Mark S. Carey

Does Corporate Lending By Banks and Finance Companies Differ? Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting

This paper establishes empirically that specialization in private-market corporate lending exists, adding a new dimension to the public vs. private debt distinctions now common in the literature on debt contracting and financial intermediation. Using a large database of individual loans, we compare lending by finance companies to that by banks. The evidence implies that it is intermediaries in general that are special in solving information problems, not banks in particular. But lending by the two types of institutions is not identical. Finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers, especially highly leveraged borrowers, although banks and finance companies do compete across the spectrum of borrower risk. The evidence supports both regulatory and reputational explanations for this specialization and perhaps an explanation based on institutional differences in borrower monitoring and control. In passing, we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and also present facts about finance companies, which have received little attention.

Credit Risk in Private Debt Portfolios

Default, loss severity, and average loss rates for a large sample of privately placed bonds are presented and compared with loss experience for publicly issued bonds. The chance of very large portfolio losses is estimated and some determinants of such losses are analyzed. Results show ex ante riskier classes of private debt perform better on average than public debt. Both diversification and the riskiness of individual portfolio assets influence the bad tail of the portfolio loss distribution. Private placements are similar to corporate loans in that both are monitored private debt. The results are thus relevant to management and securitization of private debt portfolios generally. Copyright The American Finance Association 1998.

Credit risk rating systems at large US banks

Abstract Internal credit risk rating systems are becoming an increasingly important element of large commercial banks’ measurement and management of the credit risk of both individual exposures and portfolios. This article describes the internal rating systems presently in use at the 50 largest US banking organizations. We use the diversity of current practice to illuminate the relationships between uses of ratings, different options for rating system design, and the effectiveness of internal rating systems. Growing stresses on rating systems make an understanding of such relationships important for both banks and regulators.

Parameterizing Credit Risk Models with Rating Data

Estimates of average default probabilities for borrowers assigned to each of a financial institutions internal credit risk rating grades are crucial inputs to portfolio credit risk models. Such models are increasingly used in setting financial institution capital structure, in internal control and compensation systems, in asset-backed security design, and are being considered for use in setting regulatory capital requirements for banks. This paper empirically examines properties of the major methods currently used to estimate average default probabilities by grade. Evidence of potential problems of bias, instability, and gaming is presented. With care, and perhaps judicious application of multiple methods, satisfactory estimates may be possible. In passing, evidence is presented about other properties of internal and rating-agency ratings.

A Guide to Choosing Absolute Bank Capital Requirements

Resampling implementation of a stress-scenario approach to estimating portfolio default loss distributions is proposed as the basis for estimates of the appropriate absolute level of economic capital allocations for portfolio credit risk. Estimates are presented for stress scenarios of varying severity. Implications of use of different analysis time horizons are analyzed. Results for a numeraire portfolio are quite sensitive to such variations. Although the analysis is framed in terms of recent proposals to revise regulatory capital requirements for banks, the arguments and results are also relevant for bankers making capital structure decisions.

The Bank as Grim Reaper: Debt Composition and Bankruptcy Thresholds

We offer a model and evidence that private debtholders play a key role in setting the endogenous asset value threshold below which corporations declare bankruptcy. The model, in the spirit of Black and Cox (1976), implies that the recovery rate at emergence from bankruptcy on all of the firms debt taken together is increasing in the pre-bankruptcy share of private debt in all debt. Empirical evidence supports this and other implications of the model. Indeed, debt composition has a more economically material empirical influence on recovery than all other variables we try taken together.

Global Financial Integration: A Collection of New Research

This introductory note summarizes and draws together the work reported in eight research papers written by staff economists of the Boards Division of International Finance as part of a project on global financial integration. The eight papers are also International Discussion Finance Discussion Papers (IFDPs), the numbers of which are specified on the table of contents that appears herein. When viewing this introduction online, the paper titles appearing on the table-of-contents page are web links that may be used to navigate directly to each papers on-line file.

Risk Choices and Compensation Design

We analyze the impact of bad-tail risks on managerial pay functions, especially the decision to pay managers in stock or in options. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that options are often a superior vehicle for limiting managerial incentives to take bad-tail risks while providing incentives to exert effort. Arrangements similar to collar options are able to incent the desired project choice in wider range of circumstances than call options or stock. However, information requirements appear high. We briefly explore alternatives with features similar to maluses and clawbacks, which are a bit like weakening the limited liability of managers.