Marvin Farber

The Foundation of Phenomenology.

The fluctuation of word-meanings and the ideality of the unity of meaning , 237. D. Pure logic and the ideal meanings, 238. E. The phe-nomenological and ideal content of experiences of meaning, 240. The difference between mediate and immediate parts of a whole, 301. 6. Nearer and more remote parts of a whole, 302. 7. The concepts of whole and part defined by means of the concept of foundation, 304. 8. Sensory forms of unity and wholes, 305. 9. Categorial forms of unity and wholes, 307. 10. The pure formal types of wholes and parts, and the postulate of an a priori theory, 309. 11. On the partition of wholes through the partition of their factors, 309.

The Idea of God

Sedamnaesti vek jeste važan momenat za promisljanje određenja Boga. To je period u kome je impersonalno priznavanje transcendencije kao polazne tacke za filozofsku refleksiju bilo zamenjeno radikalnom pozicijom subjektivnosti. Bog je sada jedna kategorija u demonstraciji, a ne vise pretpostavljeni cilj putovanja. Filozofija, pak, do ovog vremena konstituisana metafizikom (metaphysica, philosophia prima, znaci ontologija) morala je da u novi domen prebaci neke probleme i koncepte koje je ranije obrađivala samo otkrivena teologija (theologia, sacra scientia). Ova dvostruka transformacija vrlo se lepo vidi na problemu sustine Boga: od Dekarta (Rene Descartes) pa nadalje metafizicke rasprave o karakteristikama i atributima Boga sastoje se u prevođenju, da tako kažemo, u cisto filozofske pojmove teoloskih rasprava o božanskim imenima, kakve su se pojavljivale pocev od Starog i Novog zaveta preko posredovanja njihovih formulacija kod Pseudo-Dionisija Areopagite (Pseudo-Dyonisius Areopagite) (peti vek?), u njegovoj proslavljenoj De divinis nominibus.

Values and the Scope of Scientific Inquiry

Whether philosophy may be regarded as a science is still a disputed question. The historical functions of philosophy have been diversified, with religious, political, socioeconomic, and individual motives playing a role, in addition to the influence of the sciences upon philosophic thought. The view that philosophy is the most fundamental and rigorous science has coexisted with attempts to subordinate it to institutions representing vested interests.

The Philosophic Impact of the Facts Themselves

If philosophy is to have the status of the most rigorous science, or if it is to be regarded simply as a science, it must earn the right to the designation. Every science has a special function, and a selective domain for inquiry. Although a discipline which applies to all special sciences — logic — has been called the science of sciences, it would be fatuous to portray logic as resting upon a throne and as governing all that exists or could possibly exist. The special sciences function as fields for work in a primary sense, and they grow out of the need to enable human beings to maintain themselves and to further their interests by understanding and changing the world. With conflicting social classes, this need has been satisfied one-sidedly, in accordance with the dominant interests of the social system. The logic which is implicit in the nascent and developing sciences receives fresh impetus when it is treated as a special discipline, even though it has unrestricted application. It develops further with the growth of the sciences, and it is also an aid to that development. But there should be no talk or image of a logic “governing” the sciences.

Value and Existence

The question of the place of values in the world of existence requires the determination of the place of man in the natural world. This question has received conflicting answers in the philosophical literature. The term “value” has been defined narrowly and broadly; and the nature of man has been accepted in traditional forms or on the basis of scientific knowledge and explanation. The overextension of the concept of value, to make it apply to all existence as a general ontological principle, has been prominent.