Matthias Lankau

Cooperation Preferences in the Provision of Public Goods: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Social Identity

Traditionally economic theory assumes that preferences are stable facilitating positive predictions of economic policy. While there is conflicting experimental evidence on the temporal stability of cooperation preferences in public goods provision, surprisingly little is known about their stability in different institutional settings. We contribute to this literature by testing whether social identity impacts on cooperation preferences in public goods provision. Specifically, our experiment features a within subject design based on one shot public good games in strategy method, which are carried out in random, in and out group matching protocols. Our findings indicate that cooperation preferences are not stable across these matching circumstances. Quite to the contrary, we find that when matched with in group members, subjects consistently show the preference for higher levels of conditional cooperation and thus less self serving bias than in out group matching. Additionally, while the probability to be a conditional cooperator remains stable under each treatment, we identify an elevated propensity to be a free rider when matched with individuals of a different identity. These results indicate that it can be reasonable to devise policy institutions that strengthen the feeling of belonging to a particular group in order to enhance social welfare.

Negative reciprocity and its relation to anger-like emotions in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups

Several studies have shown that social identity fosters the provision of public goods and enhances the willingness to reciprocate the cooperative behavior of group members. Nonetheless, the question of how social identity affects negative reciprocity in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups has only received little attention. Consequently, we seek to fill this gap by examining whether social identity affects individuals’ willingness to sanction deviating group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in negative reciprocity. To test our hypotheses, we employ one-shot public good games in a strategy method with punishment opportunity and induced social identity. Our results indicate that members of identity-homogeneous groups are prone to reveal less negative reciprocity than identity-heterogeneous groups when they face contributions smaller than their own. We also find that anger-like emotions much more strongly influence punishment behavior when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in identity-homogenous groups. These findings contribute to an increased understanding of the nature of social identity and its impact on reciprocity, improving economists’ ability to predict behavior while taking emotions into consideration.