Markos Mamalakis

Class conflict and economic development in Chile, 1958-1973

This account of the interplay of politics and economics in Chile in three successive administrations ending with the 1973 coup suggests that social class plays a major role in determining the outcome of economic policies in Latin America. As the author demonstrates, the nature of the class alliance that controls the state apparatus in Chile, together with the actions of foreign capital, determines not only the type of economic policies followed, but their outcomes as well. A comparison of the three regimes of Jorge Alessandri (1958-64), Eduardo Frei (1964-70), and Salvador Allende (1970-73) is especially important because they represent the main approaches to economic development available to all Third World countries today. The three regimes are compared in terms of policies on property relations, government expenditure, credit, investment, wages, prices, employment, and foreign investment. The outcomes are analyzed through data on economic growth and income distribution. In a concluding chapter, the author comments on the meaning of the Chilean experience for other countries.

Overall Employment and Income Strategies

Latin American countries have a better record of income growth than of either creating employment or improving income distribution. They seem incapable of incorporating all those able and willing to work into high productivity employment. They have been unable to achieve a rapid enough growth of income and productivity in the countryside and urban areas, in rural agriculture as well as rural services, in remote provinces as well as in the capital cities, in education, transportation as well as industry and mining, so that all labourers can contribute to output and receive a fair share of aggregate income and expenditures.1

Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America (review)

Levitsky concludes his analysis with a note of qualified optimism. On the one hand, he believes that the PJs decentralized structure and capacity for innovation will enable it to recover once again from defeat and disillusionment. He has since been proven correct with the election and administration of President Nestor Kirschner, who took office in 2003. On the other hand, he notes the drawbacks of the PJs weak institutionalization and increased reliance on clientelistic linkages, particularly the lack of accountability, susceptibility to corruption, and limited capacity to pursue a truly redistributive agenda.