Yannis Papadopoulos

Cooperative forms of governance: Problems of democratic accountability in complex environments

Abstract. Various schools of research in public policy (the literature on ‘governance’ and its continental counterparts) are converging to focus on the growth of policy styles based on cooperation and partnership in networks, instead of on vertical control by the state. This article focuses on issues of democratic accountability and responsiveness with these governance arrangements. It argues that until recently the legitimacy of governance networks was not at the forefront of theoretical developments, even though the ‘democratic deficit’ of governance is problematic both for normative and for pragmatic reasons. There is now increased sensitivity to this problem, but the remedies presented in the literature are unsatisfactory, and critiques of governance presuppose a somewhat idealised image of representative democracy in terms of accountability or responsiveness of decision-makers. They also fail to offer adequate solutions to some of the central legitimacy problems of policy-making in complex societies.

Accountability and Multi-level Governance: More Accountability, Less Democracy?

This paper seeks to explain why the trend towards more cooperative forms of policy-making, though in all likelihood necessary for policy efficiency and even at first glance promising with respect to inclusiveness and pluralism, can have negative consequences for democratic accountability. The paper first explores the properties of multi-level governance that lead to a deficit in democratic accountability (lack of visibility, uncoupling from representative institutions, composition of networks, and ‘multi-levelness’ itself) before coming to more general conclusions on the characteristics and limits of accountability mechanisms in multi-level governance and on their consequences for democracy.

How party linkages shape austerity politics: clientelism and fiscal adjustment in Greece and Portugal during the eurozone crisis

ABSTRACT Drawing on an analysis of austerity reforms in Greece and Portugal during the sovereign debt crisis from 2009 onwards, we show how the nature of the linkages between parties and citizens shapes party strategies of fiscal retrenchment. We argue that parties which rely to a greater extent on the selective distribution of state resources to mobilize electoral support (clientelistic linkages) are more reluctant to agree to fiscal retrenchment because their own electoral survival depends on their ability to control state budgets to reward clients. In Greece, where parties relied extensively on these clientelistic linkages, austerity reforms have been characterized by recurring conflicts and disagreements between the main parties, as well as a fundamental transformation of the party system. By contrast, in Portugal, where parties relied less on clientelistic strategies, austerity reforms have been more consensual because fiscal retrenchment challenged to a lesser extent the electoral base of the mainstream parties.

Positioning Accountability in European Governance: An Introduction

The special issue of which this paper forms the introduction takes as its central focus one particular aspect of democratic governance: accountability. It attempts to position a broad understanding of the notion of accountability within the overall context of the evolving political system of governance in Europe and in particular of the European Union. With accountability at the centre, we consider its relationship to a fairly wide range of other themes in any given political system. This introduction first looks to the concept of accountability as it stands alongside and within other major themes of contemporary political systems. The issue of accountability beyond the national democratic state is then considered, and in particular within what Sbragia has termed the ‘ecology’ of governance. The introduction concludes with summaries of the papers included in the special issue.

On the Politicisation of the European Union: Lessons from Consociational National Polities

The debate on the politicisation of the EU should consider its consociational nature. Comparing the EU to Switzerland and Belgium, this article discusses S. Hixs and S. Bartolinis contrasting views on politicisation. S. Hixs recipe for bipolar politicisation is based on some incorrect assumptions. It is not obvious that the EU is evolving towards more Left–Right polarisation. Even if this were the case, the nature of the EU implies that compromises are indispensable. Therefore, Hixs suggestions would not suffice to clarify political choice, and Euroscepticism would not be reduced. The consociational nature of the EU also makes less credible S. Bartolinis fears of possible negative consequences for governability. The politicisation of constitutive issues can even help to integrate Eurosceptic segments of public opinion. The authors suggest a middle way regarding EU politicisation based on lessons from consociational polities, and the coupling of a system of ‘negotiation democracy’ with mechanisms of direct popular participation.

The empirical assessment of agency accountability: a regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur

Regulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies is ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability ‘fora’ to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent fora, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzagenturs accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes. Points for practitioners Regulatory agencies are often considered as independent, yet accountable. This article provides a realistic framework for the study of accountability ‘regimes’ in which they are embedded. It emphasizes the need to identify the various actors (accountability fora) to which agencies are formally accountable (parliamentary committees, auditing bodies, courts, and so on) and to consider possible relationships between them. It argues that formal accountability ‘on paper’, as defined in official documents, does not fully account for de facto accountability, which depends on the resources possessed by the fora (mainly information-processing and decision-making capacities) and the credibility of their sanctioning capacities. The article applies this framework to the German Bundesnetzagentur.

Europeanization? Two Logics of Change of Policy-Making Patterns in Switzerland

Abstract This article is based on a comparison of changes of policy-making patterns in Switzerland between the strongly Europeanized sector of economic regulatory policy (in spite of Switzerland not being a EU member state) and the weakly Europeanized sector of social policy (as a control case). We observe in both sectors the erosion of the traditional Swiss concensual pattern that was used to imply a strong influence for the interest groups at the expense both of the executive and of parties of the legislature. Co-operative procedures lost their influence for different reasons: in the case of economic regulatory policy their integrative role was considered as an obstacle to reform, and in the case of social policy it was undermined by a higher level of conflict. Also process change meant more technocratic policy making in the first case, and an increased influence of parliamentary politics in the second. Two “causal narratives” emphasize the distinctiveness of the logic of change in each policy sector.

“Daring to Be a Daniel” How Much Does It Contribute to a “More Fine-Grained Understanding” of Pathologies of Accountability?

Flinders provides a thought-provoking piece on possible pathologies of democratic accountability. This note, however, points out some weaknesses in this line of thinking. The assumptions about the etiology of democratic pathologies are not always robust, the symptoms are dramatized, and there is an inferential jump from anecdotal evidence to a general diagnosis about the health of democracy. This article mainly discusses two partly inaccurate descriptions and qualifies the conclusions based thereon: one on the deleterious role of the media and one on the penetration of “monitory democracy” in contemporary governance.

Transparency: from Bentham’s inventory of virtuous effects to contemporary evidence-based scepticism

There is growing enthusiasm for transparency in public affairs. Discourses idealising the value of transparency are part of the rhetoric of advocates of ‘good governance’. However, there is little discussion of the justifications for transparency. The view that transparency underpins legitimacy is similar to that of the advocates for ‘publicity’ in the initial era of representative government, when transparency (or publicity) became a crucial issue in political debates. This article identifies the intellectual roots of claims for transparency through a retrospective examination of the initial pleas in its favour. It concentrates on Jeremy Bentham, who provided an extended inventory of reasons for publicity. We examine Bentham’s major arguments and how they are currently analysed. We conclude that the virtuous effects of transparency are today qualified by criticisms in scholarly work which emphasise the possible costs and perverse effects of the search for transparency or demonstrate that it may fail to deliver the expected benefits.

The Principal-Agent Framework and Independent Regulatory Agencies

The goal of this contribution is to discuss the application of the principal–agent framework to the study of interactions between elected politicians – the principal – and independent regulatory agencies – the agent. Through a review of recent research we suggest that the principal–agent framework, despite its parsimony and analytical leverage, requires considerable refinement to make sense of these relations. Indeed, evidence on the functioning of independent regulatory agencies shows that some of their key practices tend to deviate from expectations based on the principal–agent framework. First, principals do not necessarily seek to exert control over agencies. Second, relations which structure the principal–agent mechanics other than those with elected principals are decisive in shaping the behaviour of regulators. Third, agencies can acquire political power over time and eventually subvert the logic of delegation. It is time to recognise that these deviations should not be conceived as anomalies but rather as systemic features that characterise post-delegation relations between elected politicians and independent regulators.