Kilian Bizer

Voluntary agreements – trick or treat?

Voluntary agreements (VAs) in environmental policy can increase the attention and commitment of individual actors within defined groups and social contexts. However while VAs can be usefully applied in a general framework of responsive regulation, they have a significant potential to fail if they are intended to replace command-and-control or economic incentives. As VAs are neither cost-effective nor equal to command-and-control in enforcing a given environmental goal, they should only supplement regular environmental policy instruments. The environmental effectiveness of agreements depends on certain characteristics. On the basis of four case studies this paper shows that cultural context matters as does a framework of clear targets and distinct responsibilities. Effectiveness is also high if the information gathered through regular monitoring, reporting and verification of performance is collected independently and made available to the public. Given this it is concluded that VAs are a treat in environmental policy if they are applied as a supplementary measure in a mixed policy approach, but once they replace command-and-control and economic incentives as a purely deregulatory measure VAs quickly turn into a trick. Copyright

Cooperation Preferences in the Provision of Public Goods: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Social Identity

Traditionally economic theory assumes that preferences are stable facilitating positive predictions of economic policy. While there is conflicting experimental evidence on the temporal stability of cooperation preferences in public goods provision, surprisingly little is known about their stability in different institutional settings. We contribute to this literature by testing whether social identity impacts on cooperation preferences in public goods provision. Specifically, our experiment features a within subject design based on one shot public good games in strategy method, which are carried out in random, in and out group matching protocols. Our findings indicate that cooperation preferences are not stable across these matching circumstances. Quite to the contrary, we find that when matched with in group members, subjects consistently show the preference for higher levels of conditional cooperation and thus less self serving bias than in out group matching. Additionally, while the probability to be a conditional cooperator remains stable under each treatment, we identify an elevated propensity to be a free rider when matched with individuals of a different identity. These results indicate that it can be reasonable to devise policy institutions that strengthen the feeling of belonging to a particular group in order to enhance social welfare.

Voluntary agreements: cost-effective or a smokescreen for failure?

Voluntary environmental agreements are widely considered an alternative instrument to command-and-control policies or economic incentives and are frequently labeled “efficient” or “cost-effective.” In this article it is argued that voluntary agreements are much more limited in scope. It is shown that agreements are cost-effective only under restrictive conditions rarely observed and that flexibility of nonbinding agreements often results in failing the environmental objectives altogether. Empirical evidence of an interdisciplinary analysis of eight case studies suggests that voluntary agreements should be applied as additional instruments rather than alternatives where small and homogeneous groups can be motivated to adhere to voluntary standards or where government agencies carry “big sticks” (i.e., threats of regulatory standards).

Lock-In Effects in Competitive Bidding Schemes for Payments for Ecosystem Services

Competitive bidding is considered to be a cost-effective allocation mechanism for payments for ecosystem services. This article shows that competition is not a necessary condition for sustaining cost-effectiveness in the long run. In a repeated conservation auction, learning, specific investments and the creation of social capital bias the chances of winning a follow-up contract in favour of former auction winners. Applying the concept of fundamental transformation (Williamson 1985), we argue that this asymmetry weakens competition and leads to lock-in effects between the auctioning agency and a stable pool of sellers with uncertain consequences for cost-effectiveness. We compare data from two laboratory experiments on auction-based conservation programmes and show under which conditions lock-in effects are likely to occur in a controlled environment. Our findings demonstrate lock-in effects do not erode the effectiveness of an auction but change the rules of the game towards more favourable conditions for the provision of the targeted good or service. In view of the empirical evidence for a superior performance of long-term contract relationships compared to low-cost short-term contracting, we discuss directions for follow-up empirical work.

Die Effizienz von Zuteilungsmechanismen bei Flächenzertifikaten zwischen Versteigerung und Grandfathering: Experimentelle Evidenz

Zusammenfassung: Die Einführung handelbarer Flächenzertifikate wird als Regulierungsinstrument zur Reduktion des Flächenverbrauchs in Deutschland diskutiert. Bislang fehlen jedoch empirische Studien zur Untersuchung der Wohlfahrts- und Umverteilungswirkung eines solchen cap & trade Systems. Insbesondere die Frage nach der Effizienz verschiedener Mechanismen der Primärallokation von Zertifikaten ist politisch relevant, aber bisher nicht untersucht. Die vorliegende Studie analysiert daher anhand eines ökonomischen Laborexperiments, das ein Zertifikatsystem zur Flächenverbrauchsreduktion simuliert, die Auswirkungen von drei Primärallokationsmechanismen: einer vollständigen Gratiszuteilung, einer ausschließlichen Versteigerung und einer hälftigen Aufteilung von Gratiszuteilung und Versteigerung. Es zeigt sich, dass ein Auktionsmechanismus die Effizienz und Stabilität des Zertifikatsystems senkt. Zertifikatpreise weisen eine höhere Volatilität auf und es bestehen stärker als durch die Theorie zu erwartende Umverteilungseffekte zu Gunsten des Auktionators. Persistente Preisunterschiede zwischen Auktion und innerkommunalem Handel verhindern eine effiziente Allokation der Zertifikate. Während das Zertifikatsystem insgesamt bei einer Gratiszuteilung einen hohen Effizienzgrad erreicht, führt ein Auktionsmechanismus zu Ineffizienzen, Unsicherheit und starken Umverteilungswirkungen. Aus wirtschaftspolitischer Sicht unterstützen diese Ergebnisse eine Gratis-Zuteilung innerhalb eines Systems handelbarer Flächenzertifikate.

Handelbare Flächenzertifikate – vom akademischen Diskurs über einen Modellversuch in die Planungspraxis?

ZusammenfassungDie Idee, handelbare Nutzungszertifikate auf den Problembereich der Flächeninanspruchnahme für Siedlung und Verkehr zu übertragen, wird in Wissenschaft und Politik seit über 15 Jahren diskutiert. Dennoch blieb es in Deutschland lange Zeit bei wissenschaftlichen Erörterungen und Vorschlägen sachverständiger Politikberatungsgremien, bis 2009 mit der Koalitionsvereinbarung der Regierungsparteien eine modellhafte Erprobung eines überregionalen Handelssystems für die Flächennutzung angeregt wurde. Der vorliegende Beitrag bietet einen Überblick über die Ergebnisse des mit der fachlichen Vorbereitung dieses Modellversuchs befassten Forschungsprojektes im Auftrag des Umweltbundesamtes, das 2012 startete. Dazu wird zunächst die wissenschaftliche Debatte über die positiven wie negativen Wirkungen handelbarer Flächenzertifikate zusammengefasst. Anschließend skizziert der Beitrag das geplante methodische Design des Modellversuchs, der ein „kontrolliertes Feldexperiment“ und parallel „kommunale Fallstudien“ umfassen soll. Der Aufsatz schließt mit einem kurzen Ausblick auf die zu erwartenden Erkenntnisse aus dem Modellversuch.AbstractFor more than 15 years now, researchers and policy makers have been discussing the transfer of trading programs from the regulation of emissions to the regulation of land development. However, the debate remained limited to researchers for a long time, until the German government initiated preparation of a nationwide “pilot project” in 2009. This paper reports on the results of the preliminary project funded by the Federal Environment Agency. An interdisciplinary team developed an outline proposal for the “pilot project”. After a summary of the consequences, benefits and cost of tradable planning permits in general, the paper presents and discusses how the project should be organized in detail. The proposal suggests a controlled field experiment in combination with extensive municipal case studies. The paper concludes with a perspective of the expected outcome of the “pilot project” which has started in 2012.

Improving the Integrated European Impact Assessment

Based on an institutional analysis of the incentive situation of desk officers, the DG’s leading officers as well as the Impact Assessment Board, the Inter-Service Steering Group (now called the IASC) and interest groups this chapter develops hypotheses on the functioning of impact assessments and their quality. Checked against the literature and 30 impact assessments conducted by various Directorate Generals of the EU Commission we argue that quality control should be as independent as possible, that de facto blocking rights of the quality control board are necessary and that desk officers must be moved towards quantification and monetarisation of impacts also in the environmental realm in order to balance economic, social and environmental impacts in a transparent way.

Grundprobleme von Indikatorsystemen für Regionale Nachhaltigkeit

KurzfassungDie Autoren prüfen in dem Beitrag, ob sich Indikatorensysteme regionaler Nachhaltigkeit für den interregionalen Vergleich von Nachhaltigkeitsniveaus sowie als politische Steuerungsinstrumente eignen. Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse stehen das Skalierungs-, das regionale Struktur-sowie das Aggregationsproblem. Die Resultate zeigen, dass beim bisherigen Stand der Forschung erhebliche methodische, theoretische und empirische Defizite bestehen, die selbst bei verbesserten Regionalisierungsverfahren wissenschaftlich fundierte Vergleiche interregionaler Nachhaltigkeit vorerst erschweren dürften.AbstractThis paper explores the possibility to use indicator systems of regional sustainability for interregional comparisons as well as policy instruments. The potential for such a utilisation is limited by three major problems. First, the problem of aggregating many separate indicators to finally one sustainability index, on which fiscal relations supposedly could be based, second the varying regional endowments which provide different starting points for sustainable developments, and finally the problem of cardinal or ordinal scale as many of the indicators discussed are only of qualitative nature. As a result we conclude that regional comparisons of sustainability suffer from substantial methodological and theoretical shortcomings even if improved regionalisations can be applied.

The Essential Elements of a Risk Governance Framework for Current and Future Nanotechnologies

Societies worldwide are investing considerable resources into the safe development and use of nanomaterials. Although each of these protective efforts is crucial for governing the risks of nanomaterials, they are insufficient in isolation. What is missing is a more integrative governance approach that goes beyond legislation. Development of this approach must be evidence based and involve key stakeholders to ensure acceptance by end users. The challenge is to develop a framework that coordinates the variety of actors involved in nanotechnology and civil society to facilitate consideration of the complex issues that occur in this rapidly evolving research and development area. Here, we propose three sets of essential elements required to generate an effective risk governance framework for nanomaterials. (1) Advanced tools to facilitate risk-based decision making, including an assessment of the needs of users regarding risk assessment, mitigation, and transfer. (2) An integrated model of predicted human behavior and decision making concerning nanomaterial risks. (3) Legal and other (nano-specific and general) regulatory requirements to ensure compliance and to stimulate proactive approaches to safety. The implementation of such an approach should facilitate and motivate good practice for the various stakeholders to allow the safe and sustainable future development of nanotechnology.

Tradable development rights under uncertainty: An experimental approach

ABSTRACT Tradable development rights (TDR) are discussed as a mechanism to reduce land consumption while ensuring an efficient implementation of profitable building projects. We present a novel laboratory experiment on the feasibility of TDR and simulate the acquisition and trading of development rights. In particular, we investigate the effects of uncertainty in the revenues of land consumption projects. Overall, we find that TDR are reallocated as suggested by theory, although higher uncertainty has substantial detrimental effects on the distribution of land consumption projects and thus aggregate welfare. This enables us to formulate distinct policy implications for the design of TDR systems.