Matti Wiberg

Winners and Losers in the Council: Voting Power Consequences of EU Enlargements

Who will have power in the enlarged European Union? How will the enlargement of the EU alter the configuration of Member States’ a priori voting power in the Council of Ministers? One of the most controversial topics debated in the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was the need for institutional reform, namely how to make EU decision-making more effective. An important dimension of institutional reform is the challenge posed by enlargement. The entry of several new countries will have considerable consequences for the functioning of EU institutions. This article analyses the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers under different majority requirements in an enlarged Union. The analysis shows how the enlargement weakens the influence of all Member States. The larger Member States will lose more than the others, relatively speaking. The more stringent the decision rule, the more power the smaller members have.

Questioning in European Parliaments

Although parliamentary questions (PQs) are a feature of most legislatures, no two legislatures share exactly identical questioning forms. This research provides an overview of forms of questioning in European parliaments, covering variation in the main institutional features, the processing of questions and the impact of political parties on questioning. Cross-national and temporal variation in the behavioural trends in questioning is identified using more in-depth analysis of patterns of questioning in the national parliaments of the United Kingdom, France and Spain. The accountability game is found to have a general structure based on the principal–agent relationship and the fact that government must answer questions posed by MPs. PQs are conceived as formal mechanisms to combat information asymmetries and moral hazard, especially when there is hidden information, and by means of them MPs can give orientation or indirizzo (direction) to the executive.

Parliamentarizing Foreign Policy Decision-Making Finland in the European Union

Within less than a decade Finlands status has changed from a non-aligned country to a full European Union (EU) member. This article analyses two dimensions of the process: Finnish integration policy and the impact of EU membership on domestic balance of power. Commitment to European integration is primarily explained by the need to secure a place among the West European countries in order to protect national economic and political interests. We examine governmental behaviour in the membership negotiations and the main cleavages of the 1994 membership referendum. The institutional changes within and between the legislative, executive and administrative branches are investigated. Foreign policy decision-making has undergone a significant transformation, with the government and the parliament the key players in deciding national European policy. While the dynamics of the EU political system facilitate fragmentation of policy-making along sectoral lines, on key issues national policy formulation is based on broad coordination, with an emphasis on achieving elite consensus that, it is argued, enhances national power in the EU institutions.

The Eduskunta and the Parliamentarisation of Finnish Politics: Formally Stronger, Politically Still Weak?

According to the ‘decline of parliaments’ thesis that dominates the literature, the executive branch has increased its powers vis-à-vis the legislature. However, at the same time most studies indicate that the parliaments in the Nordic region are on average stronger than their counterparts in central and southern European countries. This article examines the validity of the ‘decline of parliaments’ thesis in the context of Finland, a country where recent constitutional reforms have strengthened parliamentarism by reducing the powers of the president and empowering the government and the parliament. Analysing the constitutional balance of power between state organs, the interaction between the government and the opposition, and the ability of the parliament to hold the cabinet accountable, this article argues that despite its stronger constitutional position, the Eduskunta faces considerable difficulties in controlling the government.

Strong parliament of a small eu member state: The Finnish parliament's adaptation to the EU

If even the minister participating in the meeting of the Council of Ministers does not know the agenda of the day, not to say anything of whether the minister has all relevant documents available, how can anyone imagine that the Parliament could influence the decisions? The Finnish Ex‐EU minister Mr Pertti Salolainen (Cons).1 The article gives a presentation of the Finnish Parliaments early adaptation to EU membership. Our main argument is that the Finnish Eduskunta is stronger that the other national parliaments with respect to dealing with EU issues, because the Eduskunta is pro‐active and because the whole Parliament, all standing committees included, is involved in the preparation of Finnish national EU policies before decisions are taken in the Council of Ministers. The Finnish Parliament is thus in a strong position to influence in advance, on an established routine basis, the position of the Finnish representative in the Council of Ministers. We also point out some practical and informational prob...

Grounds for Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service: The Deontological-Teleological Distinction Considered

This study of the grounds for recognition of conscientious objection to military service focuses on the conventional distinction between deontological and teleological moral theories. It is analytically proved that if it is possible to justify conscientious objection on deontological grounds, then this must necessarily be the case even on some teleological grounds.

The Minor Impact of EU on Legislation in Finland

The impact of European integration and the European Union (EU) on national parliaments first received serious political and academic attention in the mid-1990s. Both members of parliament (MPs) themselves and scholars became more interested in whether and how national parliaments controlled their governments in European matters, particularly as a broader range of policies and national laws were overtaken by EU laws. The first decade of the new millennium saw the completion of several comparative research projects on the role of national parliaments in the EU (Wiberg 1997; Maurer and Wessels 2001; Auel and Benz 2005; Holzhacker and Albaek 2007; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007; Tans et al. 2007; Barrett 2008). But despite this proliferation of research, we lack empirical studies on the extent to which national parliaments have in fact been Europeanised, i.e., how much and in what ways the EU impacts national parliaments. And more specifically, we lack agreement on how to measure or operationalise the Europeanisation of national parliaments.

Controlling Outcomes: Voting Power in the European Parliament 1979-2000

This article examines voting power in the directly elected European Parliament (1979-2000). The distribution of voting power among party groups is analysed under simple majority, 2/3, 3/4 and 3/5 majority rules with the standardized Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik voting indices. The share of seats controlled by each party group is compared to its share of a priori voting power. No party group has ever alone controlled the voting outcome, but on the other hand all groups possess at least some voting power. Nevertheless, the findings clearly indicate that the smaller groups are marginalized in the Parliament. The medium-sized groups have also relatively little voting power, but their ideological locations enable them to influence outcomes beyond their numerical strength. We discuss the practical implications of our findings for coalition behaviour in the chamber and for Parliaments influence in the EU policy process.

Steuerung des Abstimmungsverhaltens 1979–1995

Wer hat die Macht im Europaischen Parlament? Eine knappe Antwort auf diese Frage wurde einfach nur die Starke der Fraktionen, gemessen in Mandaten, zur Grundlage nehmen. Eine umfassende und vollstandige Antwort muste auf einer detaillierten historischen Analyse der Handlungen und Unterlassungen der verschiedenen Akteure im Europaischen Parlament beruhen. Die erste Moglichkeit wurde eine zu starke Vereinfachung bedeuten, die zweite ware zu komplex. Wir werden uns hier auf die Macht der Fraktionen im Europaischen Parlament im Hinblick auf die Kontrolle uber das Abstimmungsverhalten konzentrieren.