Markus Hinterleitner

Policy failures, blame games and changes to policy practice

Studies examining the policy implications of elite polarisation usually concentrate on policy formulation and change, but neglect the impact of polarisation on the day-to-day application of policies. Applying the method of causal process tracing to the Swiss “Carlos†case, a blame game triggered by the reporting about an expensive therapy setting for a youth offender, this article exposes and explains a hitherto neglected, but highly important, mechanism between political elites engaging in blame generation and changes in policy practice. A policy’s distance and visibility to mass publics, as well as the incentives and resources of elites to engage in blame generation, explain the dynamics within blame games, which, in turn, effect organisational and behavioural changes that help institutionalise a more politicised policy practice. Politicised policy practice can make an important difference to policy target populations, as well as damage output legitimacy and undermine democracy.

Reconciling Perspectives on Blame Avoidance Behaviour

Blame avoidance behaviour (BAB) has become an increasingly popular topic in political science. However, the preconditions of BAB, its presence and consequences in various areas and in different political systems largely remain a black box. In order to generate a better understanding of BAB and its importance for the workings of democratic political systems, the scattered literature on BAB needs to be assessed and structured. This article offers a comprehensive review of the literature on blame avoidance. It departs from Weaver’s concept of blame avoidance and subsequently differentiates between work on BAB in comparative welfare state research and work on BAB in public policy and administration. It is argued that between these two strands of literature a bifurcation exists since both perspectives rarely draw on each other to create a more general understanding of BAB. Advantages from existing approaches must be combined to assess the phenomenon of blame avoidance in a more comprehensive way.

The politics of external approval: Explaining the IMF's evaluation of austerity programmes

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programmes implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a countrys institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme.

Anticipatory and reactive forms of blame avoidance: of foxes and lions

Blame avoidance behavior (BAB) encompasses all kinds of integrity-protecting activities by officeholders in the face of potentially blame-attracting events. Although considered essential for a realistic understanding of politics and policymaking, a general understanding of this multi-faceted behavioral phenomenon and its implications has been lacking to date. We argue that this is due to the lack of careful conceptualization of various forms of BAB. Crucially, the difference between anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB is largely neglected in the literature. This paper links anticipatory and reactive forms of BAB as two consecutive decision situations. It exposes dependence relationships between the situations that trigger BAB, the rationalities at work, the resources and strategies applied by blame-avoiding actors, and the various consequences thereof. The paper concludes that anticipatory and reactive BAB are distinct phenomena that require specific research approaches to assess their relevance for the workings of polities.

Blame, Reputation, and Organizational Responses to a Politicized Climate

Hinterleitner and Sager conceptualize how public sector organizations (PSOs) react to elite polarization, which is as an increasingly common phenomenon in Western democracies. For politicians operating under polarized conditions, PSOs are a primary blame-deflection target. Since blame from politicians presents a threat to the reputation of PSOs, they react to these threats. While research has made progress in examining specific responses to reputational threats, the authors argue that an overarching categorization of responses is missing. The chapter adapts the concept of anticipatory blame avoidance to the decision-making of PSOs, using it as an umbrella concept to categorize and systematize the reactions of PSOs. PSOs that prioritize crafting responses to reputational threats may neglect tasks and duties potentially decisive for effective and problem-oriented public service delivery.