Merryn D. Constable

Grasping the concept of personal property

The concept of property is integral to personal and societal development, yet understanding of the cognitive basis of ownership is limited. Objects are the most basic form of property, so our physical interactions with owned objects may elucidate nuanced aspects of ownership. We gave participants a coffee mug to decorate, use and keep. The experimenter also designed a mug of her own. In Experiment 1, participants performed natural lifting actions with each mug. Participants lifted the Experimenters mug with greater care, and moved it slightly more towards the Experimenter, while they lifted their own mug more forcefully and drew it closer to their own body. In Experiment 2, participants responded to stimuli presented on the mug handles in a computer-based stimulus-response compatibility task. Overall, participants were faster to respond in trials in which the handles were facing in the same direction as the response location compared to when the handles were facing away. The compatibility effect was abolished, however, for the Experimenters mug--as if the action system is blind to the potential for action towards another persons property. These findings demonstrate that knowledge of the ownership status of objects influences visuomotor processing in subtle and revealing ways.

Object ownership and action: The influence of social context and choice on the physical manipulation of personal property

Abstract Understanding who owns what is important for guiding appropriate action in a social context. Previously, we demonstrated that ownership influences our kinematic patterns associated with hand–object interactions (Constable et al. in Cognition 119(3):430–437, 2011). Here, we present a series of experiments aimed at determining the underlying mechanisms associated with this effect. We asked participants to lift mugs that differed in terms of ownership status (Experiments 1 and 2) and personal preference (Experiment 3) while recording spatial and acceleration measures. In Experiment 1, participants lifted their own mug with greater acceleration and drew it closer to themselves than they did the experimenter’s mug. They also lifted the experimenter’s mug further to the right compared with other mugs. In Experiment 2, spatial trajectory effects were preserved, but the acceleration effect abolished, when the owner of the ‘other-owned’ mug was a known—but absent—confederate. Experiment 3 demonstrated that merely choosing to use a mug was not sufficient to elicit rightward drift or acceleration effects. We suggest that these findings reflect separate and distinct mechanisms associated with socially related visuomotor processing.

Do you see what I see? Co-actor posture modulates visual processing in joint tasks

ABSTRACT Interacting with other people is a ubiquitous part of daily life. A complex set of processes enable our successful interactions with others. The present research was conducted to investigate how the processing of visual stimuli may be affected by the presence and the hand posture of a co-actor. Experiments conducted with participants acting alone have revealed that the distance from the stimulus to the hand of a participant can alter visual processing. In the main experiment of the present paper, we asked whether this posture-related source of visual bias persists when participants share the task with another person. The effect of personal and co-actor hand-proximity on visual processing was assessed through object-specific benefits to visual recognition in a task performed by two co-actors. Pairs of participants completed a joint visual recognition task and, across different blocks of trials, the position of their own hands and of their partners hands varied relative to the stimuli. In contrast to control studies conducted with participants acting alone, an object-specific recognition benefit was found across all hand location conditions. These data suggest that visual processing is, in some cases, sensitive to the posture of a co-actor.

The modulation of motor contagion by intrapersonal sensorimotor experience.

Sensorimotor experiences can modify the internal models for action. These modifications can govern the discrepancies between predicted and actual sensory consequences, such as distinguishing self- and other-generated actions. This distinction may also contribute toward the inhibition of movement interference, which is strongly associated with the coupling of observed and executed actions. Therefore, movement interference could be mediated by the sensorimotor experiences underlying the self-other distinction. The present study examined the impact of sensorimotor experiences on involuntary movement interference (motor contagion). Participants were required to complete a motor contagion paradigm in which they executed horizontal arm movements while observing congruent (horizontal) or incongruent (vertical) arm movements of a model. This task was completed before and after a training protocol in which participants executed the same horizontal arm movements in the absence of the model stimuli. Different groups of participants trained with or without vision of their moving limb. Analysis of participants who were predisposed to motor contagion (involuntary movement interference during the observation of incongruent movements) revealed that the no vision group continued to demonstrate contagion at post-training, although the vision group did not. We propose that the vision group were able to integrate the visual afferent information with an internal model for action, which effectively refines the ability to match self-produced afferent and efferent sources of information during response-execution. This enhanced matching allows for a better distinction between self and other, which in turn, mediates the inhibition of motor contagion.

I before U: Temporal order judgements reveal bias for self-owned objects:

A multitude of studies demonstrate that self-relevant stimuli influence attention. Self-owned objects are a special class of self-relevant stimuli. If a self-owned object can indeed be characterised as a self-relevant stimulus then, consistent with theoretical predictions, a behavioural effect of ownership on attention should be present. To test this prediction, a task was selected that is known to be particularly sensitive measure of the prioritisation of visual information: the temporal order judgement. Participants completed temporal order judgements with pictures of “own” and “experimenter” owned objects (mugs) presented on either side of a central fixation cross. There was a variable onset delay between each picture, ranging between 0 ms and 105 ms, and participants were asked to indicate which mug appeared first. The results indicated a reliable change in the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) in favour of their own mug. Such a change in the PSS was not observed for two groups of participants who were exposed to a mug but did not keep the mug. A further experiment indicated that the source of the bias in PSS was more consistent with a criterion shift or top-down attentional prioritisation rather than a perceptual bias. These findings suggest that ownership, beyond mere-touch, mere-choice, or familiarity, leads to prioritised processing and responses, but the mechanism underlying the effect is not likely to be perceptual in nature.

Ownership Status Influences the Degree of Joint Facilitatory Behavior

When engaging in joint activities, humans tend to sacrifice some of their own sensorimotor comfort and efficiency to facilitate a partner’s performance. In the two experiments reported here, we investigated whether ownership—a socioculturally based nonphysical feature ascribed to objects—influenced facilitatory motor behavior in joint action. Participants passed mugs that differed in ownership status across a table to a partner. We found that participants oriented handles less toward their partners when passing their own mugs than when passing mugs owned by their partners (Experiment 1) and mugs owned by the experimenter (Experiment 2). These findings indicate that individuals plan and execute actions that assist their partners but do so to a smaller degree if it is the individuals’ own property that the partners intend to manipulate. We discuss these findings in terms of underlying variables associated with ownership and conclude that a self-other distinction can be found in the human sensorimotor system.

The influence of intrapersonal sensorimotor experiences on the corticospinal responses during action–observation

ABSTRACT The coupling of perception and action has been strongly indicated by evidence that the observation of an action primes a response in the observer. It has been proposed that these primed responses may be inhibited when the observer is able to more closely distinguish between self- and other-generated actions – the greater the distinction, then the greater the inhibition of the primed response. This self–other distinction is shown to be enhanced following a period of visual feedback of self-generated action. The present study was designed to examine how sensorimotor experiences pertaining to self-generated action affect primed responses from observed actions. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was used to investigate corticospinal activity elicited during the observation of index- and little-finger actions before and after training (self-generated action). For sensorimotor training, participants executed finger movements with or without visual feedback of their own movement. Results showed that the increases in muscle-specific corticospinal activity elicited from action–observation persisted after training without visual feedback, but did not emerge following training with visual feedback. This inhibition in corticospinal activity during action–observation following training with vision could have resulted from the refining of internal models of self-generated action, which then led to a greater distinction between “self” and “other” actions.

Eye movements may cause motor contagion effects

When a person executes a movement, the movement is more errorful while observing another person’s actions that are incongruent rather than congruent with the executed action. This effect is known as “motor contagion”. Accounts of this effect are often grounded in simulation mechanisms: increased movement error emerges because the motor codes associated with observed actions compete with motor codes of the goal action. It is also possible, however, that the increased movement error is linked to eye movements that are executed simultaneously with the hand movement because oculomotor and manual-motor systems are highly interconnected. In the present study, participants performed a motor contagion task in which they executed horizontal arm movements while observing a model making either vertical (incongruent) or horizontal (congruent) movements under three conditions: no instruction, maintain central fixation, or track the model’s hand with the eyes. A significant motor contagion-like effect was only found in the ‘track’ condition. Thus, ‘motor contagion’ in the present task may be an artifact of simultaneously executed incongruent eye movements. These data are discussed in the context of stimulation and associative learning theories, and raise eye movements as a critical methodological consideration for future work on motor contagion.

Right away: A late, right-lateralized category effect complements an early, left-lateralized category effect in visual search

According to the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, learned semantic categories can influence early perceptual processes. A central finding in support of this view is the lateralized category effect—namely, the finding that categorically different colors (e.g., blue and green hues) can be discriminated faster than colors within the same color category (e.g., different hues of green), especially when they are presented in the right visual field. Because the right visual field projects to the left hemisphere, this finding has been popularly couched in terms of the left-lateralization of language. However, other studies have reported bilateral category effects, which has led some researchers to question the linguistic origins of the effect. Here we examined the time course of lateralized and bilateral category effects in the classical visual search paradigm by means of eyetracking and RT distribution analyses. Our results show a bilateral category effect in the manual responses, which is combined of an early, left-lateralized category effect and a later, right-lateralized category effect. The newly discovered late, right-lateralized category effect occurred only when observers had difficulty locating the target, indicating a specialization of the right hemisphere to find categorically different targets after an initial error. The finding that early and late stages of visual search show different lateralized category effects can explain a wide range of previously discrepant findings.

“Two Minds Don’t Blink Alike”: The Attentional Blink Does Not Occur in a Joint Context

Typically, when two individuals perform a task together, each partner monitors the other partners’ responses and goals to ensure that the task is completed efficiently. This monitoring is thought to involve a co-representation of the joint goals and task, as well as a simulation of the partners’ performance. Evidence for such “co-representation” of goals and task, and “simulation” of responses has come from numerous visual attention studies in which two participants complete different components of the same task. In the present research, an adaptation of the attentional blink task was used to determine if co-representation could exert an influence over the associated attentional mechanisms. Participants completed a rapid serial visual presentation task in which they first identified a target letter (T1) and then detected the presence of the letter X (T2) presented one to seven letters after T1. In the individual condition, the participant identified T1 and then detected T2. In the joint condition, one participant identified T1 and the other participant detected T2. Across two experiments, an attentional blink (decreased accuracy in detecting T2 when presented three letters after T1) was observed in the individual condition, but not in joint conditions. A joint attentional blink may not emerge because the co-representation mechanisms that enable joint action exert a stronger influence at information processing stages that do not overlap with those that lead to the attentional blink.