Meredith W. Watts

Are There Typical Age Curves in Political Behavior? The "Age Invariance" Hypothesis and Political Socialization

The acquisition and expression of political orientations are highly age-related; however, the nature of age-typical forms is rarely conceptualized in socialization research. The first part of this article examines the hypothesized nature of “age invariance” identified by criminologists in the study of deviant behavior and the inverted U-curve of voting behavior identified by political scientists. The second part uses survey data from German youth and young adults (n = 7,280, ages 13 to 30) to describe typical age patterns for various types of unconventional behavior. The more unconventional the behavior, the more the curve resembles what criminologists have long found for deviant behavior. Youth approval of the more disruptive forms of political behavior has a left-skewed age distribution that is also typical of deviant behavior. This suggests an unappealing combination of potential actionism and political ignorance occurring in late adolescence, a possibility that ought to be of consequence for the design of civic education and other interventions. From a research perspective, these age-typical patterns can be useful as a theory-building and theory-testing strategy by treating them as baselines against which individual and cultural variations can be measured.

Aggressive Youth Cultures and Hate Crime: Skinheads and Xenophobic Youth in Germany

Contemporary bias crime in Germany increased dramatically after unification and remained at a relatively high, though fluctuating, level for the decade. Right-wing skinheads and neo-Nazis played a significant role in the violence, but at least one third of the violent incidents came from informal groups of young males who were not affiliated. This represents a shift in anti-Semitic and antiforeigner violence from the 1980s and earlier, when the perpetrators were likely to be older and affiliated with identifiable ideological groups. Contemporary xenophobia is not only linked to aggressive elements of youth culture but appears to be increasingly connected to local and international ideological networks. Electronic media such as the Internet have given both the political and commercial entities of skinhead and right-wing culture a means of support and growth.

VOTING IN AN OPEN PRIMARY

Using data collected from state-wide surveys for the four most recent presidential primaries in Wisconsin, together with data from three other states for 1976 and 1980, this study examines (1) the preponderance of party-consistent, independent, and cross-over voting; (2) the percentages of votes given various candidates from these types of voters; and (3) the probable “winners” in the four Wisconsin primaries under different hypothetical participation rules.

The Wisconsin Open Primary 1968 to 1984

Statewide surveys from the five most recent presidential primaries in Wisconsin are used to examine voting trends of independents and party identifiers in Wisconsin presidential primaries. The primary concerns are (1) the extent and direction of crossover voting, (2) election-specific factors that effect crossover voting, and (3) possible inconsistency between crossover voting and future vote choices.

Are Nativists a Different Kind of Democrat? Democratic Values and “Outsiders” in Japan

This paper combines three elements: a discussion of democratic values and the status of outsiders in Japanese political culture, the development of new measures to examine sensitive issues of nativism and foreigner perception in Japan, and an empirical exploration of the relationship between democratic values and antipathy toward outsiders. Two forms of democratic orientation were investigated in a sample of about 1,000 university students in Japan: a defensive version, which adheres to the formalistic requirements of democracy but is exclusionary and illiberal, and a universalist version that is liberal and tolerant. A defensive orientation is associated with greater chauvinism, a greater sense of threat emanating from foreigners, and a heightened anxiety about economic competition. A universalist orientation is associated with low perceived threat and low chauvinism, a lack of fear of economic competition, and a positive view of the cultural contributions of outsiders. Nativism may indeed be compatible with democratic values, but only with the defensive, exclusionary form. In short, the defensive form is democracy for xenophobes. Such an orientation is not unique to Japan, but is likely to be found in developing democracies as well as in advanced democracies that feel threatened.

Orientations toward Conventional and Unconventional Participation among West German Youth

The transmission-reproduction perspective emphasizes the learning of political orientation through hierarchical (usually institutional and conventional) processes. A voluntaristic perspective calls attention to the individuals ability to choose reference groups and modes of participation (often unconventional and noninstitutional) and has the empirical advantage in focusing on pluralistic influences in politicization. This analysis employs a large combined data base on West German youth (n = 2,500-3,000) that allows logit analysis of the internal differentiation by age, sex, and education in their orientations toward such pluralistic reference groups and political tactics. There are differences among young males and females that appear to be both developmental (related to age and sex) and situational (related to education). Younger, less educated males (15-17 years of age) are the most conservative of all age or sex groups. Older male youth show a stronger orientation toward conventional electoral participation than do females (who remain more unconventional), though by their 20s the males lag behind the females, whose progressive (left-liberal) advantage is less than for their younger counterparts. Overall young males show signs of a trend from conservatism to actionism to conventionalism, while females show a consistent progressive and unconventional advantage in all age groups. A concluding section reflects on the possible meaning of these findings for contemporary political styles among German youth.