Mark L. Wheelis
University of California
Network
Latest external collaboration on country level. Dive into details by clicking on the dots.
Publication
Featured researches published by Mark L. Wheelis.
Archive | 2004
Mark L. Wheelis
Although biological weapons have been used only sporadically throughout human history, and their military effectiveness has never been clearly demonstrated by use in war, the impact of natural disease outbreaks continually reminds us that they are potentially very effective weapons. For that reason there has been a continual fascination with them by nations in the last century, a fascination that continues today. Particularly where regional hegemony (or resisting it) may require unconventional weapons, they remain a major threat. The legal regime prohibiting them is clear and in place, but it lacks effective mechanisms to verify compliance and to build confidence in the existing legal regime. Repairing that gap constitutes an urgent agenda for the international community.
Archive | 2002
Mark L. Wheelis
Progress is being made in Geneva towards the negotiation of a Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),1 which would be opened for signature and ratification by all parties to the BWC. One of the provisions of this Protocol will almost certainly be a mechanism for investigating certain outbreaks of disease,2 to resolve suspicions that might arise about compliance with the BWC.
Archive | 2004
Mark L. Wheelis
Any formal procedures for the international investigation of certain disease outbreaks will have certain elements, such as forensic standards for evidence handling, that are generally not familiar to field epidemiologists. However, formal procedures will help insulate scientists from the political dimensions of such investigations. Nevertheless, several aspects to the ongoing negotiations deserve the careful consideration of public health organizations and practitioners, for example ways in which epidemiologic information gathered during a public health investigation can be used to justify a weapons-control investigation, or to support or rebut the conclusions of such an investigation. Additionally, further consideration is needed about the implications of public health investigations’ sharing personnel with highly politicized arms control investigations, a consequence of the small numbers of professionals with expertise in relevant disciplines.
Archive | 2002
Mark L. Wheelis; Graham S. Pearson
The importance of the exchange of scientific and technological information is recognised in the first paragraph of Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)1 which states that: (1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. [Emphasis added]
Archive | 1986
Roger Y. Stanier; John L. Ingraham; Mark L. Wheelis; Page R. Painter
Archive | 1986
Roger Y. Stanier; John L. Ingraham; Mark L. Wheelis; Page R. Painter
Archive | 1986
Roger Y. Stanier; John L. Ingraham; Mark L. Wheelis; Page R. Painter
Archive | 1986
Roger Y. Stanier; John L. Ingraham; Mark L. Wheelis; Page R. Painter
Archive | 1986
Roger Y. Stanier; John L. Ingraham; Mark L. Wheelis; Page R. Painter
Archive | 1986
Roger Y. Stanier; John L. Ingraham; Mark L. Wheelis; Page R. Painter