Thomas E. Cronin

An Item Veto for the President

In their efforts to reduce federal deficits, national political leaders sometimes have embraced bold constitutional and statutory “reform” measures. President Reagan, for example, has campaigned for a constitutional amendment to permit the President to veto subsections contained within appropriations bills. This article describes the history and assesses the advantages and disadvantages of this proposed item veto. By pointing out potentially undesirable consequences of the item veto, we note that unintended side-effects may weaken Congress and provide more power than an effective president needs, and more power than an imperial president should ever have. We conclude the item veto is overrated and its effects not well understood. It would not greatly reduce deficits and it would disrupt the existing system of checks and balances. More important, it is an example of escapism from the basic tasks of statecraft and political decisionmaking that should be center stage in the legislative and executive branches.