Megan M. Saylor

Concepts about the capabilities of computers and robots: a test of the scope of adults' theory of mind

We have previously demonstrated that people apply fundamentally different concepts to mechanical agents and human agents, assuming that mechanical agents engage in more location-based, and feature-based behaviors whereas humans engage in more goal-based, and category-based behavior. We also found that attributions about anthropomorphic agents such as robots are very similar to those about computers, unless subjects are asked to attend closely to specific intentional-appearing behaviors. In the present studies, we ask whether subjects initially do not attribute intentionality to robots because they believe that temporary limits in current technology preclude real intelligent behavior. In addition, we ask whether a basic categorization as an artifact affords lessened attributions of intentionality. We find that subjects assume that robots created with future technology may become more intentional, but will not be fully equivalent to humans, and that even a fully human-controlled robot will not be as intentional as a human. These results suggest that subjects strongly distinguish intelligent agents based on intentionality, and that the basic living/mechanical distinction is powerful enough, even in adults, to make it difficult for adults to assent to the possibility that mechanical things can be fully intentional.

Remote control and children's understanding of robots

Children use goal-directed motion to classify agents as living things from early in infancy. In the current study, we asked whether preschoolers are flexible in their application of this criterion by introducing them to robots that engaged in goal-directed motion. In one case the robot appeared to move fully autonomously, and in the other case it was controlled by a remote. We found that 4- and 5-year-olds attributed fewer living thing properties to the robot after seeing it controlled by a remote, suggesting that they are flexible in their application of the goal-directed motion criterion in the face of conflicting evidence of living thing status. Children can flexibly incorporate internal causes for an agents behavior to enrich their understanding of novel agents.

Longitudinal associations among maternal communication and adolescent posttraumatic stress symptoms after cancer diagnosis

The purpose of this study was to prospectively examine adolescent and maternal posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) and maternal communication from time near cancer diagnosis to 12‐month follow‐up to identify potential risk factors for adolescent PTSS.

A transition model for cognitions about agency

Recent research in a range of fields has explored peoples concepts about agency, and this issue is clearly important for understanding the conceptual basis of human-robot interaction. This research takes a wide range of approaches, but no systematic model of reasoning about agency has combined the concepts and processes involved agency-reasoning comprehensively enough to support research exploring issues such as conceptual change in reasoning about agents, and the interaction between concepts about agents and visual attention. Our goal in this paper is to develop a transition model of reasoning about agency that achieves three important goals. First, we aim to specify the different kinds of knowledge that is likely to be accessed when people reason about agents. Second, we specify the circumstances under which these different kinds of knowledge might be accessed and be changed. Finally, we discuss how this knowledge might affect basic psychological processes of attention and memory. Our approach will be to first describe the transition model, then to discuss how it might be applied in two specific domains: computer interfaces that allow a single operator to track multiple robots, and a teachable agent system currently in use assisting primary and middle school students in learning natural science concepts.

The interaction of children's concepts about agents and their ability to use an agent-based tutoring system

Computer-based teachable agents are a promising compliment to classroom instruction. However, little is known about how children think about these artificial agents. In this study, we investigated childrens concepts about the intentionality of a software agent they had interacted with and tested whether these concepts would change in response to exposure to the agent. We also tested whether individual differences in concepts about agent intentionality would affect childrens ability to learn from the agent. After repeated exposure to a teachable agent, students did not make more intentional attributions for the agent than a computer, but a general understanding of agency predicted success in learning from the agent. Understanding basic concepts about agency appears to be an important part of the successful design, implementation, and effectiveness of computer-based learning environments.

Distinguishing defaults and second-line conceptualization in reasoning about humans, robots, and computers

In previous research, we demonstrated that people distinguish between human and nonhuman intelligence by assuming that humans are more likely to engage in intentional goal-directed behaviors than computers or robots. In the present study, we tested whether participants who respond relatively quickly when making predictions about an entity are more or less likely to distinguish between human and nonhuman agents on the dimension of intentionality. Participants responded to a series of five scenarios in which they chose between intentional and nonintentional actions for a human, a computer, and a robot. Results indicated that participants who chose quickly were more likely to distinguish human and nonhuman agents than participants who deliberated more over their responses. We suggest that the short-RT participants were employing a first-line default to distinguish between human intentionality and more mechanical nonhuman behavior, and that the slower, more deliberative participants engaged in deeper second-line reasoning that led them to change their predictions for the behavior of a human agent.

Knowing Others in the First Year of Life

A newborn fixates on the parent’s face. In a matter of weeks, the young baby will smile in response to the parent. Within the first year, most babies will actively redirect their parents’ attention to an object of their own interest, and before parents have time to put the baby pictures away in an album, young toddlers will begin to read their parents’ minds, forging the link between adult mental states and the actions they generate. How do infants move from an initial attraction to other people to an eventual understanding of them? In particular, what predispositions, knowledge, and skills are available to infants in the first year of life to ready them for the development of a theory of mind – that is, an understanding that people are motivated by internal, psychological states? These questions are central among those addressed by Maria Legerstee in her book, Infants’ Sense of People: Precursors to a Theory of Mind. Drawing primarily on a large body of her own research, Legerstee challenges the notion that infants’ initial perception of people is based on behavioral features (such as selfpropelled movement), and argues instead that infants’ earliest understanding of people is based on a conceptual distinction between people and other objects. Infants, in Legerstee’s view, are innately predisposed to both identify and identify with others. Extensive research has demonstrated that, from birth, infants preferentially respond to human faces and voices, distinguishing these social stimuli from other visual and auditory input [faces: e.g., Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; voices: e.g., DeCasper & Fifer, 1980]. Questions do arise, however, with respect to what these early preferences reveal about infants’ understanding of others. Do infants distinguish people from objects on the basis of perceptual features at the start, only later to develop a conceptual distinction between social and nonsocial stimuli? Or are infants born

The Process of Active Word Learning

Language learning is largely a robust process that seems to progress automatically in typically developing children. In the preschool years, some children may also make active, self-directed attempts at learning words that they are curious about. This may involve asking questions about unknown words that they encounter. We propose that asking information-seeking questions about word meanings requires preschoolers to monitor uncertainty, be aware of their lexical ignorance, and be motivated by curiosity. We provide some preliminary data that suggest questions about word meaning emerge during the preschool period, but children are not equally inclined to ask such questions. We also provide evidence that awareness of gaps in one’s lexicon may benefit word learning and that children with larger vocabularies were more likely to ask about unknown words than those with smaller vocabularies.

Introduction: How Children Propel Development

In this chapter, we outline our view of active learning. Active learning involves the ability to identify gaps in one’s knowledge, skills for seeking the missing information and the inclination to do so. We consider the treatment of active learning in the context of both classic and contemporary research on cognitive and language development. The probable relation between active learning and children’s nascent curiosity is also considered.

Betrayal trauma and child symptoms: The role of emotion.

ABSTRACT Both mothers’ and children’s exposures to interpersonal violence—including betrayal traumas—are linked with heightened risk for children developing internalizing and externalizing symptoms. Despite this association, little research has examined additional factors that may explain this risk, such as emotion skills. The current study examined the relationship between mother–child emotion understanding abilities and use of emotion language on a behavioral facial affect perception task and betrayal trauma exposure in relation to child internalizing/externalizing symptoms. The sample included 47 ethnically diverse female guardians (ages 25–51 years old; M age = 37.7) and their children (ages 7–11 years old; M age = 9.1). Results indicated that maternal provision of a spontaneous, unprompted reason for emotions during the facial affect perception task was significantly associated with lower child internalizing/externalizing symptoms when both mothers’ and children’s betrayal trauma histories were controlled. The results suggest that emotion skills (in particular, the way mothers talk about emotions) warrant greater attention in research on the development of child internalizing/externalizing problems.