Mark Visser

Fear of crime and feelings of unsafety in European countries: Macro and micro explanations in cross-national perspective

In this study, we set out to explain fear of crime and feelings of unsafety, using two waves of the European Social Survey (2006 and 2008) covering 25 European countries (N = 77,674). The results of our multilevel analyses showed varying effects of contextual- and individual-level characteristics on our two outcomes. Higher crime levels in countries increase the fear of crime; however, they do not affect feelings of unsafety. Social protection expenditure proves to be an important determinant of both fear of crime and feelings of unsafety. Moreover, distrust in the police, generalized social distrust, and perceived ethnic threat induce fear of crime as well as feelings of unsafety. Finally, policy implications are discussed.

Support for radical left ideologies in Europe

This article examines support for radical left ideologies in 32 European countries. It thus extends the relatively scant empirical research available in this field. The hypotheses tested are derived mainly from group-interest theory. Data are deployed from the 2002�2010 European Social Surveys (N = 174,868), supplemented by characteristics at the country level. The results show that, also in the new millennium, unemployed people and those with a lower income are more likely to support a radical left ideology. This is only partly explained by their stronger opinion that governments should take measures to reduce income differences. In contrast to expectations, the findings show that greater income inequality within a country is associated with reduced likelihood of an individual supporting a radical left ideology. Furthermore, cross-national differences in the likelihood of supporting the radical left are strongly associated with whether a country has a legacy of an authoritarian regime.

Trends in labour force participation of older men: Examining the influence of policy reforms, normative change and deindustrialization in the Netherlands, 1992–2009

This study examines trends in labour force participation of older men (55–64 years) in the Netherlands between 1992 and 2009 using Dutch Labour Force Survey data. In this period, the share of early retirees and disability recipients steadily decreased, while labour force participation of Dutch older men increased. The authors characterize these developments both theoretically and empirically in terms of policy reforms, normative change and deindustrialization. More specifically, institutional early retirement arrangements were abolished due to the rising costs associated with the ageing of the Dutch population. Older men, therefore, became more likely to be employed, unemployed or disabled compared to early retired between 1992 and 2009. The authors also find that deindustrialization increases the chances of employment for older men with a university degree. Moreover, a shrinking industry sector is particularly harmful for the lowest educated older men, as their likelihood to be in unemployment increases compared to early retirement.

The crowding in hypothesis revisited: New insights into the impact of social protection expenditure on informal social capital

ABSTRACT This study revisits the crowding in hypothesis and contributes to the literature in two ways. First, in addition to total social spending, we examine whether different types of social spending increase social capital among their target groups. Second, we distinguish within- from between-country effects of social spending. Data from the European Social Survey are analysed with logistic multilevel regression models. We analyse two indicators of informal social capital: having social contact with friends, family or work colleagues and having anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters with. The results show that the more governments spend on social protection, the more likely people within those countries are to have social and intimate contact. The results also demonstrate that within-country effects of the types of social spending on having social contact disappear once we control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries. Yet, within countries with higher social spending on sickness/health care, old age and social exclusion, we find that these specific expenditures facilitate intimate contact among people in bad health, retirees and people who are having difficulties living on their present income, respectively. Overall, the crowding in hypothesis is supported. We conclude that it is important to examine the types of social spending and to distinguish within- and between-country effects.

Financiële spanning en informeel sociaal isolement: De rol van macro-economische omstandigheden en sociale zekerheidsuitgaven in 32 Europese landen in het decennium na de eeuwwisseling

This study examines to what extent financial strain, that is, difficulties to cope on ones income, is related to informal social isolation, that is, lacking social contacts with friend, relatives and colleagues. We consider to what extent macro-economic conditions and social protection expenditure affect informal social isolation as well as the relationship between financial strain and informal social isolation. Moreover, we study to what extent the effect of social protection expenditure on informal social isolation is weaker or stronger under varying macro-economic conditions. We perform multilevel analyses, taking advantage of data derived from the European Social Survey (2002-2010). Our findings show that experiencing financial strain induces social isolation. In economically less developed countries, informal social isolation is higher; in nations with high levels of social security expenditure, it is lower. Finally, particularly financially strained people suffer in terms of informal social isolation when macro-economic conditions are disadvantageous and welfare state expenditure is low.

Extreme politieke oriëntaties in Europa: Verklaringen op micro- en macroniveau

In this study, we set out to explain extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing ideologies within and between 30 European countries in a multi-level framework. To test our hypotheses, we use data from the European Social Surveys of 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 (N = 176.803), enriched with country characteristics. Our results show that lower educated people and manual workers are more likely to support left-wing extremism, because they are of the opinion that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Interestingly, the lower educated and manual workers are also more likely to have an extreme right-wing ideology. This effect, however, is explained by a higher level of perceived ethnic threat. At the country-level, our analyses indicate that a heritage of a totalitarian regime increases the likelihood for an individual to hold an extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing ideology. Moreover, we found a positive effect of the percentage of unemployed people in a country on the probability to support left-wing extremism.