Michael Brecher

A framework for research on foreign policy behavior

The study of foreign policy is underdeveloped ; its theoretical content is inadequate ; and analysis for the most part lacks rigor. Some preparatory work has been done. State behavior is no longer seen exclusively as a reaction to external stimuli; internal pressures, too, are now widely recognized as affecting foreign policy decisions. Yet, as James Rosenau has cogently observed, &dquo;to identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not

Toward a Theory of International Crisis BehaviorA Preliminary Report

A redefinition of crisis is offered which departs from the conventional view, notably in the emphasis on finite time instead of short time and in the addition of perceived “high probability of war.” A concept of intrawar crisis is introduced. Preliminary results of mapping crises from 1939 to 1975 are indicated, along with the selection procedures for 30 cases to be analyzed in depth (“vertical” research). Three boundary-free typologies are explicated: dimensions of crisis, attributes of crisis actor, and characteristics of crisis decisional unit. Building upon an earlier research framework, a model of crisis behavior and choice is specified, along with the methods to be utilized to produce comparable findings about 22 research questions focusing on threat, time, and probability of war. “Horizontal” research across the 450 cases will seek to discover meaningful patterns in the crisis behavior of states.

Crises in World Politics

In examining patterns in international crises, the authors offer one path to a cocerted attack on a central phenomenon in world politics. After surveying the releva literature, including competing definitions, they set forth a conceptual map of int national crisis variables: actor attributes (age, territory, regime, capability, values system characteristics (size, geography, structure, alliance configuration, stability); a the crisis dimensions they wish to explain (trigger, actor behavior, superpower activity, and the role of international organizations—that is, crisis management, of come, and consequences). From this taxonomy they have developed a research frar work on international crisis, and, as an illustration of more narrow explanatory devie a crisis management-outcome model. Three clusters of hypotheses on the substar and form of crisis outcomes, and the duration of crises, are then tested against I evidence from 185 cases for the period from 1945 to 1962. The ultimate aim is illuminate international crises over a 50-year period, 1930–1980, across all continer cultures, and political and economic systems in the contemporary era.

International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia

Asian studies have long since ventured beyond the traditional limits of Orientalia to embrace history and the social sciences; they have not as yet, however, applied the insights of international relations to an area framework. Similarly, international relations specialists have all but ignored the relevance of their discipline to Asia. The purpose of this article is to help bridge the serious gap between these two fields.

International Crises, 1945–1975: The UN Dimension

This study focuses on the record of UN involvement in international crises during the 1945–1975 period. It is guided by two general research questions: (1) what is the relationship between the attributes of international crises and the extent, substance, substance, and effectiveness of UN activity; and (2) under what conditions is UN intervention in international crises likely to lead to favorable outcomes. Data on 160 crises are drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Project data set. In general, we find that while the UN intervened in only 59% of all crises, its rate of intervention in serious crises (crises with violent triggers, grave threat, violent crisis management techniques, and large numbers of participants) was considerably higher. The UN was most effective in crisis abatement in crises involving full scale war. Crises with UN intervention were more likely than others to terminate in some form of agreement among the parties.

Patterns of Crisis Management

This study focuses on the management of international crises from 1945 to 1979, with an emphasis on cases in the Arab-Israel conflict. A Protracted Conflict-Crisis Model is presented and tested. The findings indicate that Arab-Israel crises are distinctive, but not because of the their geographic location. Instead, as predicted by the model, patterns of crisis management appear to depend on whether or not a crisis occurs within a protracted conflict. This discovery suggests that the profile of an international crisis, notably the extent of violent behavior and superpower activity, can be anticipated more reliably in terms of the concept of protracted conflict.

State Behavior in International Crisis: A Model

This article presents a stress-coping-choice model of state behavior in international crisis. Competing definitions of crisis are first examined, with special reference to the differences between the Hermann and ICB definitions. Thereafter the model is specified-notably the independent variable, stress induced by perceptions of value threat, time pressure, and the probability of war-and the dependent variable, choice. The central research question is the effects of changing crisis-induced stress on coping and on choice. A multifaceted methodology is delineated. I he model is then applied to the behavior of one state in two international crises, Israel in 1967 and 1973. A set of 23 hypotheses drawn from empirical studies of the 1914, Korean War, and Cuban Missile crises is assessed with the findings from these Middle East cases. More than two-thirds are supported, suggesting the possible existence of common attributes in international crisis behavior, relating to information processing, consultation patterns, decisional forums, and the consideration of alternatives. Finally, new propositions about coping by decision makers of states under conditions of escalating and deescalating stress are generated from the findings indicated in this inquiry.

Stability and Polarity: New Paths for Inquiry

One of the most intractable debates in the field of world politics concerns the linkage of systemic polarity to international stability. Despite many theoretical expositions and limited testing, disagreement persists over which type of structure and distribution of power is most stable. The dialogue on polarity and stability has focused on the relative merits of bipolar and multipolar structures; in other words, which configuration of power centers is more stable, two or more than that number? Advocates of each system have their adherents and, for some time now, have agreed to disagree. Most of the debate on polarity and stability thus far has been cast in terms that do not facilitate its resolution. The objective of this paper is to reformulate the debate, in order to facilitate a more compelling empirical judgment of the competing claims. More specifically, this involves revision of the central concepts. Polarity, it will be asserted, cannot be assessed only in terms of distribution of power. The concept also should incorporate the notion of autonomous decision centers. With respect to instability, war is held to be a less comprehensive measurement than international crisis. It is recommended that renewed testing should focus on the linkage of polarity to stability as so defined.

Polarity and stability: New concepts, indicators and evidence

One of the most sustained debates among students of international politics concerns the linkage of systemic polarity to levels of stability. The present investigation attempts to contribute to this dialogue in two ways. First, prior studies of polarity and stability are reappraised in terms of the central concepts and presumed causal linkage, leading to several changes in approach. Specifically, polarity cannot be assessed only in terms of the distribution of power; the concept also should incorporate the notion of autonomous decision centers. With respect to instability, war is considered to be a less complete indicator than international crisis. Incorporating these revised concepts, a model of security regimes is devised deductively, including a rank‐ordering of polarity configurations in terms of stability levels. Second, renewed testing focuses on the presumed ordering of configurations from most to least stable: bipolarity (1945–62), multipolarity (1929–39) and polycentrism (1963–85). Data from the I...

India's devaluation of 1966: linkage politics and crisis decision-making *

Among Indias foreign policy crises since independence the most intense were in the military-security issue-area. Some, like the concentration of Indian and Pakistani forces on the Kashmir and Punjab borders in July 1951, de-escalated without war. Others, like the disputed claims over the Rann of Kutch in the early months of 1965, led to limited military hostilities followed by stalemate. Still others culminated in war with Indias principal neighbours - with Pakistan in 1947–9, 1965 and 1971, and with China in 1962. All of these conform to the definition of a crisis along the peace-war continuum: