Martino Maggetti

The role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making: a comparative analysis

This article examines the role of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in policy-making, focusing on six cases concerning the revision of crucial laws related to the competencies of the investigated IRA. These cases were selected from three small European countries (the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) and two policy areas (finance and competition). After collecting documental and survey information on the participation and weight of each actor, the Actor-Process-Event Scheme was used to obtain a synthetic measure of agencies’ centrality in the course of each policy process. My hypotheses on the centrality of agencies are then tested with a two-step Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that de facto independence from the political decision-makers is a necessary condition for the maximal centrality of agencies in policy-making, whilst non-professionalization of the legislature and low independence from the regulatees are jointly sufficient for explaining this outcome.

The policy-making structure of European regulatory networks and the domestic adoption of standards

European regulatory networks (ERNs) constitute the main governance instrument for the informal co-ordination of public regulation at the European Union (EU) level. They are in charge of co-ordinating national regulators and ensuring the implementation of harmonized regulatory policies across the EU, while also offering sector-specific expertise to the Commission. To this aim, ERNs develop ‘best practices’ and benchmarking procedures in the form of standards, norms and guidelines to be adopted in member states. In this paper, we focus on the Committee of European Securities Regulators and examine the consequences of the policy-making structure of ERNs on the domestic adoption of standards. We find that the regulators of countries with larger financial industries tend to occupy more central positions in the network, especially among newer member states. In turn, network centrality is associated with a more prompt domestic adoption of standards.

The Independence of Regulatory Authorities

This chapter offers a theoretical and empirical assessment of the distinctive feature of regulatory agencies, namely their independence. First, we discuss the formal and informal aspects of regulatory independence, their conceptualization, and their operationalization. Second, we present empirical research explaining the variation of formal independence across countries and sectors. We also point out that formal independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for regulators’ de facto independence from political decision-makers and from the regulated industries. We conclude by highlighting the persistent relevance of regulatory independence for the study of the ongoing processes of re-regulation and agencification.

Problems (and solutions) in the measurement of policy diffusion mechanisms

A growing literature in public policy, comparative politics and international relations has studied how the policies of one unit (e.g. country, federal state or city) are influenced by the policies of other units – that is, how policies diffuse. This article provides a meta-analysis of 114 studies, demonstrating persisting inconsistencies in the measurement of the mechanisms driving policy diffusion processes. Different indicators are used to measure the same mechanism, and the same indicators are used to measure different mechanisms. To improve this state of affairs, this article puts forward a conceptual structure that serves as a guide for the application of diffusion arguments, a starting point for theoretical refinement and a benchmark to assess measurement validity. In addition to paying more attention to the conceptual consistency of indicators, overcoming the problems currently found in the literature requires the construction of original, innovative research designs instead of the replication of widely used templates.

Unexplored aspects of bureaucratic autonomy: a state of the field and ways forward:

This article first provides a selective overview of the literature on bureaucratic autonomy and identifies different approaches to this topic. The second section discusses three major sets of open questions, which will be tackled in the contributions to this special issue: the subjective, dynamic and relational nature of autonomy; the complex linkages between tasks, organizational forms, and national path dependencies on the one hand and autonomy and performance on the other hand; and the interplay between autonomy, accountability and democratic legitimacy.

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from �government� to �governance� as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision-making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem-solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance � that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten-year period and semi-structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

Network governance and the domestic adoption of soft rules

ABSTRACT European regulatory networks (ERNs) are in charge of producing and disseminating non-bindings standards, guidelines and recommendations in a number of important domains, such as banking and finance, electricity and gas, telecommunications, and competition regulation. The goal of these soft rules is to promote ‘best practices’, achieve co-ordination among regulatory authorities and ensure the consistent application of harmonized pro-competition rules across Europe. This contribution examines the domestic adoption of the soft rules developed within the four main ERNs. Different factors are expected to influence the process of domestic adoption: the resources of regulators; the existence of a review panel; and the interdependence of the issues at stake. The empirical analysis supports hypotheses about the relevance of network-level factors: monitoring and public reporting procedures increase the final level of adoption, while soft rules concerning highly interdependent policy areas are adopted earlier.

The media accountability of independent regulatory agencies

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a ‘democratic deficit’, following their statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a ‘multi-pronged system of control’ is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential ‘accountability forum’ for regulators. The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases – the British and Swiss competition commissions – mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.

Designing research in the social sciences

Social Sciences and Research Design Conceptual Analysis Causal Analysis Statistical Research Designs for Causal Inference Temporality Heterogeneity Interdependence Conclusions: Connecting the Dots

Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Study of Policy Processes

Abstract Given the increasing popularity of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) for the study of public policy and policy processes, this article offers a review of two key issues: multiple configurational causality and temporality. On the one hand, the study of multiple configurational causal relations allows researchers to deal with the extremely complex set of elements that interact in policy processes. However, this task poses the challenge of balancing deductive and inductive logics in a research design. On the other hand, policy process theories often involve temporal arguments, but QCA does not easily deal with dynamic elements. This article discusses these challenges and proposes several ways to address them. It thereby illustrates the advantages and limitations of QCA for students of policy processes.