Michael D. Noel

Edgeworth Price Cycles, Cost-Based Pricing and Sticky Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets

This paper examines dynamic pricing behavior in retail gasoline markets for 19 Canadian cities over 574 weeks. I find three distinct retail pricing patterns: 1. cost-based pricing, 2. sticky pricing, and 3. steep, asymmetric retail price cycles that, while seldom documented empirically, resemble those of Maskin & Tirole[1988]. Using a Markov switching regression, I estimate the prevalence of patterns and the structural characteristics of the cycles. Retail price cycles prevail in over 40% of the sample. I show they are more prevalent when there is a greater penetration of small firms. The cycle is accelerated and amplified with very many small firms. In markets with few small firms, sticky pricing is dominant. My findings is consistent with the theory of Edgeworth Cycles.

Edgeworth Price Cycles, Cost-Based Pricing, and Sticky Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets

This paper examines dynamic pricing behavior in Canadian retail gasoline markets. I find three distinct pricing patterns: cost-based pricing, sticky pricing, and sharp asymmetric retail price cycles that resemble the Edgeworth cycles of Maskin and Tirole (1988). I use a Markov-switching regression to estimate the prevalence of the regimes and the structural characteristics of the cycles themselves. I find cycles are more prevalent when there are more small firms and are accelerated and amplified with very many small firms. In markets with few small firms, sticky pricing dominates. The findings are consistent with the theory of Edgeworth cycles.

Edgeworth Price Cycles and Focal Prices: Computational Dynamic Markov Equilibria

Motivated by the discovery of apparent Edgeworth Cycles in many retail gasoline markets, this paper extends the Maskin & Tirole [1988] theory Edgeworth Cycles to a wide range of more complicated and realistic settings. Taking a computational approach to search for Markov Perfect Equilibria, I examine models involving duopoly and triopoly, differentiation, capacity constraints, and different sharing rules, discount factors and initial beliefs about price leading behavior. I find Edgeworth Cycles equilibrium in many scenarios outside the homogenous-good Bertrand mold. Cycle characteristics and average markups depend on the scenario.

The Speed of Gasoline Price Response in Markets with and without Edgeworth Cycles

Retail gasoline prices are known to respond fairly slowly to wholesale price changes. This does not appear to be true for markets with Edgeworth price cycles. Recently many retail gasoline markets in the midwestern United States and other countries have been shown to exhibit price cycles in which competition generates rapid cyclical retail price movements. We show that cost changes in cycling markets are passed on two to three times faster than in markets without cycles. We argue that the constant price movement inherent within the Edgeworth cycle eliminates price frictions and allows firms to pass on cost fluctuations more easily.

Edgeworth Price Cycles and Intertemporal Price Discrimination

In a retail gasoline market exhibiting Edgeworth Price Cycles, prices change asymmetrically with many small decreases interrupted by occasional large increases. The result is a de facto menu of prices from which consumers can choose based on exactly when they buy. This article introduces four classes of purchase timing strategies designed to systematically shift consumer purchases towards the cycle troughs. It shows in the study market of Toronto, Canada, the monetary gains to consumers from optimized timing strategies are as high as 3.9%. Markups earned from these consumers fall up to 82%. In spite of the gains from timing strategies, surprisingly few consumers use them. Evidence is presented that a main reason is that consumers are not well informed about the cycles. Policy implications are discussed.

Defining Markets that Involve Multi-Sided Platform Businesses: An Empirical Framework with an Application to Google's Purchase of DoubleClick

A multi-sided platform (MSP) serves as an intermediary for two or more groups of customers who are linked by indirect network effects. Recent research has found that MSPs are significant in many industries and that some standard economic results - such as the Lerner Index - do not apply to them, in material ways, without some significant modification to take linkages between the multiple sides into account. This article extends several key tools used for the analysis of mergers to situations in which one or more of the suppliers are MSPs. It shows that the application of traditional tools to mergers involving MSPs results in biases the direction of which depends on the particular tool being used and other conditions. It also extends these tools to the analysis of the merger of MSPs. The techniques are illustrated with an application to an acquisition by Google in the online advertising industry.

Forecasting gasoline prices in the presence of Edgeworth Price Cycles

Forecasting is a central theme in economics. The ability to forecast prices enables economic agents to make optimal decisions for the present and future. In this article, we investigate if and how gasoline prices can be forecast in retail gasoline markets that are subject to high-frequency, asymmetric price cycles known as Edgeworth Price Cycles. We examine a series of purchase timing decision rules and a series of feasible forecasting algorithms for updating those rules over time. We find that, in the presence of cycles, agents in our five Australian markets can systematically reduce purchase prices below market average the equivalent of 11 to 15 U.S. cents per gallon, using simple decision rules and feasible forecasting algorithms.

Do Gasoline Prices Resond Asymmetrically to Cost Shocks? The Confounding Effect of Edgeworth Cycles

Asymmetric price cycles which look similar to Edgeworth Cycles are appearing in increasingly many retail gasoline markets in the U.S. and worldwide. The cycles can give the appearance of asymmetric prices responses to cost shocks under traditional methodologies. This article shows how to remove the confounding effect of the cycles and test for any true underlying asymmetry in price responses. Designing the correct counterfactual is key. The methodology is demonstrated for one strongly cycling market and some asymmetry to cost shocks is found. Covert collusion is unlikely, but the ability to coordinate cyclical price increases may play a role. Consumers can still reduce xpenditures on gasoline up to 7.7% with simple timing rules of thumb.

Analyzing Market Definition and Power in Multi-sided Platform Markets

The SSNIP test and Critical Loss Analysis are widely used tools for determining market definition in merger and sometimes other antitrust matters. However, the standard techniques used to test for a relevant antitrust market are incorrect when the firms in question operate two-sided platforms. When a two-sided platform raises price on one side of its business, it negatively impacts both sides iteratively. We show how Critical Loss Analysis can be extended to the case of two-sided platforms and drive formulas for its implementation. We perform comparative statics to show that the bias from the misuse of one-sided formulas in a two-sided setting can be large.

Regulated and Unregulated Substitutes: Aversion Effects of an Ethanol Mandate

One approach for handling more aggressive goals under an ethanol mandate is to use a “dual blend” mandate in which both the preferred new ethanol blend and the old (possibly ethanol‐free) blend of gasoline coexist. Highlighting the case of New South Wales, Australia, we show the dual nature of such a mandate can potentially lead to significant costs when consumers are averse. We show consumers en masse rejected the new blend and paid 43 cents per gallon more to avoid it. Not even the second of the mandates four targets could be reached, and the consumer cost was substantial.