Matt Woerman

Secular Trends, Environmental Regulation, and Electricity Markets

The confluence of several pending environmental rulemakings will require billions of dollars of investment across the industry and changes in the operation of facilities. These changes may lead to retirement of some facilities, and there has been much debate about their potential effects on electricity reliability. Only very exceptional circumstances would trigger supply disruptions; however, the changes may affect electricity prices, the generation mix, and industry revenues. Coincident with these new rules, expectations about natural gas prices and future electricity demand growth are changing in ways that also will have substantial effects on the industry. This paper addresses these two sets of issues using a detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity market. The findings suggest that recent downward adjustments in natural gas prices and electricty demand projections have a substantially larger impact on electricity prices and generation mix than do the new environmental rules.

Linking by Degrees: Incremental Alignment of Cap-and-Trade Markets

National and subnational economies have started implementing carbon pricing systems unilaterally, from the bottom up. Therefore, the potential linking of individual cap-and-trade programs to capture efficiency gains and other benefits is of keen interest. This paper introduces a two-tiered framework to guide policymakers, with an interest in North American policy outcomes. One tier discusses program elements that need to be aligned before trading of allowances across programs can occur. The second identifies benefits of incremental alignment of program elements even prior to trading between programs—which we call “linking by degrees.” We apply this framework to California’s cap-and-trade program and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. These programs are already linking through cooperation and sharing of information. Many aspects of the program designs are ready for the exchange of allowances within a common market; however, the difference in allowance prices remains an issue to be considered before formal linking could occur.

Retail Electricity Price Savings from Compliance Flexibility in GHG Standards for Stationary Sources

The EPA will issue rules regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing steam boilers and refineries in 2012. A crucial issue affecting the scope and cost of emissions reductions will be the potential introduction of flexibility in compliance, including averaging across groups of facilities. This research investigates the role of compliance flexibility for the most important of these source categories—existing coal-fired power plants—that currently account for one-third of national emissions of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas. We find a flexible standard, calibrated to achieve the same emissions reductions as a traditional(inflexible) approach, reduces the increase in electricity price by 60 percent and overall costs by two-thirds in 2020. The flexible standard also leads to substantially more investment to improve the operating efficiency of existing facilities, whereas the traditional standard leads to substantially greater retirement of existing facilities.

Cost-effectiveness and Economic Incidence of a Clean Energy Standard

A Clean Energy Standard (CES) is a flexible, market-based policy instrument that could be adopted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the U.S. electricity system over time. This paper uses several well-known energy system and electricity models to analyze a CES that reflects broad principles outlined in President Obamas January 2011 State of the Union Address and in the Administrations subsequent Blueprint for a Secure Energy Future. 1 In particular, it examines three different design options for a CES that would each lead to approximately 80% clean electricity by 2035. These different design options provide broadly similar economic incentives for clean energy deployment and yield similar overall welfare impacts, but they exhibit different distributional outcomes. The most inclusive CES crediting approach favors producers over consumers in competitive electricity markets as well as regions with larger initial endowments of clean energy. On the other hand, the most restrictive crediting approach favors consumers over producers and reduces preferences for regions with larger initial endowments of clean energy. While specific technology outcomes vary across the four models used in this study, key insights about cost-effectiveness and economic incidence are largely robust to the underlying modeling platform. These insights may be important considerations in future CES policy design efforts.

Technology Flexibility and Stringency for Greenhouse Gas Regulations

The Clean Air Act provides the primary regulatory framework for climate policy in the United States. Tradable performance standards (averaging) emerge as the likely tool to achieve flexibility in the regulation of existing stationary sources. This paper examines the relationship between flexibility and stringency. The metric to compare the stringency of policies is ambiguous. The relevant section of the act is traditionally technology based, suggesting an emissions rate focus. However, a specific emissions rate improvement averaged over a larger set of generators reduces the actual emissions change. A marginal abatement cost criterion to compare policy designs suggests cost-effectiveness across sources. This criterion can quadruple the emissions reductions that are achieved, with net social benefits exceeding

Economic ideas for a complex climate policy regime

25 billion in 2020, with a 1.3 percent electricity price increase. Under the act, multiple stringency criteria are relevant. EPA should evaluate state implementation plans according to a portfolio of attributes, including effectiveness and cost.

US Status on Climate Change Mitigation

The parsimony of economic theory provides general insights into an otherwise complex world. However, the most straightforward organizing principles from theory have not often taken hold in environmental policy or in the decentralized climate policy regime that is unfolding. One reason is inadequate recognition of a variety of institutions. This paper addresses three ways the standard model may inadequately anticipate the role of institutions in the actual implementation of climate policy, with a US focus: multilayered authority across jurisdictions, the impressionistic rather than deterministic influence of prices through subsidiary jurisdictions, and the complementary role of prices and regulation in this context. The economic approach is built on the premise that incentives affect behavior. We suggest an important pathway of influence for economic theory is to infuse incentive-based thinking into the conventional regulatory framework. In a complex policy regime, incentives can be shaped by shadow prices as well as market prices.

Supply Curves for Conserved Electricity

In 2009, President Obama pledged that, by 2020, the United States would achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of 17 percent from 2005 levels. With the failure of Congress to adopt comprehensive climate legislation in 2010, the feasibility of the pledge was put in doubt. However, we find the United States is near to reaching this goal; currently, the country is on course to achieve reductions of 16.3 percent from 2005 levels in 2020. Three factors contribute to this outcome: greenhouse gas regulations under the Clean Air Act, secular trends including changes in relative fuel prices and energy efficiency, and subnational efforts. Nonetheless, global emissions likely will be greater than if comprehensive climate legislation had passed because of the absence of offsets, and at this point the United States is expected to fail to meet its financing commitments under the Copenhagen Accord for 2020.

Designing by Degrees: Flexibility and Cost-Effectiveness in Climate Policy

In this paper, we introduce a new top-down approach to modeling the effects of publicly financed energy-efficiency programs on electricity consumption and carbon dioxide emissions. The approach draws on a partial-adjustment econometric model of electricity demand and represents the results of a reverse auction for electricity savings from different levels of public investment. The model is calibrated to recent estimates of the cost-effectiveness of rate payer–funded efficiency programs at reducing electricity consumption. The results suggest that supply curves for conserved electricity are upward sloping, convex, and dependent on policy design and electricity prices. Under the scenarios modeled, electricity savings of between 1 and 3 percent are achievable at a marginal cost of

Mercury and Air Toxics Standards Analysis Deconstructed: Changing Assumptions, Changing Results

50 per megawatt hour (MWh) and a corresponding average cost of