Martin Eichenbaum

When is the Government Spending Multiplier Large

We argue that the government-spending multiplier can be much larger than one when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds. The larger the fraction of government spending that occurs while the nominal interest rate is zero, the larger the value of the multiplier. After providing intuition for these results, we investigate the size of the multiplier in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model. In this model the multiplier effect is substantially larger than one when the zero bound binds. Our model is consistent with the behavior of key macro aggregates during the recent financial crisis.

Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy

We present a model embodying moderate amounts of nominal rigidities which accounts for the observed inertia in inflation and persistence in output. The key features of our model are those that prevent a sharp rise in marginal costs after an expansionary shock to monetary policy. Of these features, the most important are staggered wage contracts of average duration three quarters, and variable capital utilization.

Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Shocks to Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates

This paper investigates the effects of shocks to U. S. monetary policy on exchange rates. We consider three measures of these shocks: orthogonalized shocks to the federal funds rate, orthogonalized shocks to the ratio of nonborrowed to total reserves and changes in the Romer and Romer index of monetary policy. In sharp contrast to the literature, we find substantial evidence of a link between monetary policy and exchange rates. Specifically, according to our results a contractionary shock to U. S. monetary policy leads to (i) persistent, significant appreciations in U. S. nominal and real exchange rates and (ii) significant, persistent deviations from uncovered interest rate parity in favor of U. S. interest rates.

Firm-Specific Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle

Macroeconomic and microeconomic data paint conflicting pictures of price behavior. Macroeconomic data suggest that inflation is inertial. Microeconomic data indicate that firms change prices frequently. We formulate and estimate a model which resolves this apparent micro - macro conflict. Our model is consistent with post-war U.S. evidence on inflation inertia even though firms re-optimize prices on average once every 1.5 quarters. The key feature of our model is that capital is firm-specific and pre-determined within a period.

Labor Hoarding and the Business Cycle

This paper investigates the sensitivity of Solow residual based measures of technology shocks to labor hoarding behavior. Using a structural model of labor hoarding and the identifying restriction that innovations to technology shocks are orthogonal to innovations in government consumption, we estimate the fraction of the variability of the Solow residual that is due to technology shocks. Our results support the view that a significant proportion of movements in the Solow residual are artifacts of labor hoarding behavior. Specifically, we estimate that the variance of innovations to technology is roughly 50 percent less than that implied by standard real business cycle models. In addition, our results suggest that existing real business cycle studies substantially overstate the extent to which technology shocks account for the variability of postwar aggregate U.S. output.

Sticky price and limited participation models of money: A comparison

Abstract We provide new evidence that models of the monetary transmission mechanism should be consistent with at least the following facts. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, the aggregate price level responds very little, aggregate output falls, interest rates initially rise, real wages decline by a modest amount, and profits fall. We compare the ability of sticky price and limited participation models with frictionless labor markets to account for these facts. The key failing of the sticky price model lies in its counterfactual implications for profits. The limited participation model can account for all the above facts, but only if one is willing to assume a high labor supply elasticity (2 percent) and a high markup (40 percent). The shortcomings of both models reflect the absence of labor market frictions, such as wage contracts or factor hoarding, which dampen movements in the marginal cost of production after a monetary policy shock.

Chapter 2 Monetary policy shocks: What have we learned and to what end?

Abstract This chapter reviews recent research that grapples with the question: What happens after an exogenous shock to monetary policy? We argue that this question is interesting because it lies at the center of a particular approach to assessing the empirical plausibility of structural economic models that can be used to think about systematic changes in monetary policy institutions and rules. The literature has not yet converged on a particular set of assumptions for identifying the effects of an exogenous shock to monetary policy. Nevertheless, there is considerable agreement about the qualitative effects of a monetary policy shock in the sense that inference is robust across a large subset of the identification schemes that have been considered in the literature. We document the nature of this agreement as it pertains to key economic aggregates.

Prospective deficits and the asian currency crisis

This paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 Asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. The expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in Asia. We articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises. We present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis.

Unit Roots in Real Gnp: Do We Know, and Do We Care?

No, and maybe not. [additional text from authors introduction] To us, the possibility of providing a compelling case that real GMP is either trend or difference stationary seems extremely small, certainly on the basis of post-war data. This is because there is only one difference between these two types of processes and that difference is completely summarized by the answer to the question. How much should an innovation to real GMP affect the optimal forecast of real GMP into the infinite future? If the answer is zero, then real GMP is trend stationary. If the answer is not zero, then real GMP is difference stationary. The competing hypotheses have no other testable differences. Once we pose the question in this way, it seems clear that economists ought to be extremely skeptical of any argument that purports to support one view or the other. Simply put, its hard to believe that a mere 40 years of data contain any evidence on the only experiment that is relevant.

The output, employment, and interest rate effects of government consumption

This paper investigates the impact on aggregate variables of changes in government consumption in the context of a stochastic, neoclassical growth model. We show, theoretically, that the impact on output and employment of a persistent change in government consumption exceeds that of a temporary change. We also show that, in principle, there can be an analog to the Keynesian multiplier in the neoclassical growth model. Finally, in an empirically plausible version of the model, we show that the interest rate impact of a persistent government consumption shock exceeds that of a temporary one. Our results provide counter examples to existing claims in the literature.