Matthias Lamping

The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern

A balanced, innovation-friendly and uniform patent system is indispensable for Europe. However, the latest EU proposal for a patent package (Patent Regulation and flanking court system) is both dangerous and misguided. While a superficial glance may create the false impression of a patent law advancement through the proposal, it instead actually threatens to forestall the necessary legal progress and innovation capacities for the foreseeable future. It might prove disastrous to implement a patent system which is already known to be detrimental from both the legal as well as the innovation perspectives. This paper provides a short introduction to the major reasons for concern regarding the current proposals and explains why it is imperative to reconsider the proposals entirely afresh.

Refusal to Licence as an Abuse of Market Dominance: From Commercial Solvents to Microsoft

Although intellectual property rights do not automatically confer a dominant market position, they may put the right holder in the position to behave more or less independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers. The extent of that relative immunity from competition depends on a number of factors, from the specific characteristics of the protected subject-matter through to the structure of the relevant market. In extreme cases, an intellectual property right will constitute an “essential facility” and therefore enable the right holder to control access to, and thus competition in, the market. In such cases, a refusal to license may lead to an abuse of market dominance within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the abuse may consist in a discrimination of trading partners, an unjustified foreclosure of competitors, a negligence of market needs or an expansion of market power to another related market. However, a compulsory license will not always be the appropriate remedy to stop the established abuse, its anti-competitive effects, and its recurrence. In principle, the European Commission asks the dominant company to cease and desist from the abusive conduct, but it does not grant compulsory licenses.

Intellectual Property Harmonization in the Name of Trade

In order to enjoy credibility and acceptance among those involved, harmonization must be the outcome of a deliberative process with a defined goal, but without a predetermined solution. States need to be clear about the purpose of harmonization and the measures for achieving it; they need to agree about how to handle different needs, priorities and expectations; and they need to be prepared to accept compromises beyond their narrow self-interest. The TRIPS Agreement tells a different story. Countries have learned to live with it, but nobody is entirely happy. In order to make international law more inclusive and responsive to different socio-economic conditions and needs, the TRIPS Agreement needs to be reconceptualized as a market framework regulation that promotes competition and innovation but also allows states to regulate the use of intellectual property in ways that grow out of, and comply with, their own traditions and interests. This ultimately means that the marriage of convenience between trade and intellectual property may have to come to an end.

Innovationsförderung nach TRIPS Zwischen progressiver Liberalisierung und regulativem Fundamentalismus

Immaterialguterrechte haben im Laufe des letzten Jahrhunderts einen Paradigmenwechsel von Ein- und Ausfuhrschranken hin zu designierten Voraussetzungen fur den Freihandel durchlaufen. Ausloser dieses Umbruchs war das Interesse der Industrielander, Marktchancen in weniger entwickelten Landern zu realisieren und damit dem Verfall der eigenen Wettbewerbsfahigkeit entgegenzuwirken. Daher ruhrt auch das Bedurfnis, den Entwicklungslandern durch das TRIPS-Ubereinkommen ein Ordnungssystem aufzuerlegen, das zwar einen moglichst starken Schutz auslandischer Investitionen gewahrleistet, fur die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung dieser Lander aber keine optimalen Voraussetzungen bietet. Den Vertragsstaaten ist im Hinblick auf die Ausgestaltung und Anwendung des nationalen Rechts aber durchaus noch eine gewisse Flexibilitat geblieben, um den Ausgleich zwischen einem effektiven Schutz von Innovationen und deren effizienter Nutzung und Weiterentwicklung zu wahren. Inwiefern sie von diesem Ermessensspielraum Gebrauch machen konnen, ist jedoch bedauerlicherweise keine rechtliche, sondern eine politische Frage.