Graham S. Pearson

The Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Issues, Outcomes, and Unfinished Business

The Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was held November 25 to December 6, 1996. It successfully re-emphasized the norm against biological warfare, usefully broadening this to include molecular biology and applications resulting from genome studies. It also emphasized that use in any way and under any circumstances would be a violation of Article I. Disappointingly, compliance concerns regarding Iraq and the former Soviet Union were less strongly addressed. Article IV and the importance of national legislation as a potential counter to possible terrorist use was underlined. The importance of the existing confidence-building measures (CBMs) was confirmed and the work of the Ad Hoc Group was strongly endorsed, with a change to a negotiating format being explicitly stated, although without setting the target date of 1998 for completion. Article X was re-emphasized, with special note made of the advances made at the Rio Summit, Agenda 21, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and of the initiatives being taken by the World Health Organization to counter new, emerging, and re-emerging infectious diseases. This article addresses the issues, outcomes, and unfinished business of the Fourth Review Conference.

The Importance of Distinguishing Between Natural and other Outbreaks of Disease

The topic of distinguishing between natural and deliberate or accidental outbreaks of disease is central to building international confidence that unusual outbreaks of disease are not the result of prohibited activities. The key to solving this problem of distinguishing natural from other outbreaks lies in the scientific and technological evaluation of outbreaks and this is the focus of this ARW entitled “Scientific and Technical Means of Distinguishing Between Natural and Other Outbreaks of Disease”. The March 1996 NATO ARW in Budapest entitled “The Technology of Biological ArmsControl and Disarmament” concluded that “the BW challenge is closely related to problems in the public health arena, particularly the emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases. This close relationship can complicate arms control tasks, such as the differentiation between BW use and the natural, if unusual, outbreak of disease.” The summary went on to identify as a short term scientific and technological priority the finding of “a politically acceptable framework for investigations of alleged BW use in the context of the growing public health crisis in many parts of the world as well as the need to develop effective measures for enhancing confidence in compliance with the BWC grounded in the best possible science and technology.”

Verification of the biological and toxin weapons convention

Introduction M. Dando, et al. The Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons G. Pearson. Biological Weapons Proliferation Concerns J. Tucker. The Biotechnology Revolution: The Science and Applications K. Nixdorff, et al. The Relevance of Advances in Biotechnology to the Task of Strengthening the BTWC M. Dando. Technological Aspects of Verification: Declarations, Managed Access and Confidential Proprietary Information R. Guthrie. Technological Aspects of Verification: Investigation of Alleged Use of Biological Weapons R. Guthrie. Verification Technologies: Sampling and Identification C. Eon, H. Garrigue. Biological Agent Detection Technology J. Valdes. Towards a Verification Protocol M. Chevrier. Prospects for the Ad Hoc Group T. Toth. New Scientific and Technological Aspects of Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC): An Overview of the ASI and a 1999 Postscript G. Pearson.

How to make microbes safer

Much could be gained by building closer links between international efforts to protect society from natural and engineered microorganisms, and parallel efforts to prevent the threat of microorganisms as biological weapons.

The Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) are two classes of weapon that are little understood despite the widespread use of chemical weapons (CW) in the First World War and in more recent times in the Iraq/Iran War of the 1980s. Biological weapons (BW) are even less understood although the threat that Iraq might use BW against the coalition forces in the Gulf conflict of 1990/91 attracted much attention at the time. Since then, there has been increased public awareness about disease, which has been heightened by the outbreak of Ebola in Zaire, and its possible use as a weapon of war as the United Nations has gradually uncovered the Iraqi biological weapons programme.

Preventing deliberate disease.

The danger from deliberate disease as a weapon of war ‐ biological weapons ‐ is examined and it is concluded that biological weapons currently pose the greatest danger of all weapons of mass destruction. The ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Group negotiating a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention is analysed. The Protocol is nearing completion and contains provisions for declarations of the most relevant facilities, for declaration follow up procedures including infrequent randomly‐selected visits to declared sites, for investigations of non‐compliance concerns as well as measures to promote international co‐operation for peaceful purposes in microbiology and biotechnology. It is concluded that an efficient and effective Protocol is achievable within the coming year.

Iraq Biological Weapons Programme

UNSCR 687 (1991)1 set out the requirement for Iraq to declare its biological weapons capabilities within 15 days of the adoption of the resolution, which occurred on 3 April 1991, by stating, ‘Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within 15 days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration on the locations, amounts, types of all items specified in…’. The items specified are ‘all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto’. Furthermore, the resolution also required that a plan be developed for the future OMV of Iraq’s compliance to ensure that Iraq does not acquire any of these proscribed weapons.

Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation

Although UNSCOM has been functioning for over seven years, there has thus far been relatively little published analysis of the work of UNSCOM and what this means for non-proliferation. In the early years it would have been premature to jump to conclusions — and indeed, it is now apparent that it is only since 1995 that a fuller appreciation of the extent of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programmes have become clearer. Another factor that may have contributed to the absence of analysis was the importance in the early years of maintaining confidentiality in the face of Iraqi non-cooperation when it was vitally important to maintain pressure on Iraq to make full, final and complete disclosures (FFCDs) of its proscribed programmes. More recently, UNSCOM has taken the initiative to make presentations to Iraq at the political level of what the Commission’s appreciation is of the proscribed programmes in an attempt through the fusion of the political dialogue and technical expert work to expedite the completion of the Commission’s work. Technical evaluation meetings have been held between international specialists and Iraqi specialists to address outstanding issues.

The Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was signed on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975 when 22 States Parties had ratified the Convention. Today, it has 150 States Parties and 16 Signatory States. At successive Review Conferences the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention and improving implementation have been recognized which led to the agreement in 1986 at the Second Review Conference of four Confidence-Building Measures which were extended in 1991 at the Third Review Conference. The Third Review Conference also saw the agreement that an ad hoc group of governmental experts (VEREX) should be set up to examine possible verification measures from a scientific and technological viewpoint. VEREX met twice in 1992 and twice in 1993 producing a final report which was considered by a Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention in 1994.

Scientific and Technical Means of Distinguishing Between Natural and Other Outbreaks of Disease: An Overview of the ARW and a 2000 Postscript

The NATO ARW on “Scientific and Technical Means of Distinguishing Between Natural and Other Outbreaks of Disease” was held in the Centre of Epidemiology and Microbiology in the National Institute of Public Health in Prague, Czech Republic on Sunday 18 to Tuesday 20 October 1998 under the co-directorship of Professor Bohumir Kriz, Head of the Centre of Epidemiology and Microbiology and Professor Graham Pearson, Visiting Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies in the University of Bradford, UK. 38 experts participated from 16 countries; 20 from NATO countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, UK and USA), 15 from partner countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and the Ukrain e) and three from other countries (Brazil, South Africa and Sweden).