Matthew Dull

Divided We Quarrel: The Politics of Congressional Investigations, 1947–2004

Are congressional committee investigations into alleged executive-branch wrongdoing more common during periods of divided government? We analyze original data tracking congressional committee investigations into alleged fraud, waste, and abuse by the executive branch between 1947 and 2004. Countering David Mayhews (1991) empirical finding, we show that divided government generates more and more-intensive congressional investigations, but this relationship is contingent on partisan and temporal factors. Our findings shed new light on the shifting dynamic between partisan institutional politics and congressional oversight.

Rooting Out Waste, Fraud, and Abuse The Politics of House Committee Investigations, 1947 to 2004

Scholars have long bemoaned congressional disinterest in oversight. We explain varied congressional attention to oversight by advancing the contingent oversight theory. We show how the structure of congressional committees, partisan majorities, and theories of delegation together explain when, why, and for how long Congress investigated executive branch malfeasance between 1947 and 2004. Divided government, partisan committees, and committees characterized by broad statutory discretion generate more investigations, whereas distributive committees and unified government dampen Congress’ investigatory vigor. The conduct of oversight depends on more than a desire to produce good government or the incentive structures faced by individual members of Congress.

The Weaponization of Congressional Oversight

During the 2006 election cycle, Democrats campaigned on the promise of returning managerial competence to Washington.1 Congressional Republicans had been wracked by a series of ethics scandals, while the Bush administration had to deal with charges of maladministration in the handling of Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath and the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. Democrats complained loudly that congressional Republicans, serving as handmaidens for the administration and leery of possible political fallout, turned a blind eye to the serious allegations of administrative failings. Not only was the one hundred and ninth Congress notable for its relative lack of legislative productivity, it paid scant attention to executive oversight.2 House committees held only 960 hearings during the two year session—200 less than Democrats held during unified government under President Bill Clinton between 1993 and 1994. Senate Democrats, frustrated with Republican unwillingness to examine seriously the Bush Administration’s policy in Iraq, resorted to holding their own hearings on prewar intelligence (Pincus 2006). Democrats campaigned throughout the summer and fall on the promise to exercise increased oversight of the executive branch, with Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi notably pledging to “drain the Republican swamp” if voters threw out Republicans and gave them the majority (Espo 2006). Voters threw Republicans out, and the Democratic majority made good on their promise: At the conclusion of the one hundred and tenth Congress, the House conducted more than 1,400 hearings. Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA), the new chair of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, alone held 203 hearings during the last two years of the Bush administration (Sherman and Cohen 2010).

Can Climate Signals Inform Emergency Management? Preliminary Evidence

The emergency management community has widely discussed the long-term implications of global climate change for weather-related hazards such as floods, hurricanes, and droughts, but the community has paid relatively little attention to the connection between these hazards and shorter-term seasonal climate fluctuations (e.g., El Niño). This paper explores the potential for applying recent scientific and technical advances in the use of seasonal climate information to improve how emergency managers address such hazards risks and their associated disaster losses. The preliminary analysis presented here begins with a brief review of evidence from the research literature linking mid- and long-term forecasts to flood planning and management. We report on a small telephone survey of emergency managers involved in flood planning and management in 26 Oregon and Washington counties that experience interannual climate-variation that can increase the frequency or intensity of flooding. Our survey findings help illuminate the opportunities and obstacles for using climate science to inform emergency management. We then present results of a 2008 survey of emergency managers and educators that asks about the use of climate information for a wider range of weather-related hazards. We conclude by summarizing the opportunities for and obstacles to the use of climate information in emergency management.