Matteo Morganti

A new look at relational holism in quantum mechanics

Teller argued that violations of Bell’s inequalities are to be explained by interpreting quantum entangled systems according to ‘relational holism’, that is, by postulating that they exhibit irreducible (‘inherent’) relations. Teller also suggested a possible application of this idea to quantum statistics. However, the basic proposal was not explained in detail nor has the additional idea about statistics been articulated in further work. In this article, I reconsider relational holism, amending it and spelling it out as appears necessary for a proper assessment, and application, of the position.

Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism

Structural realism first emerged as an epistemological thesis aimed to avoid the so-called pessimistic metainduction on the history of science. Some authors, however, have suggested that the preservation of structure across theory change is best explained by endorsing the metaphysical thesis that structure is all there is. Although the possibility of this latter, ‘ontic’ form of structural realism has been extensively debated, not much has been said concerning its justification. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments in favor of ontic structural realism that can be reconstructed from the literature and find both of them wanting.

Tropes and Physics

According to some (see Bacon (2002)), the notion of a trope—that is, of an ‘abstract particular’, or ‘particularized property’, not deriving from a universal—can be traced, among others, to Plato, Aristotle, Boethius, Avicenna, Saint Th omas, Scotus, Leibniz and Husserl. For sure, it was defended in the 20th century by Stout (1921) and (1923), and later by Williams (1953). Nowadays, the literature on tropes is becoming progressively larger (see, for instance, Campbell (1981) and (1990), Simons (1994), Daly (1994), Denkel (1996) and (1997), Von Wachter (2000), Chrudziminski (2002), Maurin (2002) and Stjernberg (2003)). Despite a growing popularity of the theory1, though, an evident gap persists as regards the application of trope ontology; in particular, while the amount of work specifying how the view is to be understood—or what is (allegedly) wrong with tropes—is by now sizeable, few authors have attempted to substantiate the claim that the basic constituents of reality are tropes by identifying the latter with actual entities described by physical theory. Metaphysics, though, had better mesh well with our best scientifi c theories; whence it is clear that there is a missing brick in the philosophical construction here. Th is paper aims to fi ll this gap by looking at quantum theory and the Standard Model of elementary particles in search for the

Moderately naturalistic metaphysics

The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

Weak Discernibility, Quantum Mechanics and the Generalist Picture

a) Sticking with the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles (PII) as a criterion of individuality and object-hood, and consequently holding that quantum particles are not individual objects; b) Endorsing the idea that individuality is a primitive and non-furtheranalysable metaphysical fact of self-identity and numerical distinctness from other entities (the terms ‘primitive thisness’, ‘transcendental individuality’ and ‘haecceity’ have been variously used) which cannot be captured in terms of properties, and consequently demands the abandonment of PII.1

Individual Particles, Properties and Quantum Statistics

It is often held that the peculiar statistical behaviour of quantum particles is due to their non-individuality. In this paper, a new suggestion is put forward: quantum particles are individuals, and the distinctive features of quantum statistics are determined solely by the fact that all the properties it describes are emergent relations.

Relationism about Time and Temporal Vacua

This paper examines the discussion concerning temporal vacua, originated by Shoemaker’s famous 1969 paper, in connection to relationism about time – roughly, the view that time is nothing over and above a network of relations between things. A novel solution to the problem allegedly constituted by temporal vacua is presented, which turns out to call for, and support, a formulation of relationism that differs from the usual ones. In particular, it is argued that relationism requires neither actual nor merely possible modifications in the qualities or positions of things, and can be made entirely independent of the notion of change.

Metaphysics and Science

What we now call science appeared in its primitive form as early as the period during which the first Western civilisations flourished. By collecting observational data, elaborating upon them and employing them as a guide for gaining control of things, Babylonians and Egyptians started the study of astronomy, mathematics and medicine. In ancient Greece, knowledge began to be pursued for its own sake and not just for practical purposes. But while it is legitimate to say that the distinction between what one may call the ‘pure’ and the ‘applied’ — i.e., between abstract knowledge on the one hand and technical/practical knowledge on the other — was clear already in the Greek culture, the separation between science and philosophy was at that time far from sharply drawn. As a matter of fact, for the Greeks, all those seeking knowledge for its own sake were to be classified as ‘philosophers’ (lovers of wisdom). And the later Latin term ‘scientia’ — from which ‘science’ originates — corresponded to the Greek ‘episteme’, a concept referring to certain, reliable knowledge in general. Even in the Middle Ages, when philosophy and metaphysics were more precisely defined and systematically developed, those of science and philosophy continued to be more or less interchangeable notions with a rather broad meaning.

New Realism and Scientific Realism

The recent ‘new realist’ wave in philosophy reacts to the postmodernist/deconstructivist rejection of the notions of truth and objectivity by (re)affirming the priority of the real over the subjective and socially constructed. Crucial in this dynamics is, among other things, the refusal of the anti-scientific stance integral to the non-realist view. In light of this, it is advisable to look at the new realism vs. antirealism debate from the perspective of the seemingly more local dispute concerning scientific realism vs. antirealism. Indeed, doing this enables one to exploit elements that are peculiar to the discussion concerning the epistemic content of scientific theories with a view to properly evaluating, and even clarifying and further articulating, the ‘new realist’ stance itself.