Matthias Basedau

Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries: A New Research Instrument Applied to 28 African Political Parties

The institutionalization of political parties is said to be important for democratic development, but its measurement has remained a neglected area of research. We understand the institutionalization of political organizations as progress in four dimensions: roots in society, level of organization, autonomy, and coherence. On this basis we construct an Index of the Institutionalization of Parties (IIP), which we apply to 28 African political parties. The IIP uses extensive GIGA survey and fieldwork data. Initial results reveal a more differentiated degree of institutionalization than is commonly assumed. In addition to illustrating overall deficits in party institutionalization, the IIP highlights an astonishing variance between individual parties and - to a lesser extent - between national aggregates. Further research on party institutionalization remains necessary, particularly regarding its causes and consequences.

Why do some oil exporters experience civil war but others do not?: investigating the conditional effects of oil

According to quantitative studies, oil seems the only natural resource that is robustly linked to civil war onset. However, recent debates on the nexus of oil and internal conflict have neglected the fact that there are a number of peaceful rentier oil states in existence. Few efforts have been made to explain why some oil-exporting countries have experienced civil war while others have not. We thus address this puzzle, by arguing that civil war risks depend on the specific conditions of oil production and how they come to structure state–society relations. Specifically, we expect that states that are either highly dependent on oil or who have problematic relations with oil regions are prone to civil war. However, these risks will be mitigated either when democratic institutions can manage conflicts peacefully or when abundant oil revenues can be spent in such a way as to buy peace. We test this conditional argument by comparing 39 net oil exporters, using a (crisp-set) Qualitative Comparative Analysis – a methodology particularly suited to test conditional relationships in medium- N samples. Our results largely confirm our conditional hypotheses. Conditions of oil production are ambiguous, and particular combinations thus explain the onset of civil war. Specifically, we find that high abundance is sufficient to ensure peace, while two distinct pathways lead to civil war: the combination of high dependence and low abundance, as well as the overlap of ethnic exclusion and oil reserves in non-abundant and non-democratic oil states.

Promoting Peace and Democracy Through Party Regulation? Ethnic Party Bans in Africa

Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced bans on ethnic or - in more general terms - particularistic parties. Such party bans have been neglected in research, and this paper engages in a preliminary analysis of their effects on democracy and peace. Theoretically, particularistic party bans can block particularisms from entering politics but also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to extra-legal or violent means. Neutral or context-dependent effects are also possible. Applying macro-qualitative comparison and bivariate statistics on the basis of a unique inventory of party bans and readily available indicators for the dependent variables, no simple connection can be detected. Rather, context conditions seem to be of superior explanatory power. We also find a systematic connection between party bans and variables that could be conceptualized as the causes of their implementation.

Ethnicity and party preference in sub-Saharan Africa

Recent research has questioned the notion that ethnicity is the main determinant of party preference in sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on data from representative survey polls in eight anglophone and francophone sub-Saharan countries, multinomial and binary logit regressions confirm that ethnicity counts but does not explain party preference as a whole. More importantly we find that the relevance of ethnicity varies substantially from country to country. Looking at possible effects, there is little evidence that ‘ethnicized’ party systems harm democracy; discussing possible structural, institutional and historical determinants of the role of ethnicity in party politics, tentative results suggest that specific integrative cultural features, low ethnic polarization, one-party dominance and a historical non-mobilization of ethnicity might thwart the politicization of ethnicity. Future research should focus on the interaction of several factors and how processes of ethnic mobilization evolve historically.

Ethnic party bans in Africa: an introduction

During the 1990s the number of African states allowing multiparty elections increased dramatically. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied in the majority of countries by legal bans on ethnic and other particularistic parties. The main official reason has been the aim of preventing the politicization of ethnicity as this is feared to lead to ethnic conflict and political instability. Despite the resurgent interest in institutional engineering, this phenomenon has received little scholarly attention. This contribution outlines the main research questions and preliminary answers of a collaborative research project which combines large and small N comparisons and case studies. Bans are relatively rarely enforced and the decision actually to ban parties is best explained by the interaction of an experience of ethnic violence in the past and hybrid regimes using these measures to restrict political party competition. Positive effects on democracy and conflict management seem generally limited and are context dependent.

Party systems in Africa: Problems of categorising and explaining party systems

Abstract Starting from controversial findings about the relationship between party systems and the prospects of democratic consolidation, this article argues that problems can only be properly addressed on the basis of a differentiated typology of party systems. Contradictory research results do not pose an ‘African puzzle’ but can be explained by different and inadequate approaches. We argue that a modified version of Sartoris typology of party systems provides an appropriate method for classifying African party systems. Based on Sartoris framework, a preponderance of predominant and dominant party systems is identified. This can be explained partly by the prevailing authoritarian nature of many multiparty regimes in Africa but not by electoral systems or the ethnic plurality of African societies. All kinds of electoral systems are connected to dominant party systems. High ethnic fragmentation does not automatically produce highly fragmented party systems. This phenomenon can be attributed to the ‘ethnic congress party’ that is based on an ethnic elite coalition.

Ethnic fractionalization, natural resources and armed conflict

Thus far, researchers working on ethnicity and resources as determinants of civil conflict have operated largely independently of each other. While there is plenty of evidence that natural resources may spur armed conflict, empirical evidence for the nexus between ethnic fractionalization and conflict remains inconclusive. Some authors conclude that ethnically fractionalized societies are actually spared from intrastate violence. Others find either a positive relationship or none at all between ethnic fragmentation and internal conflict. In this context, this paper serves two purposes: first, it shows that salience-based fractionalization indices are associated with a higher risk of ethnic conflict onset; second, it finds evidence that oil further increases the conflict potential within fractionalized countries. The combination of oil and a shared identity seems to help overcome the collective action problems associated with rebellion, by providing recruitment pools, strong motives and the necessary financial means for insurgency. Employing logit models for pooled time-series cross-sectional data, our quantitative analysis shows that various ethnic fractionalization indicators are robustly linked to a substantially increased risk of ethnic armed conflict onset in a subset of oil-abundant countries.

How ethnic are African parties really? : Evidence from Francophone Africa

Though African party systems are said to be ethnic, there is little evidence for this claim. The few empirical studies rarely rely on individual data and are biased in favour of Anglophone Africa. This paper looks at four Francophone countries, drawing on representative survey polls. Results reveal that ethnicity matters, but that its impact is generally rather weak and differs with regard to party systems and individual parties. ‘Ethnic parties’ in the strict sense are virtually absent. In particular, the voters’ location seems more important than ethnic affiliation. Other determinants such as regional ties, elite strategies, cross-cutting cleavages, and rational preferences deserve more attention in the future study of voting behaviour in Africa.

Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

Theoretically, the “mobilization hypothesis” establishes a link between religion and conflict by arguing that particular religious structures are prone to mobilization; once politicized, escalation to violent conflict becomes more likely. Yet, despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African conflicts, this assumption has not yet been backed by systematic empirical research on the religion–conflict nexus in the region. The following questions thus remain: Do religious factors significantly impact the onset of (religious) armed conflict? If so, do they follow the logic of the mobilization hypothesis and, if so, in which way? To answer these questions, this article draws on a unique data inventory of all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008, particularly including data on mobilization-prone religious structures (e.g., demographic changes, parallel ethno-religious identities) as well as religious factors indicating actual politicization of religion (e.g., inter-religious tensions, religious discrimination, incitement by religious leaders). Logit regressions suggest that religion indeed plays a significant role in African armed conflicts. These findings are compatible with the mobilization hypothesis, and stress the impact of conflict-prone religious structures, and particularly, the fact that overlaps of religious and ethnic identities are conflict-prone. Future research should investigate the religion-ethnicity-nexus in more detail.

Parties in chains: Do ethnic party bans in Africa promote peace?:

Since the sweeping (re)introduction of multiparty systems in the early 1990s, almost all sub-Saharan countries have introduced legal provisions to ban ethnic or other identity-based particularistic parties. Altogether, 12 countries have actually banned political parties on these grounds. In theoretical terms, such bans can exclude particularism from politics but — contrary to public discourse — also run the risk of forcing groups to resort to violent means or of becoming an object of conflict themselves. Empirically speaking, hardly any general patterns in the effects of bans can be detected. A closer look at 12 politically relevant bans in six countries reveals an initially stabilizing impact in one case (Rwanda in 1994). A ban on a religious party in Kenya in 1993 triggered violent conflict. In cases such as Equatorial Guinea (1994) and Rwanda (2001, 2003), this regulatory measure, allegedly designed to promote peace, seems to be part of the ‘menu of manipulation’ and is abused to suppress the opposition.