Christof Hartmann

Elections in Asia and the Pacific: a data handbook

SOUTH EAST ASIA Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Philippines Singapore Vietnam EAST ASIA China Japan Korea (North) Korea (South) Mongolia Taiwan SOUTH PACIFIC Australia Cook Islands Federated States of Micronesia Fiji Islands Kiribati Marshall Islands Nauru New Zealand Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu

Decentralisation in Africa : a pathway out of poverty and conflict?

Grounded in empirically-based country case studies, this new study provides a sober assessment of what decentralisation can achieve. The current momentum for decentralisation of government in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world is unparalleled, but are the benefits claimed by its advocates being realised? Focusing on two claims in particular, this book questions whether decentralisation does offer a significant pathway out of poverty and conflict in Africa. Issues of poverty reduction are addressed in Uganda, Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania, while those of conflict management are explored in Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda and Rwanda.

Ethnic party bans in Africa: an introduction

During the 1990s the number of African states allowing multiparty elections increased dramatically. Paradoxically, this has been accompanied in the majority of countries by legal bans on ethnic and other particularistic parties. The main official reason has been the aim of preventing the politicization of ethnicity as this is feared to lead to ethnic conflict and political instability. Despite the resurgent interest in institutional engineering, this phenomenon has received little scholarly attention. This contribution outlines the main research questions and preliminary answers of a collaborative research project which combines large and small N comparisons and case studies. Bans are relatively rarely enforced and the decision actually to ban parties is best explained by the interaction of an experience of ethnic violence in the past and hybrid regimes using these measures to restrict political party competition. Positive effects on democracy and conflict management seem generally limited and are context dependent.

Understanding variations in party bans in Africa

The article is interested in the main reasons for the emergence and enforcement of party bans in sub-Saharan Africa. While the introduction of legal provisions that allow for the banning of particularistic political parties is the standard on the African continent, few countries actually use these provisions and actually deny registration or ban existing parties. We use qualitative comparative analysis to compare the introduction of party bans and the patterns of implementation across all sub-Saharan countries. Our analysis shows that structural conditions do matter. Countries that did not introduce legal provisions to ban political parties combine a British colonial background and a stronger tradition of multi-party democracy. With regard to the decision to actually use these provisions our analysis shows the interaction of two conditions to be decisive: Countries which have experienced ethnically motivated violence in the past and which are at the same time ‘liberalizing’ their regimes rely on party bans to restrict political party competition.

Senegal's party system: the limits of formal regulation

Senegal has a long history of multiparty rule. In the 1970s the regime used party regulation to restrict political competition; since the 1990s and notwithstanding a steady rise of the number of political parties to around 150 at the end of 2008, there have been only a few attempts to regulate the activities of political parties. Party bans have been effective in limiting the politicization of ethnicity in the party system, but other social and political variables have contributed equally to this outcome. Formal rules have not been applied in stopping the rise of religious parties, as the electoral success of these parties remains limited. The shrinking importance of political parties in the increasingly personalist regime of President Wade makes regulation of party activities a less contested issue.

The regulation of party switching in Africa

The article presents a complete overview of existing regulations of party switching in Africa since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s. While most established democracies do not see any reason for sanctioning with legal restrictions the decision of members of parliament to change their party affiliation, in Africa many countries take a critical stance towards party switching. Frequent party switching is considered to weaken political parties, to hinder the institutionalisation of party systems, and to endanger the stability of government and the legitimacy of democracy. The article distinguishes legal regulations of party switching conceptually by what is prohibited and its enforcement. A preliminary analysis shows that anti-defection laws indeed matter for party system institutionalisation in Africas emerging democracies.

Expatriates as voters? The new dynamics of external voting in Sub-Saharan Africa

Expatriate voting has gained in importance over the last decade in Sub-Saharan Africa. This article gives an empirical overview of existing regulations in all independent states of the continent and examines some explanatory approaches in the African context. One approach claims that expatriate enfranchisement is a functional response to the increasing importance of migrants and their remittances. A second explanation refers to the role of domestic political structures and regime types. A third cluster of explanatory factors links external voting to the interests of political parties. Both in the broader comparative analysis and by looking more specifically at the cases of Ghana, South Africa, Cape Verde and Nigeria, all three approaches specifically contribute to understanding variation of external voting rights in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Democracy as a Fortuitous By-product of Independence UN Intervention and Democratization in Namibia

Democratization of Namibia was a more or less fortuitous by-product of independence. Universal suffrage was the rallying cry in the racially dominated system of South African Apartheid rule in Namibia because it equalled independence. It was thus the participatory aspect of democracy which allowed the acceptance of a liberal constitution and a set of democratic institutions. Independence meant that the armed liberation movement simply took over the state. External UN intervention was still crucial in creating a level playing ground for the first free and fair elections. UNTAG success was helped by a clear Chapter VI mandate, decisive leadership, a thinly populated country, and a South African administration which was no longer controlled by hardliners. International negotiations over Resolution 435 started fifteen years before their implementation, and international actors were integral to keeping the parties to its promises. External actors thus played a major and supporting role in the background.

Limits of Constitutional Reform in Managing African Conflicts

Alan Kuperman’s edited book (2015) is a welcome addition to a growing body of literature that aims to discuss the role of constitutions, and more broadly, political institutions, in managing ethnic conflict. The political and academic relevance of this agenda is obvious. Policy-makers frequently ask for best practices and a toolbox of institutional design, especially in situations where constitutions are perceived as a critical element of post-conflict peace building. Political scientists also typically believe that the successful management of violent conflicts may indeed depend on the intelligent design of political institutions. The book is an impressive example of innovative and theory-grounded research. It builds upon and tests earlier hypotheses about the best type of political institutions to manage and mitigate societal conflict and violence (Choudry, 2008; Reynolds, 2002). Although the literature contains some large-n comparative analyses, there has heretofore been very little research based on controlled comparative case studies. In light of the scholarly and policy agendas, such a comparative research design seems a particular sound strategy. It takes seriously the varying contexts and is able to produce policy recommendations that are neither probabilistic trends nor specific to a single case but that reflect the cumulative insights from the detailed and careful reconstruction of causal patterns emerging in the countries analysed. Such an approach needs a lot of case-specific expertise, which the collaborative project behind the book has brought together without any doubt. While I agree with the book’s general methodological approach and much of its policy recommendations, I would argue in the following that some theoretical decisions taken in the book are more debatable. I would like in particular to advance some arguments about the nature of the underlying conflicts that are supposed to be addressed by constitutional reform, and about the way we should understand the different constitutional design options. My short comments will end with some suggestions for further research and lessons for policy-making. Ethnopolitics, 2016 Vol. 15, No. 5, 523–527, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2016.1144415

Territorial Power Sharing and the Regulation of Conflict in Africa

The article argues that there is a relative lack of territorial power sharing in sub-Saharan Africa, but that this should not surprise us given the socio-ethnic context of most African countries which lack both majoritarian ethnic groups and clear culturally based distinctions between contending groups. A comprehensive analysis of the various federal systems and of some decentralising countries reveals a sobering record of conflict management and discusses some explanatory variables. In this context, forms of power sharing that include provisions on territorial autonomy, amounting to full-fledged federalism or restricted to some degree of decentralisation, should be regarded with caution. Regional autonomy as a solution to civil war will not work in most cases.