Michael Jacovides

Locke’s construction of the idea of power

Abstract I explain Locke’s account of the origin of our idea of power, showing that it concerns the idea of the disposition to act or change, and that this idea is constructed out of the ideas of action or change. I also show how Locke could have modified his account to avoid Hume’s criticism and argue that his neglect to do so reflects a studied neglect of taxonomy, an ambiguity in the notion of capacity, and complications in Locke’s conception of simple ideas. A comparison of the two empiricists reveals that not only do they disagree about the role of reason in the origin of our idea of power, but they are also talking about different ideas. Within the framework of Locke’s account of the origin of the idea of power, I explain why he believes that bodies only provide us with an obscure idea of active power. I conclude by defending his insight that there is a deep connection between the ability to predict and the idea of power.

Locke on the Semantics of Secondary Quality Words: A Reply to Matthew Stuart

Locke on the Semantics of Secondary-Quality Words: A Reply to Matthew Stuart Michael Jacovides Revised April 16, 2007 Let me first acknowledge the justice of Matthew Stuart’s criticism of my earlier treatment of Locke’s semantics for secondary-quality words and offer a revised account in its place. I’ll then argue that Locke’s thesis that secondary qualities are powers to produce ideas in us is not offered as a careful description of a being in the world but rather as a corollary to his semantics. I’ll go on to criticize some of what Stuart writes in defense of his own interpretation, according to which Locke believes that objects are only colored when they are seen. Finally, I’ll try to show that emphasizing Locke’s denial that secondary qualities are real beings helps us understand his flexible use of secondary-quality predicates.

Locke on the Propria of Body

In this paper, I will explain the relation between the two mysteries. Our Rosetta Stone is Locke’s argument that we understand body and spirit equally well since we are ignorant of their underlying substances but we ‘have distinct clear Ideas of two primary Qualities, or Properties’ (Essay 2.23.30) of each. I will show that he is working with a restricted notion of primary quality in this passage, but one that demonstrably falls under the kind defined in his chapter on primary and secondary qualities. According to Locke, the fundamental primary qualities of bodies flow from corporeal substances and the determinations of these fundamental qualities constitute real essences. Locke’s discussion cannot be understood without understanding the relevant scholastic background. In the first half of my paper, I will explain his argument as an idiosyncratic application of doctrines he learned and taught at Oxford. In the second half, I will use lessons from my interpretation of the argument to explain the relation that Locke believes obtains between a substance and its fundamental primary qualities, and then I will build upon that explanation to elucidate his general account (in so far as he has a general account) of the inherence of qualities in corporeal substances.

Cambridge Changes of Color

Lockes porphyry argument at 2.8.19 of the Essay has not been properly appreciated. On my reconstruction, Locke argues from the premise that porphyry undergoes a mere Cambridge change of color in different lighting conditions to the conclusion that porphyrys colors do not belong to it as it is in itself. I argue that his argument is not quite sound, but it would be if Locke chose a different stone, alexandrite. Examining his argument teaches us something about the relation between explanatory qualities and real alterations and something about the ways that colors inhere in bodies.