Mattias Kumm

Global constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

When the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued its judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat 2 – better known now as the Kadi case – it highlighted the constitutional dimension that results from the interaction between different political and legal arenas in the global system. The ECJ challenged the hierarchic international legal order in which the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was understood to have fi nal normative authority. In so doing, the ECJ reiterated the centrality of the rule of law in the protection of human rights. In the process the case promoted the constitutionalisation of the global system. At the same time, the ECJ justifi ed its judgment by the need to protect the constitutional order of the EU and the constitutional values of its member states. While scholars of European law have addressed the far-reaching implications of this case, there has been less attention paid to it by those working on wider issues in international relations theory, international law and political science more generally. This case demonstrates how the interaction between different political and legal orders impacts on the fundamental rights of individuals in ways that deserve much more attention. It is, therefore, a good example of how constitutional questions and claims are emerging beyond the state and how they require the input of different disciplines at the intersection of law and politics. If we take the range of academic output on the case as an indicator, it clearly is infl uential far beyond the discipline of European or International Law, possibly marking a critical juncture for the fi eld of international

Hard times: Progress narratives, historical contingency and the fate of global constitutionalism

Editorials in academic journals can serve many functions, including as a snapshot of a discipline’s preoccupations at a particular moment in time. As Global Constitutionalism enters its fourth year of publication, we begin with refl ections on the current global political environment. If last year’s editorial asked ‘How large is the world of global constitutionalism?’ – and earlier editorials elaborated on the rationale for a new journal on Global Constitutionalism 1 and addressed the interdisciplinary challenges arising from the journal’s novel remit 2 – this year the mood is decidedly different. Indeed, in light of developments over the past year, it is appropriate to consider whether, as a political matter, at least certain elements of global constitutionalism have provisionally peaked or even entered a period of decline – and if so, how scholars interested in global constitutional processes should respond.

How large is the world of global constitutionalism

As Global Constitutionalism enters its third year, we want to take the opportunity to refl ect on and explore the conceptual and institutional boundaries of the world of global constitutionalism. In our fi rst editorial two years ago we defi ned the mission of the journal to promote a deeper understanding of the foundations, limitations and principles of political order and their dynamics over time across or between states, institutions or political communities. We insisted that Constitutionalism is not to be understood primarily as the study and interpretation of a constitutive legal document, but as a reference frame for interdisciplinary research with a particular focus. We elaborated on the challenges of interdisciplinarity in our second editorial. In this year’s editorial we want to refl ect further on the particular focus that comes with a constitutionalist frame of reference.

Editorial: The end of ‘the West’ and the future of global constitutionalism

A century after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and more than 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘Eastern Block’, we may now to be witnessing the collapse of the American Republic and the Western order it created and led after WWII. Whether NATO, the EU and the string of alliances the United States has built across Asia will continue to exist in three or fi ve years is by no means a foregone conclusion, but it has become an open question. 1 2016 was the year that Americans elected the populist authoritarian nationalist Donald J Trump as the forty-fi fth President of the United States and the British voted in favour of ‘Brexit’. The US/British alliance that underwrote the global order after WWII may well remain an alliance: the fi rst foreign leader the new President received was Theresa May, although only after meeting with Nigel Farage, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) leader. However, both they and their erstwhile partners in that alliance are now playing a leading role in the unravelling of the order that they built and supported. Thus, Trump has dismissed the United Nations (UN) as a ‘social club’ and threatened to cut down US contributions, originally characterised NATO as obsolete, and stated that he would be neither surprised nor concerned if the European Union (EU) disintegrated. Furthermore he threatens to upend the global trade order, burying the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership Agreement (TPPA) and ending negotiations surrounding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), threatening the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), at least in his pronouncements, showing no indication to take seriously World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. Meanwhile under

Geschichte als Argument? Republikanisches Geschichtsverständnis im Transnationalen Europa

Die Europaische Union ist eine Rechtsgemeinschaft, deren normatives Fundament die klassischen Prinzipien des aufgeklarten Republikanismus sind: Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Rechtsherrschaft. Politische und rechtliche Konflikte in einem solchen Gemeinwesen sind im wesentlichen Konflikte, die Fragen der Interpretation und Konkretisierung dieser Prinzipien betreffen. Das trifft, trotz des verschiedenen Gewichts und Abstraktionsgrades, gleichermasen auf Diskussionen eines neuen Verfassungsentwurfs, der Artikulation eines politischen Programms, der Diskussion eines spezifischen gesetzgeberischen Losungsvorschlags oder der Losung eines gerichtlichen Disputs zu. Die Frage ist, welche offentliche Rolle Geschichte in einer durch solche Prinzipien konstituierten Rechtsgemeinschaft spielen soll und welche Rolle ihr nicht zuzumuten ist. Gibt es so etwas wie eine republikanische Tugend des Vergessens? Gibt es eine spezifische narrative Struktur, die eine gemeineuropaische Geschichte zwecks Verfeinerung und Erweiterung des offentlichen Vernunftgebrauchs aufweisen sollte? Welche Implikationen ergeben sich aus der spezifischen politischen und rechtlichen Form der Europaischen Union, insbesondere aus dem spezifisch horizontalen Charakter des Europaischen Konstitutionalismus fur die Struktur europaischer Geschichtsschreibung und europaischer Erinnerungskultur?