Mary J. Benner

Exploitation, Exploration, and Process Management: The Productivity Dilemma Revisited

We develop a contingency view of process managements influence on both technological innovation and organizational adaptation. We argue that while process management activities are beneficial for organizations in stable contexts, they are fundamentally inconsistent with all but incremental innovation and change. But dynamic capabilities are rooted in both exploitative and exploratory activities. We argue that process management activities must be buffered from exploratory activities and that ambidextrous organizational forms provide the complex contexts for these inconsistent activities to coexist.

Process Management and Technological Innovation: A Longitudinal Study of the Photography and Paint Industries

This research explores the impact of process management activities on technological innovation. Drawing on research in organizational evolution and learning, we suggest that as these practices reduce variance in organizational routines and influence the selection of innovations, they enhance incremental innovation at the expense of exploratory innovation. We tested our hypotheses in a 20-year longitudinal study of patenting activity and ISO 9000 quality program certifications in the paint and photography industries. In both industries, the extent of process management activities in a firm was associated with an increase in both exploitative innovations that built on existing firm knowledge and an increase in exploitations share of total innovations. Our results suggest that exploitation crowds out exploration. We extend existing empirical research by capturing how process management activities influence the extent to which innovations build on existing firm knowledge. We suggest that these widely adopted organizational practices shift the balance of exploitation and exploration by focusing on efficiency, possibly at the expense of long-term adaptation.

The Lemons Problem in Markets for Strategy

Research in corporate governance has predominantly focused on the moral hazard problem and governance mechanisms that mitigate it. In this paper, we instead focus on adverse selection as an alternative agency problem, emphasizing well-intentioned managers making strategic choices they believe will increase firm value, but facing difficulty informing capital market participants about the value of these choices. We suggest that more valuable strategies are more difficult for market participants to evaluate, and that pressures on managers to adopt easy-to-evaluate strategies can generate this adverse selection or “lemons” problem. We argue that governance mechanisms designed to mitigate moral hazard operate differently here, in some cases exacerbating rather than solving the adverse selection problem. We further propose that firms with unique and complex strategies may migrate to private equity as a partial remedy.

Measuring Up? Persistence and Change in Analysts’ Evaluative Schemas Following Technological Change

We examine shifts in how analysts assess the strategies of incumbent firms following a radical technological change. Specifically, we use an inductive study of earnings conference call transcripts and analyst reports to study how analysts’ evaluative schemas change with technological change in the wireline telecommunications industry. We find three temporal themes. At first, analysts pressure firms to reverse strategic changes that are at odds with the existing “income”-focused metrics and logic that constitute the evaluative schema. Next, schema change unfolds with the ongoing technological change, as firm performance declines when measured with traditional metrics, and as managers frame strategic changes using new “growth”-focused metrics and logic. Finally, a distinct shift in the schema is apparent as analysts’ increasing attention to growth spurs a more positive view of strategic changes that they previously opposed, a less positive view of previously supported strategies that conformed to an income ...