Marina Sbisà

Illocutionary force and degrees of strength in language use

Abstract In this paper, I propose to deal with mitigation/reinforcement phenomena in terms of ‘degrees of strength’ of speech acts, and in particular of their illocutionary force. Some aspects of the received conception of a speech act do not allow illocutionary force to vary in degree and therefore it would be inappropriate to deal with mitigation/reinforcement in traditional speech-act theoretical terms. But a revised conception of the speech act as bringing about a change in the interpersonal relationship between the interlocutors might be compatible with the results of the research on mitigation/reinforcement and even contribute to a better understanding of these phenomena. In this perspective, mitigation and reinforcement appear not as stylistic phenomena superficially adjoined to the speech act, but as the adjustment and tuning of the illocutionary effect itself. In order to show how mitigation and reinforcement can be traced back to aspects of the illocutionary act and be described by the same means by which illocutionary effects can be described, I discuss examples of mitigation and reinforcement taken from recorded conversations in Italian.

Speech acts in context

Abstract This paper argues for a reorientation of speech act theory towards an Austin-inspired conception of speech acts as context-changing social actions. After an overview of the role assigned to context by Austin, Searle, and other authors in pragmatics, it is argued that the context of a speech act should be considered as constructed as opposed to merely given, limited as opposed to extensible in any direction, and objective as opposed to cognitive. The compatibility of such claims with each other is discussed. Finally, the context-changing role of speech acts is analyzed differentiating between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary dimension.

On illocutionary types

Abstract Austins four of exercitive, commissive, verdictive, and behabitive illocutionary acts are reconsidered in order to outline the corresponding illocutionary types. These are singled out as types of ‘conventional’ effects on the interactional relation. Resemblances and combinatory possibilities between types are explored in order to suggest dynamic uses of the typology.

The Feminine Subject and Female Body in Discourse about Childbirth

problematic among those areas of women’s bodily experience which have given rise to political and cultural struggle. As a philosopher of language, I thus started paying attention to the cognitive and communicative aspects of discourse about childbirth. Since my investigations had their starting point in personal experience as well as in my participation in the ongoing debates about antenatal care, I focused my attention on discourse about childbirth in my own life context: Italian medical advice books for pregnant women and interviews with women living in the Italian town where I live. However, the results of my investigations as well as some of the problems I encountered led me to reflect further about how more general issues regarding the representation of the female body and the construction of feminine subjects manifest themselves in this particular discursive field. The aim of this article is to discuss my research experience, and draw

Some Remarks About Speech Act Pluralism

This paper moves from a well known pragmatic theme in the philosophy of language—speech acts—to the philosophy of action. It focuses on the problem whether an utterance token can carry out more than one speech act, to which the attention of philosophers of language was drawn by Cappelen and Lepore’s (2005) defense of speech act pluralism. It is argued that Austin’s notions of the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts already presuppose speech act pluralism. In particular, it is shown that the notion of perlocutionary act, as defined by Austin, makes sense only within a pluralist framework, where no additional behavior on the part of the speaker is needed in order for her performance of a perlocutionary act to take place, besides those of the locutionary and illocutionary acts. The central section of the paper discusses speech act pluralism as it applies to illocutionary acts, in the light of an Austin-inspired view of illocution developed by the author in her previous work and of the analysis of the conversational practices of multi-action ascription recently outlined by Levinson. As to the locutionary act, it is argued that plural ascriptions are by far more limited than is claimed by Cappelen and Lepore, if they exist at all. In conclusion, it is shown that all the views admitting of speech act pluralism that are examined in the paper (those of Cappelen and Lepore, Levinson, and Sbisa) require an ascription-centered conception of action, such as that outlined by Austin in his papers in the philosophy of action.

Presupposition, Implicature and Context in Text Understanding

This paper examines the roles which presupposition and implicature play with respect to what is asserted by a text and to its context, as a part of the process of text understanding. This process involves constructing and updating the representation of the context. Assertion, implicature and presupposition can be described as three different ways in which changes in the representation of the context are induced. On the basis of such a description, it is claimed that, contrary to most of the literature on the subject (in which presupposition and implicature seem not to be allowed to coexist without being identified with each other), there are reasons for considering presupposition and implicature as two distinct phenomenona.

Austin on Meaning and Use

Abstract Austin rejected the objectification of “meanings” and was also critical of the identification of meaning with truth-conditions. Much of his work appears to be inspired by a conception of meaning as use. In particular, apparently at least, his “performative utterances” are utterances whose understanding amounts to the understanding of their use. But Austin did not endorse the tendency, common in Ordinary Language Philosophy, to explain the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of their use alone. His distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force was designed to avoid such a reduction. But it is unclear whether (and if so, how) speech act theory can escape paying the price of a new objectification of meaning (as consisting of “propositions” to which “forces” apply).

Implicitness in Normative Texts

The paper deals with implicitness in normative texts. Assuming a definition of normative text and considering as implicit meaning whatever is presupposed or implicated by a text, it is argued that the retrieval of implicit meaning is indispensable to the understanding of normative texts as well as of informative ones. The reliability of explicitation practices relies, however, upon the normativity of implicitness, without which we could not distinguish between correct understanding and failure to understand. The implications of the claim that implicitness is normative are examined and the explicitation of presuppositions and implicatures of normative texts is exemplified by reference to passages drawn from the regulations of a condominium and a draft law presented to Italian parliament. Explicitation practices are shown to yield information about the normative background and the motivations of the norm at issue, and to contribute to the content of the norm and to its possible applications.