Matthew Stuart

Locke's Metaphysics

Acknowledgements Preface 1. Categories 2. Qualities 3. Secondary Qualities 4. Essence 5. Substratum 6. Mind and Matter 7. Identity 8. Persons 9. Agency: the First Edition 10. Agency: the Revised Account Bibliography Index

Having Locke's Ideas

Our understanding of Locke’s theory of ideas is stymied by his reticence about what he means by ‘idea’. I attempt to work around the problem by focusing on some neglected questions that afford us a better picture of his theory. I ask not what his ideas are, but what kinds of states or episodes he counts as someone’s having an idea, and what is involved in having simple and complex ideas. I argue that although we can make sense of much of what he says about having simple and complex ideas, he is muddled about simplicity and complexity.

Locke on attention

ABSTRACT Locke’s remarks about attention have not received a great deal of attention from commentators. In Section 1, I make the case that attention plays an important role in his philosophy. In Section 2, I describe and discuss five Lockean claims about attention. In Section 3, I explore Locke’s views about attention in relation to his account of sense perception. He thinks that we attend to objects by attending to ideas, and I argue that he treats sensory ideas as transparent in a particular sense. In Section 4, I raise the worry that some of Locke’s remarks about attention seem at odds with his doctrine of the transparency of the mind. I offer two ways of resolving the problem, and suggest that they are parts of a single story.