Annette Kur

Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and the EU

It is a safe assumption1 that every one of the twenty-eight EU Member States has some form of secondary liability principles within its general tort law. Traditionally, tort law principles require an element of deliberate contribution to, and therefore positive knowledge of, another person’s action. They are therefore of limited value for situations like Internet infringement, because the contributor is typically unaware of persons committing concrete acts of infringement. When the contributor merely provides the technical infrastructure that is used by an anonymous crowd for legitimate as well as illegitimate purposes, the “deliberate contribution” or “positive knowledge” element is difficult to prove. The general principles of tort law are not harmonized within Europe.2 However, regarding Internet services that may be misused for unlawful acts (including, but not limited to, intellectual property infringement), the E-Commerce Directive has created a legal framework for exemptions from liability (the safe harbor).3 In that regard, the E-Commerce Directive is the European equivalent of the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), with the notable distinction that the ECommerce Directive applies horizontally, thus encompassing trademark infringement. Articles 12 through 14 of the E-Commerce Directive stipulate that, regarding transmission, caching and hosting, no liability will ensue if the person

Marks for goods or services (trademarks)

This comprehensive Handbook provides an in-depth analysis of the origin and main substantive provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, the most influential international treaty on intellectual property currently in force.

Die Alternativen zum Schutz durch das Urheberrecht in Deutschland

Die Frage, die den Titel dieses Beitrags bildet, hat keine eindeutige Zielrichtung. Sie kann sich auf verschiedene Situationen beziehen: a) Es wird davon ausgegangen, das Urheberrecht ware nicht „erfunden“ worden. Gabe es in diesem Fall alternative Schutzmoglichkeiten, und welche waren diese? b) Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass ein Urheberrecht an eigenschopferischen Leistungen des Urhebers gewahrt wird. Jedoch aa) konnen die daraus folgenden Anspruche gegenuber Dritten ausschlieslich vom Urheber selbst geltend gemacht werden. Verwerter konnen daher keine — auch nicht die wirtschaftlichen — urheberrechtlichen Befugnisse im eigenen Namen geltend machen; oder: bb) Der Schutz bezieht sich nur auf solche Werke, die gewissen Anforderungen an die Schopfungs- bzw. Gestaltungshohe genugen; die „kleine Munze“ wird nicht geschutzt.

Probleme im Überschneidungsbereich von Marken und Designs

Vor etwas mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten war die Welt des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes noch relativ säuberlich in einzelne Gebiete eingeteilt, die zwar Berührungspunkte, aber kaum nennenswerte Überlagerungen aufwiesen. Dies hat sich bekanntlich gründlich gewandelt; nicht nur, aber besonders deutlich im Überschneidungsbereich von Marken und Designs (Geschmacksmuster). Der deutlichste Unterschied zur zuvor bestehenden Rechtslage resultiert aus der mit der Markenrechtsnovellierung im Jahre 1994 vollzogenen Öffnung des Registerschutzes für dreidimensionale Gestaltungen. Kennzeichnungskräftige Formgebungen, die zuvor nur Ausstattungsschutz in Anspruch nehmen konnten2, wurden damit allen anderen Zeichenformen prinzipiell gleichgestellt. Hinzu kam, dass auch die Novellierung des Geschmacksmusterschutzes auf der Grundlage der europäischen Gesetzgebung mit ihrer expliziten Einbeziehung grafischer Symbole neue Formen der Designnutzung nahelegte.

From Minimum Standards to Maximum Rules

Partly born out of frustration about the incessant demands for increased intellectual property (IP) protection in the post-TRIPS era, calls for the introduction of mandatory limits for such protection have become vibrant over the last decade, leading to a number of initiatives and, recently, to the adoption of the first international IP treaty that is primarily geared towards limitations and exceptions. This chapter gives an overview on the background and current state of the movement towards maximum rules, discusses the potential benefits and drawbacks of the approach, the relationship with obligations resulting from previous IP treaties, and possible ways forward.

Introduction: Intellectual property, unfairness and speech - convergences and development

Intellectual property has elastic boundaries. The boundaries define the private and the public but at the same time, a boundary of regulation preserves the integrity of a system of regulation where identical rules apply to subject matter sharing similar characteristics. Throughout the history of intellectual property, various new types of subject matter have come to be included as objects of intellectual property protection, and similarly diverse patterns of use have emerged. The current intellectual property system extends protection to innovative ideas, creative works as well as signs, shapes, words, information, data, persona and images which may be subject to claims of property. Additionally, at the boundaries of intellectual property, similar interests and values arising out of conducts or objects have become increasingly regulated and protected as rights under the rubric of related regulations. As a result, more and more efforts and values are being claimed as objects of ownership. Such claims are not merely the domain of intellectual property rights, as written in statutory law. Courts in many jurisdictions seem prepared to afford some degree of proprietary protection by employing conduct-based norms or principles of equity. Intellectual property looks to the nature of the subject matter i.e. original work, invention, signs, and sees if it is possible to categorize emerging subject matters, such as celebrity images, into existing regimes. A conduct based regulation, in contrast would look at whether the conduct such as using a celebrity image and likeness in the advertising should be sanctioned. In between, there may be a contract of confidence which prohibits the disclosure of personal information concerning celebrity. In some cases where there were legislative changes to allow new subject matters to be protected, the expansion seems real. In others, the

(No) Freedom to Copy? Protection of Technical Features under Unfair Competition Law

Innovation is triggered by patents – at least that’s the conventional wisdom on which the patent system (more generally, the system of technical innovation rights) is founded. No attempt shall be made here to venture into the recurrent battles of faith over the validity of that statement. Instead, the starting point for the following lines is the question to what extent are innovative, technical features generally excluded from protection under legal regimes other than patent or utility model law. The topic is frequently addressed under trademark law, where it has resulted in the inclusion of specific provisions into the European Trademark Directive (89/ 104/EEC, TMD) and the Community Trade Mark Regulation (40/94, CTMR).1 Instead of dealing with European trademark law, however, this contribution will limit itself to examining whether and to what extent national unfair competition law offers a basis for protection of technical features. The choice of this topic is a tribute to the fact that in the early days of Joseph Straus’ academic career, unfair competition was a focus of his scientific interest.2 In recalling the early beginnings of an extended and immensely fruitful period of academic writing, this contribution is meant to commemorate the many years both Joseph Straus and the author have spent in the physical and spiritual realms of the Max Planck Institute in Munich.

Strategic Branding: Does Trademark Law Provide for Sufficient Self Help and Self Healing Forces?

As a matter of principle, the tensions between trade marks and free competition are less obvious than in other fields of IP law. By providing information on the availability and sources of goods and services without restricting production as such, trade marks rather serve to enable than to restrain competition. However, problems may arise where, contrary to a general assumption, specific types of signs are not in infinite supply, or where the acquisition of a trade mark right otherwise confers on the holder more or other competitive advantages than those deriving from the goodwill acquired under the sign. The article examines certain constellations in which such advantages may typically accrue - inter alia marks designating major sports events, marks consisting the shape of products, abstract colour marks - and poses the question whether European trade mark law is capable and ready to deal with the problems raised thereby. It is argued that in order to activate the self-healing forces of trade mark law against undue restraints of competition, the purely empirical approach frequently adopted by the courts in the appraisal of the distinctive character of trade marks must be complemented by a normative assessment taking also account of competition aspects.