Matthew S. Lewis

Asymmetric Price Adjustment and Consumer Search: An Examination of the Retail Gasoline Market

This article proposes a new explanation for why retail prices respond more quickly to cost increases than cost decreases. I develop a search model that assumes consumers’ expectations of prices are based on prices observed during previous purchases. This model predicts that consumers search less when prices are falling, which results in higher profit margins and a slower price response to cost changes. I then empirically examine patterns of retail gasoline price response and price dispersion to show that this model predicts observed price behavior better than previously suggested explanations.

Price Dispersion and Competition with Differentiated Sellers

I measure price dispersion among differentiated retail gasoline sellers and study the relationship between dispersion and the local competitive environment. Significant price dispersion exists even after controlling for differences in station characteristics, and price differences between sellers change frequently. The extent of price dispersion is related to the density of local competition, but this relationship varies significantly depending on the type of seller and the composition of its competitors. These findings are consistent with interactions between seller and consumer heterogeneity that are not well understood in the existing price dispersion literature.

Temporary Wholesale Gasoline Price Spikes Have Long‐Lasting Retail Effects: The Aftermath of Hurricane Rita

I study U.S. gasoline prices following Hurricane Rita to show that short‐lived geographical differences in the severity of wholesale gasoline price spikes are associated with long‐lasting geographical differences in retail prices. In most U.S. cities, wholesale prices spiked significantly for roughly 2 weeks following the hurricane. However, in cities where this spike was particularly large, retail margins remained higher than in other cities for nearly 2 months. High retail margins dissipated more quickly after the hurricane in cities where competition between stations tends to generate cyclical retail price fluctuations independent of wholesale cost movements. I discuss why prices may have fallen faster in cities exhibiting retail price cycles and present additional results identifying differences in market characteristics between cities with and without price cycles. I find that cycling cities tend to have higher population density and have independent (nonrefinery brand) stations that are more highly concentrated into large retail chains.

When Do Consumers Search

This paper provides empirical evidence relating search to price movements. We measure consumer search directly from traffic statistics for web sites that report gasoline prices. We show empirically that consumers search more as prices rise than they do when prices fall. Asymmetric search patterns have consequences for price behavior. Our findings indicate that retail margins are squeezed by increased search. In addition, we show that there is more price dispersion when prices are falling than when prices are either stable or rising. Our results provide a search‐based explanation for the ‘rockets and feathers’ phenomenon of asymmetric price adjustment.

The Speed of Gasoline Price Response in Markets with and without Edgeworth Cycles

Retail gasoline prices are known to respond fairly slowly to wholesale price changes. This does not appear to be true for markets with Edgeworth price cycles. Recently many retail gasoline markets in the midwestern United States and other countries have been shown to exhibit price cycles in which competition generates rapid cyclical retail price movements. We show that cost changes in cycling markets are passed on two to three times faster than in markets without cycles. We argue that the constant price movement inherent within the Edgeworth cycle eliminates price frictions and allows firms to pass on cost fluctuations more easily.

Odd Prices at Retail Gasoline Stations: Focal Point Pricing and Tacit Collusion

This study empirically investigates the theory that odd‐numbered pricing points can be used as focal points to facilitate tacit collusion. Like other retailers, gasoline stations in the United States disproportionately sell at prices ending in odd digits. I show that station prices are higher and change less frequently in locations using more odd prices (particularly those ending in 5 or 9), even after controlling for other market characteristics. The evidence suggests that the use of pricing points can be an effective mechanism for tacitly coordinating prices, providing an alternative explanation for the widespread use of odd prices in retail markets.

Hospital systems and bargaining power: evidence from out-of-market acquisitions

Competition analyses generally restrict their attention to how mergers alter concentration in the relevant consumer market. Studying hospital competition by focusing on the local patient market may be misleading, however, as multi-market hospital systems often play an important role in the price negotiations of their members with managed care organizations. We focus on out-of-market hospital mergers to investigate the cross-market effects of system membership on member hospital reimbursement rates. Based on acquisitions occurring across the United States during 2000-2008, we find that hospitals exhibit significant increases of around 14% in their net reimbursement rates after becoming affiliated with an out-of-market system compared to independent stand-alone hospitals. We find no evidence that the price effect results from changes in patient case-mix, the cost of providing care generally, or hospital quality. The findings reveal that systems can impact the market power of hospitals in ways that have not been considered in recent antitrust analysis.