Ken Turner

Pragmatics of Speech Actions

This volume provides extensive critical information about current discussions in the study of speech actions. Its central reference point is classic speech act theory, but attention is also paid to nonstandard developments and other approaches that study speech as action. The first part of the volume deals with main concepts, methodological issues and phenomena common to different kinds of speech action. The second part deals with specific kinds of speech actions, including types of illocutionary acts and some discourse and conversational phenomena.

Defending semantic presupposition

In this important study Noel Burton-Roberts attempts to defend a revised conception of semantic presupposition. In section 2 by way of background I introduce the original Strawsonian proposals for the recognition of a notion of presupposition and in section 3 I document some of the evidence that militates against these proposals. Neo-Strawsonian proposals involve the postulation of an ambiguous negation operator, a topic-centred definition of truth and result in presuppositions being always true. In section 4 I list what Burton-Roberts rejects from these two generations of proposals and in section 5 I outline and evaluate the revised concept. The semantics that is defended takes seriously, and attempts to reconstruct theoretically, the intuitive distinction between the absence of a classical truth-value and a nonclassical third truth-value. The basis of this theoretical reconstruction is examined and demonstrated to be faulty. In section 6 I exhibit a troublesome inconsistency in expression and I suggest that, like Strawson, Burton-Roberts appears to want to defend a prugmatic conception of presupposition.

Explorations in the semantics/pragmatics interface

Abstract The semantics-pragmatics interface has recently been the focus of an increasing amount of descriptive, theoretical and methodological interest (Turner 1999; Bianchi 2004; Szabó 2005; von Heusinger & Turner 2006). This interest is very welcome, and the present Special Issue is a further expression of it.

Probability logic and conversation

Abstract The Conversational Hypothesis is examined and it is suggested that a primary application of this Hypothesis is to solve the problem of indicative conditionals. It is argued that this application fails, and the extent of this failure is documented. The problem is that the Conversational Hypothesis is predicated upon a notion of truth and conditionals are not truth-bearing objects. A probability alternative is sketched and its advantages underscored. The alternative, whilst not problem- free,is shown to have conceptual and theoretical strengths which recommend its adoption over the truth-based paradigm.