Michael C. Desch

Civilian control of the military : the changing security environment

The end of the Cold War brought widespread optimism about the future of civil-military relations. With a declining need for military preparedness, it seemed, civilian authorities would be better able to exert control over military policies and decision making. But, argues Michael Desch in this volume, the truth is precisely the opposite. In war-time, he explains, civil authorities cannot help paying close attention to military matters. In times of peace, however, the civilian sector is less interested in military affairs - and therefore leaves them to the military. Focusing on a range of times and places, Desch begins with a look at changes in US civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. He then turns to the former Soviet Union, explaining why it was easier for civilians to control the Soviet military than its present-day Russian successor. He examines the Hindenburg-Ludendorff dictatorship in World War I Germany, Japan during the interwar era, and the French role in the Algerian crisis. Finally, he explores the changing domestic security environment and civil-military relations in southern Latin America.

War and strong states, peace and weak states?

For most of the twentieth century, international politics were dominated by World Wars I and II and by the cold war. This period of intense international security competition clearly strengthened states, increasing their scope and cohesion. However, the end of the cold war may represent a “threat trough”—a period of significantly reduced international security competition. If so, the scope and cohesion of many states may likewise change. Although this change will not be so great as to end the state or the states system, the state as we know it surely will change. Some states will disintegrate, many will cease growing in scope and may even shrink a little, and few will remain unaffected.

Grand strategies in war and peace

Examines how the US, the Soviet Union and various European powers have developed their grand Strategies - how they have integrated their political, economic and military goals in order to preserve their long-term interests in times of war and peace.

America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy

Why has the United States, with its long-standing Liberal tradition, come to embrace the illiberal policies it has in recent years? The conventional wisdom is that al-Qaidas attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terrorism have made America less Liberal. The logic of this argument is straightforward: interstate war has historically undermined domestic liberties, and the war on terrorism is causing the United States to follow this well-worn path. This explanation confronts a puzzle, however: illiberal U.S. policiesincluding the pursuit of global hegemony, launching of a preventive war, imposition of restrictions on civil liberties in the name of national security, and support for torture under certain circumstancesmanifested themselves even before the September 11 terrorist attacks and were embraced across the political spectrum. Indeed, it is precisely American Liberalism that makes the United States so illiberal today. Under certain circumstances, Liberalism itself impels Americans to spread their values around the world and leads them to see the war on terrorism as a particularly deadly type of conflict that can be won only by employing illiberal tactics.

The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery

I I n the late 1980s the United States is again debating how it can best ensure its security in a world of competing nation-states. Scholars and policy-makers call for a broad reassessment of which areas of the world are crucial to the United States and which are not. In addition, many argue that U.S. overseas commitments must now be reconciled with shrinking national resources, and perhaps with a new international order in which great power status will be determined less by military force than by economic and technological prowess. Finally, domestic concern about the non-military elements of governmental responsibility is increasing. But because these debates are not new, it is appropriate to consider them in their larger theoretical and historical contexts. I do that by addressing one crucial question: How should great powers determine their strategic interests? This is one of the key debates falling under the more general rubric of grand strategy.’ In the broadest sense, a grand strategy is the means by

Soldiers in Cities: Military Operations on Urban Terrain

Abstract : In the past half-century, the classic military conflict of armies maneuvering in the field has been replaced by conflicts that center on, rather than avoid, heavily populated areas. Modern military conflict more frequently is not just a fight to control villages or cities,but a variation on the timeless wish to control populations and the hearts of nations. The hardware and mass orientation of the levee en masse and industrial-age armies is being replaced by sophisticated terrorists, information warfare, and the politics of mass persuasion. These are reshaping the face of warfare. This book focuses on identifying the lessons of previous military operations--from combat to humanitarian operations--which will be useful to the U.S. military in the future in conducting operations in urban areas abroad and at home.

Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies

Michael Desch’s survey and critique of the new cultural literature in security studies is a welcome addition to the debate about the potential contributions of this research program to the problem of explaining state behavior in the realm of international relations.1 At a minimum, his article should prompt culturalists to make greater efforts to deane their terms as well as to clarify what they have in common and how their individual approaches differ. Nevertheless, Desch’s analysis is marred by six oaws that undermine his contention that “the best case that can be made for these new cultural theories is that they are sometimes useful as a supplement to realist theories” (p. 142). First, Desch mischaracterizes the issues at stake in the debate between realism and culturalism. He repeatedly describes the crucial question as “whether these new theories merely supplement realist theories or actually threaten to supplant them” (pp. 141, pp. 143, 144). This dichotomous characterization, however, needlessly oversimpliaes and distorts the debate, because one can easily imagine a variety of other possible relationships between culturalism and realism. One equally plausible alternative is that neither approach is in any sense superior, but that both may be indispensable to any fully satisfactory understanding of security affairs. Second, Desch employs a double standard in assessing the relative merits of cultural and realist approaches, one that necessarily skews the outcome in favor of realism. He argues that “to make the case that cultural theories should supplant realist theories, the new culturalists would have to demonstrate that their theories outperform realist theories in ‘hard cases’ for cultural theories” (p. 144). If we are to have conadence in

The Myth of Abandonment: The Use and Abuse of the Holocaust Analogy

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.

Democracy and Victory: Fair Fights or Food Fights?

Ajin Choi, David Lake, and Dan Reiter and Allan Stam have each provided useful rejoinders to the critique of democratic triumphalism in my recent article “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters.”1 In response, I begin by summarizing our arguments and pointing out several issues where we have little or no disagreement. I then examine our two major areas of contention: how best to test whether democracy matters much in explaining military outcomes, and whether the democratic triumphalists’ proposed mechanisms convincingly explain why democracies frequently appear to win their wars.

The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Liberal Tradition and Obama's Counterterrorism Policy

Barack Obama campaigned on a platform of “Change We Can Believe In.” One of the biggest changes many anticipated with his election was a dramatic break with the previous administrations counterterror policy. There were good reasons for thinking that this would be the case. George W. Bush was a Republican who took his cues from the most conservative elements of his party, including neoconservatives, the religious right, and other proponents of an assertive stance of U.S. global primacy and a forward-leaning posture in the war on terror. Conversely, Barack Obama is a liberal Democrat who opposed the Iraq War and seeks to “reset” Americas relations with other countries around the world by recommitting the United States to a more moderate approach to waging the war against al-Qaeda, including measures such as adopting a more multilateral foreign policy, closing the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, ending the practices of extraordinary rendition and enhanced interrogation, and showing a greater respect for civil liberties domestically.