Tuomas E. Tahko

Contemporary Aristotelian metaphysics

1. Introduction Tuomas E. Tahko 2. What is metaphysics? Kit Fine 3. In defence of Aristotelian metaphysics Tuomas E. Tahko 4. Existence and quantification reconsidered Tim Crane 5. Identity, quantification, and number Eric T. Olson 6. Ontological categories Gary Rosenkrantz 7. Are any kinds ontologically fundamental? Alexander Bird 8. Are four categories two too many? John Heil 9. Categories: four and more Peter Simons 10. Neo-Aristotelianism and substance Joshua Hoffman 11. Developmental potential Louis M. Guenin 12. The origin of life and the definition of life Storrs McCall 13. Essence, necessity and explanation Kathrin Koslicki 14. No potency without actuality: the case of graph theory David S. Oderberg 15. A neo-Aristotelian substance ontology: neither relational nor constituent E. J. Lowe.

Moderately naturalistic metaphysics

The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

Empirically-Informed Modal Rationalism

In this chapter, it is suggested that our epistemic access to metaphysical modality generally involves rationalist, a priori elements. However, these a priori elements are much more subtle than ‘traditional’ modal rationalism assumes. In fact, some might even question the ‘apriority’ of these elements, but I should stress that I consider a priori and a posteriori elements especially in our modal inquiry to be so deeply intertwined that it is not easy to tell them apart. Supposed metaphysically necessary identity statements involving natural kind terms are a good example: the fact that empirical input is crucial in establishing their necessity has clouded the role and content of the a priori input, as I have previously argued (Tahko 2015). For instance, the supposed metaphysically necessary identity statement involving water and its microstructure can only be established with the help of a controversial a priori principle concerning the determination of chemical properties by microstructure. The Kripke-Putnam framework of modal epistemology fails precisely because it is unclear whether the required a priori element is present.

Metaphysics as the First Philosophy

Aristotle talks about “the first philosophy” throughout Metaphysics — and it is metaphysics that Aristotle considers to be the first philosophy — but he never makes it entirely clear what first philosophy consists of. What he does make clear is that the first philosophy is not to be understood as a collection of topics that should be studied in advance of any other topics. In fact, Aristotle seems to have thought that the topics of Metaphysics are to be studied after those in Physics (Cohen 2009). In what sense could metaphysics be the first philosophy? Let me take the liberty of applying the technical jargon of contemporary metaphysics to answer: The first philosophy is an account of what is, or what it means to be, fundamental. Things that are the most fundamental are not grounded in anything more fundamental, they are ontologically independent. This does not necessarily mean that first philosophy attempts to list the most fundamental things, although this could be a part of the discipline. Rather, the study of fundamentality focuses on giving an account of what it is for something to be fundamental. So, first philosophy studies a certain type of being — the fundamental type, and it may also involve an account of which (kind of) things are, or could be, fundamental.