded players. Prosocials were less willing to exclude others the more harmful were the consequences of exclusion. Results are related to research on social exclusion, the do-no-harm principle, and social value orientations.

Cyberbomb: Effects of being ostracized from a death game

Recent research has shown that ostracism is distressful regardless of mitigating circumstances, providing evidence that humans are hard-wired to be hypervigilant to ostracism cues. Arguing that it is also highly adaptive to avoid being in a situation that signals a threat to survival we reasoned that the immediate distress to ostracism would be mitigated in a game of bomb-toss (Cyberbomb) compared to a game of ball-toss (Cyberball). Results showed that such a symbolic threat to survival is able to reduce the immediate distress caused by ostracism (Study 1 and Study 2), and––when the negative consequences of not surviving are highlighted––still powerful enough to induce aggression to fellow game players (Study 2). Taken together the studies speak to the often assumed but relatively untested relation between exclusion and survival that has been proposed in theories on belonging, exclusion and ostracism.Recent research has shown that ostracism is distressful regardless of mitigating circumstances, providing evidence that humans are hard-wired to be hypervigilant to ostracism cues. Arguing that it is also highly adaptive to avoid being in a situation that signals a threat to survival we reasoned that the immediate distress to ostracism would be mitigated in a game of bomb-toss (Cyberbomb) compared to a game of ball-toss (Cyberball). Results showed that such a symbolic threat to survival is able to reduce the immediate distress caused by ostracism (Study 1 and Study 2), and––when the negative consequences of not surviving are highlighted––still powerful enough to induce aggression to fellow game players (Study 2). Taken together the studies speak to the often assumed but relatively untested relation between exclusion and survival that has been proposed in theories on belonging, exclusion and ostracism.

God: Do I have your attention?

Religion is commonly defined as a set of rules, developed as part of a culture. Here we provide evidence that practice in following these rules systematically changes the way people attend to visual stimuli, as indicated by the individual sizes of the global precedence effect (better performance to global than to local features). We show that this effect is significantly reduced in Calvinism, a religion emphasizing individual responsibility, and increased in Catholicism and Judaism, religions emphasizing social solidarity. We also show that this effect is long-lasting (still affecting baptized atheists) and that its size systematically varies as a function of the amount and strictness of religious practices. These findings suggest that religious practice induces particular cognitive-control styles that induce chronic, directional biases in the control of visual attention.

Initial Ownership in Bargaining: Introducing the Giving, Splitting, and Taking Ultimatum Bargaining Game

In three experiments, the authors studied the role of initial ownership of property in bargaining behavior. For this purpose, they created three new variations of the Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG): giving, splitting, and taking UBGs. On the basis of insights of loss aversion and the do-no-harm principle, the authors predicted and found that allocations to the recipient were highest in the taking UBG and lowest in the giving UBG. Additional measures to study the underlying mechanism of this effect indicate that the game type effect was mediated by perceptions of entitlement, which allocators did not want to infringe on. Moreover, the effect was not affected by strategic options as provided by deception or power.

A theory of social thermoregulation in human primates

Beyond breathing, the regulation of body temperature—thermoregulation—is one of the most pressing concerns for many animals. A dysregulated body temperature has dire consequences for survival and development. Despite the high frequency of social thermoregulation occurring across many species, little is known about the role of social thermoregulation in human (social) psychological functioning. We outline a theory of social thermoregulation and reconsider earlier research on people’s expectations of their social world (i.e., attachment) and their prediction of the social world. We provide support and outline a research agenda that includes consequences for individual variation in self-regulatory strategies and capabilities. In our paper, we discuss physiological, neural, and social processes surrounding thermoregulation. Emphasizing social thermoregulation in particular, we appeal to the economy of action principle and the hierarchical organization of human thermoregulatory systems. We close with future directions of a crucial aspect of human functioning: the social regulation of body temperature.

Does communicating disappointment in negotiations help or hurt? : Solving an apparent inconsistency in the social-functional approach to emotions

On the basis of a social-functional approach to emotion, scholars have argued that expressing disappointment in negotiations communicates weakness, which may evoke exploitation. Yet, it is also argued that communicating disappointment serves as a call for help, which may elicit generous offers. Our goal was to resolve this apparent inconsistency. We develop the argument that communicating disappointment elicits generous offers when it evokes guilt in the target, but elicits low offers when it does not. In 4 experiments using both verbal (Experiments 1-3) and nonverbal (Experiment 4) emotion manipulations, we demonstrate that the interpersonal effects of disappointment depend on (a) the opponents group membership and (b) the type of negotiation. When the expresser was an outgroup member and in representative negotiations (i.e., when disappointment did not evoke guilt), the weakness that disappointment communicated elicited lower offers. When the expresser was an ingroup member and in individual negotiations (i.e., when disappointment did evoke guilt), the weakness that disappointment communicated elicited generous offers from participants. Thus, in contrast to the common belief that weakness is a liability in negotiations, expressing disappointment can be effective under particular circumstances. We discuss implications for theorizing about the social functions of emotions.