Michael A. Genovese

George W. Bush and Presidential Leadership: the Un-Hidden Hand Presidency of George W. Bush

It is often said that “9/11 changed everything!” and indeed a variety of significant changes did occur in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States. One of the many things that changed was the scope of presidential power. The power of a president at any given time is determined by a variety of factors. These include his political skill, sense of power, knowledge and creativity, ability to communicate, persuade and bully, build coalitions, present a compelling vision, work with Congress, move the machinery of government, manage the administrative elements of the office, the nature of the political opposition, and demands of the public for change. But perhaps the most important factor in determining a president’s power is political opportunity, the conditions or circumstances of the times. In routine times the president is constrained, and in crises or emergency situations a president’s power is enlarged.

Thomas Jefferson and the Vision of Democratic Leadership

Is there a form of leadership which is compatible with the demands of strong democracy? While there is a natural and inevitable tension which exists between leadership and democracy, there are ways to develop a style of leadership which conforms to the requirements of robust democracy. Thomas Jefferson pointed the way with his view of democratic leadership, and this article attempts to highlight that view in hopes of reviving the debate on the dilemma of democratic leadership.

The Presidency and Styles of Economic Management

In the past fifty years, the executive branch has become the central–though not exclusive–source of governmental economic policymaking in the United States. This article examines the styles, both institutional and individual, of economic management of modern presidents. Institutionally, I explore different administrative styles, ranging from one-on-one and small groups to large group participation. Individually, I consider the different philosophical or ideological approaches (Enterpriser and Statist), along with the strategic approach (Traditionalist and Innovator) of presidents. After reviewing how each modern president sought to manage economic policymaking along institutional and individual lines, the analysis reviews the potential costs and benefits of each approach or style, and suggests different patterns which have emerged over time. The central pattern of the post World War II period has been for presidential administrations to evolve into a variation of the Troika/Quadriad system of economic adv...

Prescriptions for Protecting the Constitutional Design for War

The national security challenges in the age of terrorism do not compel constitutional change. On the contrary, what is required is governmental adherence to those provisions that govern war and peace and national security. In Federalist No. 51, James Madison observed that the great challenge confronting America in 1787 was obliging the government to obey the Constitution. That remains the great challenge in our time. Presidents must stop aggrandizing the war power, and Congress must reassert its constitutional authority in the area of war, foreign affairs, and national security. The resurgence of Congress, engagement in vigorous discussion and debate, may well depend upon an aroused citizenry—one committed to the virtues and values of American Constitutionalism and the rule of law, one willing to hold government accountable for the performance of its constitutional responsibilities.

The Relevance of the War Clause and the Rule of Law in Our Time

The constitutional grant to Congress—not to the president—of authority to initiate war on behalf of the American people remains adequate to our national security needs in the age of terrorism. The argument for further concentration of power in the president ignores the practice of presidential usurpation of the war power, which has become commonplace, and rests on mistaken assumptions of executive perception, judgment, expertise, and the need for immediate military actions. It ignores as well the fact that unilateral presidential decision-making has resulted in tragic wars. The constitutional arrangement on matters of war and peace rightly exalts congressional discussion and debate—collective decision-making—over the judgment of a single person before the nation is plunged into war.

War and American Democracy

The beginning of the book sets the background for the discussion and debate that follows. The book opens with the new challenges posed by a post-9/11 world in which terrorism is the new enemy. We look at an old problem—the war power—in light of new circumstances—terrorism. To draw insights into the contemporary controversy, we look back at the Framers of the American system and what they sought to do at the Constitutional Convention to “tame the dogs of war.” This led to the Framers giving to Congress, not the president, the sole authority to authorize or declare war. We explore the debates and decisions made by the Framers, discuss the ratification debate, and how the assertion of the war power has changed over time.

Prescriptions for a New Age

Here, Michael Genovese presents his agenda to reform the war powers in light of the new demands of a new age. He calls for slightly more presidential authority, and a different form of accountability for the president’s decisions on war. Arguing that the eighteenth-century Constitution is not well suited for a twenty-first-century superpower facing the threat of terrorism, Genovese calls for a more muscular presidency, but one still enchained by congressional accountability.

The Institutional Effects of Executive Scandals.

In The Institutional Effects of Executive Scandals, Brandon Rottinghaus, one of the political science discipline’s top rising presidency scholars, has applied his considerable talents to a much studied, yet narrowly examined, area of executive politics: scandal. Scandals have been studied by many scholars, and are recognized as an important subfield, but most of the studies to date have been of individual cases of corruption and/or scandal. Scholars have written some excellent works on the presidencies of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and others, yet we have little in the way of systemic studies of scandals. Professor Rottinghaus sets out to correct that shortcoming and produces a systemic, thorough study of executive scandals at the national and state levels. He begins by noting that “scandals are more than just trivial decisions by occasionally immoral individuals or humorous fodder for the news. Scandals can have important impacts on the political system, trust in government, investigations by the legal system, and the ability of government to function properly” (1). With these concerns in mind, Professor Rottinghaus sets out to get to the root of scandals and their impact—not just on the individuals involved, but on the political system as a whole. By exploring both national and state executives, the author enlarges the “N,” uncovers some interesting differences between how presidents and governors respond to scandal, and demonstrates how other actors in the system deal with accusations of wrongdoing and scandals. Professor Rottinghaus is sensitive to these differences and offers a nuanced study that, although uncovering no blockbuster findings, provides valuable insights into scandals and their impact on the actors and the system. Surprisingly, the author finds that “most national chief executive scandals end quickly” (73). We quite understandably focus on the headlinegrabbing scandals such as Watergate or the Iran-Contra scandal, but they are the exceptions—not the rule. Rottinghaus further notes that “The effect of scandal is not uniform; nor is it altogether damaging” (137). Although counterintuitive, this finding is well supported in the book. Professor Rottinghaus focuses on the four key types of executive scandals: financial (the most common scandal, at 41%), political (33%), personal (17%), and international (9%). He finds that the administrations with the most

Introduction: Remembering Watergate

Watergate destroyed the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. Entailing far more than the cover-up of the botched burglary of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) offices on June 17, 1972, it was the generic name that encompassed all the serious crimes and misdemeanors of the Nixon White House. From early 1973 until Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974, to avoid almost certain impeachment, the nation was shocked by the steady stream of revelations about the misconduct of the president and his men. Time magazine called Watergate “America’s most traumatic political experience of this century.” Looking to declare an end to this sad episode in the nation’s history, Gerald Ford offered this assurance on the day he took office as Nixon’s successor: “My fellow Americans, our long national nightmare is over.”1

Vietnam, Watergate, and the War Power: Presidential Aggrandizement and Congressional Abdication

The crisis of Watergate was both spawned and worsened by America’s involvement in the war in Vietnam. Many of the early illegal actions by the Nixon administration rose from fear that opposition to the war would undermine Nixon’s efforts to build a new “grand design” in foreign affairs, and once the Watergate crisis became a national scandal, the backlash from the war further deteriorated Nixon’s then fragile political position. Further, opposition to the war led to a clash between the president and Congress over the war powers, eventually leading to the passage of the War Powers Act in 1973 over President Nixon’s veto. While initially it appeared that Nixon’s bold claims of plenary presidential war-powers was discredited, it was not long before Nixon’s sweeping assertions of presidential power in foreign affairs and war would be revived, leading to a reemergence of an imperial presidency.1