Matthew G. Bunn

THE ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

This report assesses the economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The breakeven uranium price at which reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from existing light-water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is assessed, using central estimates of the costs of different elements of the nuclear fuel cycle (and other fuel cycle input parameters), for a wide range of range of potential reprocessing prices. Sensitivity analysis is performed, showing that the conclusions reached are robust across a wide range of input parameters. The contribution of direct disposal or reprocessing and recycling to electricity cost is also assessed. The choice of particular central estimates and ranges for the input parameters of the fuel cycle model is justified through a review of the relevant literature. The impact of different fuel cycle approaches on the volume needed for geologic repositories is briefly discussed, as are the issues surrounding the possibility of performing separations and transmutation on spent nuclear fuel to reduce the need for additional repositories. A similar analysis is then performed of the breakeven uranium price at which deploying fast neutron breeder reactors would become competitive compared with a once-through fuel cycle in LWRs, for a range of possible differences in capital cost between LWRs and fast neutron reactors. Sensitivity analysis is again provided, as are an analysis of the contribution to electricity cost, and a justification of the choices of central estimates and ranges for the input parameters. The equations used in the economic model are derived and explained in an appendix. Another appendix assesses the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable worldwide in the future at a range of different possible future prices.

Expert Judgments about RD&D and the Future of Nuclear Energy

Probabilistic estimates of the cost and performance of future nuclear energy systems under different scenarios of government research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) spending were obtained from 30 U.S. and 30 European nuclear technology experts. We used a novel elicitation approach which combined individual and group elicitation. With no change from current RD&D funding levels, experts on average expected current (Gen. III/III+) designs to be somewhat more expensive in 2030 than they were in 2010, and they expected the next generation of designs (Gen. IV) to be more expensive still as of 2030. Projected costs of proposed small modular reactors (SMRs) were similar to those of Gen. IV systems. The experts almost unanimously recommended large increases in government support for nuclear RD&D (generally 2-3 times current spending). The majority expected that such RD&D would have only a modest effect on cost, but would improve performance in other areas, such as safety, waste management, and uranium resource utilization. The U.S. and E.U. experts were in relative agreement regarding how government RD&D funds should be allocated, placing particular focus on very high temperature reactors, sodium-cooled fast reactors, fuels and materials, and fuel cycle technologies.

The economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel

We assess the economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent fuel. The uranium price at which reprocessing spent fuel from light water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is estimated for a range of reprocessing prices and other fuel cycle costs. The contribution of both fuel cycle options to the cost of electricity is also estimated. A similar analysis is performed to compare fast neutron reactors (FRs) with LWRs. We review available information about various fuel cycle costs, as well as the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable at a range of future prices. We conclude that the once-through LWR fuel cycle is likely to remain significantly cheaper than recycling in either LWRs or FRs for at least the next 50 yr, even with substantial growth in nuclear power.

Transforming U.S. Energy Innovation

The United States and the world need a revolution in energy technology—a revolution that would improve the performance of our energy systems to face the challenges ahead. A dramatic increase in the pace of energy innovation is crucial to meet the challenges of: • Energy and national security, to address the dangers of undue reliance on dwindling supplies of oil increasingly concentrated in some of the most volatile regions of the world, and to limit the connection between nuclear energy and the spread of nuclear weapons; • Environmental sustainability, to reduce the wide range of environmental damages due to energy production and use, from fine particulate emissions at coal plants, to oil spills, to global climate disruption; and • Economic competitiveness, to seize a significant share of the multi-trillion-dollar clean energy technology market and improve the balance of payments by increasing exports, while reducing the hundreds of billions of dollars spent every year on importing oil. In an intensely competitive and interdependent global landscape, and in the face of large climate risks from ongoing U.S. reliance on a fossil-fuel based energy system, it is important to maintain and expand long-term investments in the energy future of the U.S. even at a time of budget stringency. It is equally necessary to think about how to improve the efficiency of those investments, through strengthening U.S. energy innovation institutions, providing expanded incentives for private-sector innovation, and seizing opportunities where international cooperation can accelerate innovation. The private sector role is key: in the United States the vast majority of the energy system is owned by private enterprises, whose innovation and technology deployment decisions drive much of the country’s overall energy systems. Efficiently utilizing government investments in energy innovation requires understanding the market incentives that drive private firms to invest in advanced energy technologies, including policy stability and predictability. The U.S. government has already launched new efforts to accelerate energy innovation. In particular, the U.S. Department of Energy is undertaking a Quadrennial Technology Review to identify the most promising opportunities and provide increased coherence and stability. Our report offers analysis and recommendations designed to accelerate the pace at which better energy technologies are discovered, developed, and deployed, and is focused in four key areas: • Designing an expanded portfolio of federal investments in energy research, development, demonstration (ERDD • Increasing incentives for private-sector innovation and strengthening federal-private energy innovation partnerships; • Improving the management of energy innovation institutions to maximize the results of federal investments; and • Expanding and coordinating international energy innovation cooperation to bring ideas and resources together across the globe to address these global challenges.

Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?

The likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack depends in part on the ability of terrorist groups to acquire, construct, and detonate a nuclear device. This article attempts to determine the difficulty of such an endeavor by examining the underlying physical facts about nuclear fission, nuclear materials, and nuclear weapons design. The facts bear out a simple conclusion: while the danger should not be exaggerated, a nuclear terrorist attack is potentially within the capabilities of a well-organized and sophisticated terrorist group. A nuclear attack might be one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try, but if a highly capable group acquired a stolen nuclear bomb or enough nuclear material to make one, there can be few grounds for confidence that they would be unable to use it.

A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism

This article presents a mathematical model for measuring the global risk of nuclear theft and terrorism. One plausible set of parameter values used in a numerical example suggests a 29 percent probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade. The expected loss over that period would be

Tackling U.S. energy challenges and opportunities: preliminary policy recommendations for enhancing energy innovation in the United States

1.17 trillion (undiscounted), or more than

Reducing the Greatest Risks of Nuclear Theft and Terrorism

100 billion per year. Historical and other evidence is used to explore the likely values of several of the key parameters, and policy options for reducing the risk are briefly assessed. The uncertainties in estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism are very large, but even a risk dramatically smaller than that estimated in the numerical example used in this article would justify a broad range of actions to reduce the threat.

DOE FY 2010 Budget Request and Recovery Act Funding for Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment: Analysis and Recommendations

The report offers preliminary recommendations for near-term actions to strengthen the U.S. effort to develop and deploy advanced energy technologies. The report comes as the Obama Administration and the 111th U.S. Congress face enormous challenges and opportunities in tackling the pressing security, economic, and environmental problems posed by the energy sector. Improving the technologies of energy supply and end-use is a prerequisite for surmounting these challenges in a timely and cost-effective way, and this report elaborates on how policy can support develop of these important energy technologies.

Nuclear security in Russia: can progress be sustained?

Keeping nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them out of terrorist hands is critical to U.S. and world security - and to the future of nuclear energy as well. In the aftermath of a terrorist nuclear attack, there would be no chance of convincing governments to build nuclear reactors on the scale required for nuclear energy to make any significant contribution to coping with climate change. The fundamental key to success will be convincing policy-makers and nuclear managers around the world that nuclear terrorism is a real threat to their countrys security, worthy of new investments of their time and resources to reduce the risks, something many of them do not believe today.