Masaya Yasuoka

How Long Should We Stay in Education If Ability is Screened

We examine how ability-screening affects demand for education and the shape of an optimal education system. Explicitly incorporating gradual screening by education into the model, we illustrate how individuals of different abilities decide to stay in education or drop out. Gradual screening induces low-ability individuals to receive over-education, reducing the net benefit obtained from education by society as a whole, as well as such individuals. A mixed education system, in which public education is provided before private education, is superior to a wholly private system, in terms of both efficiency and equity, because it reduces the over-education of low-ability individuals.

Public Investment Financed By Consumption Tax In An Aging Society

Earlier papers have examined endogenous growth models including public investment financed by an income tax. However, public capital with such financing has not been reported. Aging societies are developing rapidly in economically developed countries. Consumption taxes to finance government expenditures are attractive to alleviate intergenerational inequality. In this paper, we demonstrate that, for public investment financing, a consumption tax is better than an income tax for income growth. If a future generation’s utility is not discounted greatly in social welfare, a consumption tax is superior. A government-set income growth rate target makes income tax financing desirable by providing more social welfare.